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ESSAYS ON INFORMATION ECONOMICS
Ling Yang, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2016
This dissertation comprises three essays on information economics. I study the role of infor-
mation in various decision making environments.
In the first chapter, I propose an alternative way to study the value of information in a
game. A decision problem is similar to another if the optimal decision rule for the latter,
when applied to the former, is better than making a decision without any information in the
former. In a game, if the induced decision problem by a change in the strategies of other
players is similar to the problem originally faced by the player, the player benefits more from
her own information after the change. Using the concept of similarity, I study the value of
information in various games, even when a closed form solution is unavailable.
The second chapter studies a persuasion game between a decision maker (DM) and an
expert. Prior to the communication stage, the expert exerts costly effort to obtain decisive
information about the state of nature. The expert may feign ignorance but cannot misre-
port. We show that monitoring of information acquisition hampers the expert’s incentives
to acquire information. Contrary to everyday experiences, monitoring is always suboptimal
if the expert’s bias is large, yet sometimes optimal if the expert’s bias is small.
The third chapter studies a model in which partisan voting is rationalized by Knightian
decision theory under uncertainty (Bewley, 2002). When uncertainty is large, some voters
become hard-core supporters of their current party due to status quo bias. I characterize
equilibria of the model that are robust to electorate size. With costly information acquisition,
partisan behaviors arise naturally from status quo biases in large elections. In the selected
informative voting equilibrium, swing voters rationally mix between two alternatives: either
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they acquire information and vote informatively or they do not acquire information and vote
to cancel the partisans’ votes.
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1.0 SIMILARITY AND VALUE OF INFORMATION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Good information enables good decisions. Blackwell’s order formalizes this intuition, and
ranks different information structures for a decision maker. However, the value of information
in a game depends not only on how one plays the game according to his information, but
also on how the others play the game. In this paper, we study the value of information
in games. Our approach is to view the best-responding problem in games as an individual
decision problem. In an individual decision problem, the value of information is how much
the decision maker can gain by making an optimal decision based on the information. We
introduce a concept called similarity, and show that the concept of similarity is closely related
to the value of information in individual decision problems. We then apply the notion of
similarity to games. We study the complementarity and substitutability of information in
quadratic games with information structures that are not studied in the literature. Moreover,
we investigate the value of information in a global game and a multi-expert persuasion game.
Most of the studies that explore the value of information in games focus on tractable
but specific models, e.g., a normal-quadratic setting. This approach provides interesting and
powerful insights in many economic environments, but the need to solve the model and to
arrive at an explicit solution severely limits our ability to prove general results and casts
doubt on the applicability of our insights to general environments. In this paper, we view
the best-responding problem in games as an individual decision problem, and therefore the
comparison of the value of information in different equilibria as a comparison of different
payoff functions for a particular information structure.
In a game, we can define an interim payoff function based on the strategies of other
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players. When other players change their strategies, a new interim payoff function can be
defined. Therefore, a change in the value of one’s information induced by the changes in the
other players’ strategies can be viewed as a change in the value of own information induced
by the changes in the interim payoff function. For a particular information structure, we can
determine how the changes in the strategies of other players change the value of information
in that game, if we have an ordering on the interim payoff functions.
In order to find such an ordering, we develop a partial order on payoff functions for
a fixed information structure in an individual decision-making environment. Consider two
decision problems with different payoff functions but the same information structure. In one
decision problem, if the use of the optimal decision rule of another problem is better than
knowing nothing, we say that the former is similar to the latter. The implication of a similar
relation between these two decision problems is that the value of information in a grand
problem that combines the two is certainly higher than that in the former (Proposition 1.2).
Moreover, when the default actions are the same in these two decision problems, if one of
these two problems is not similar to the grand problem, then the value of information in the
grand problem is lower than that in the other (Proposition 1.3).
Using these two results, we explore games with payoff externality and apply the concept
of similarity to study a change in value of information caused by the change of the other
players’ strategies. We define an original decision problem based on the interim payoff
function before the change in the strategies of other players, and a new decision problem
after the change. We then construct a marginal decision problem based on the difference
between the interim payoff functions after and before the change of the strategies of other
players. If the marginal decision problem is similar to the original problem, then the change
in strategies of other players increases the value of information for the player, according to
Proposition 1.2. If the marginal decision problem is not similar to the new problem and
the default actions are the same in the original problem and the marginal problem, then
the change in strategies of other players reduces the value of information for the player,
according to Proposition 1.3.
We apply such a construction to quadratic games, a global game, and a multi-expert
persuasion game. We find conditions under which a player’s benefit from having information
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about the state of the world is higher in one equilibrium than in another. The condition
is the similarity of the problem induced by the change in other players’ strategies from one
equilibrium to another equilibrium to the problem induced by one of the two equilibria. In
quadratic games, we find conditions on information structures under which we are able to
draw an unambiguous comparison. We first establish results for affine information structure,
which is assumed in most of the papers that study quadratic games. We find that complemen-
tarity in actions translates into complementarity in information, while the substitutability
in actions translates into substitutability in information when the complementarity between
action and state is strong enough (Proposition 1.4). Then we extend our results to monotone
information structure (Proposition 1.5), with which a closed form solution is in general not
available and therefore does not receive much attention in the existing literature. In a global
game, we discuss how to compare the value of information in two different equilibria. We
show that investors find their information less valuable when the original market condition is
good (bad) and becomes even better (worse) (Proposition 1.6). In a multi-expert persuasion
game, we study how the presence of another strategic expert changes the existing expert’s
value of information. We find that information is substitute when experts have opposite
extreme biases (Proposition 1.7).
1.1.1 Related Literature
A sizable literature studies the value of information in individual decision problems. The
literature focuses on the ordering of information structures for a family of payoff functions
(i.e., Blackwell, 1951, 1953; Lehman, 1988; Athey and Levin, 2000; Persico, 2000). The
present paper differs from this strand of literature in the objects the ordering is on. In this
paper, we studies how to rank two payoff functions for the same information structure in
terms of how much the decision maker benefit from having the corresponding information
structure.
The majority of the literature on the value of information in game-theoretic setting
focuses on the linear-quadratic model. Vives (1984) studies duopolistic competition with ex-
ogenous information. In equilibrium, the expected profit increases with the precision of the
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competitor’s information when the goods are complements. In a beauty contest game, Morris
and Shin (2002) note that public information may reduce social welfare because of excessive
coordination motives. The provision of public information causes investors to over-react to
public information while neglecting socially valuable private information. However, addi-
tional public information is always beneficial to welfare in models of technological spillover
(Angeletos and Pavan, 2004) and monopolistic competition (Hellwig, 2005). By using a gen-
eral quadratic payoff function and normally distributed public and private signals, Angeletos
and Pavan (2007) consider a class of Bayesian games with a continuum of players. They find
mixed results on the value of information. Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) find that players
want to coordinate their information in models with complementarity. Jime´nez-Mart´ınez
(2014) and Ui and Yoshizawa (2015) provide general treatments with mixed findings. In this
paper, we first consider a linear-quadratic model (Proposition 1.4) and then generalize the
results to monotone information structures, which are not studies in the literature (Proposi-
tion 1.5). Aside from quadratic games, Szkup and Trevino (2014) also consider a global game
and establish that complementarity in actions does not necessarily lead to complementarity
in information acquisition. We look into a similar game and study the value of information
when a full characterization of the equilibrium is not available.
In a general setting, Van Zandt and Vives (2007) note that action complementarities
work in the same direction as state complementarities, thus players want to coordinate in
information. Gendron-Saulnier and Gordon (2015) work with general payoff functions, but
with a more restrictive information structure. In this paper, we also do not focus on solving
the game per se. We concentrate on the change in a player’s payoff resulting from the
change of the other players’ strategies, which can be caused by a change in information,
payoff functions or the game environment itself, and discuss how it would affect the value of
information in equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 propose the framework. Section
1.3 introduces the concept of similarity, and discusses the relationship between similarity and
value of information. Section 1.4 contains application of similarity in various games. Section
1.5 concludes. Some of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix A.
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1.2 THE DECISION PROBLEM
The stochastic environment consists of an unknown state of the world Θ, with realization
θ ∈ Θ, and a signal X with realization x ∈ X.1 Given a prior H ∈ 4 (Θ), the distribution
of the signal induces a joint distribution over states and signals, F : Θ×X → [0, 1]. We call
F an information structure. Let FX (.|θ) be the signal distribution conditional on Θ = θ and
FX (.) be the marginal distribution of signal, i.e., FX (.) = EΘ [FX (.|θ)]. Let FΘ (.|x) be the
conditional distribution of Θ given X = x. The posterior is consistent with the prior, i.e.,
for all θ ∈ Θ, EX [FΘ (θ|x)] = H (θ).
After observing the signal realization, a decision maker takes an action a ∈ A ⊂ R. His
payoff function is u : A × Θ → R. A payoff function u and an information structure F
constitute a decision problem 〈F, u〉. The (ex ante) value of the decision problem 〈F, u〉 is
V (F, u) = EX
[
sup
a∈A
∫
Θ
u (a, θ) dFΘ (θ|x)
]
.
We assume throughout this paper that all the distributions and payoff functions involved are
regular enough so that the expected payoff is always well-defined. A decision rule σ : X →
4 (A) assigns a distribution over actions to every signal realization. We call σ∗ an optimal
decision rule for the decision problem 〈F, u〉, if σ∗ (x) is optimal for every x ∈ X, i.e.,
σ∗ (x) ∈ arg max
s∈4(A)
∫
Θ
u (s, θ) dFΘ (θ|x) .
We denote the set of optimal decision rules for decision problem 〈F, u〉 by∑∗F,u and a generic
element of the set
∑∗
F,u by σ
∗
F,u. We assume throughout this paper that given an information
structure F , an optimal decision rule exists. This can be ensured by, for example, assuming
that the action space A is compact and u is continuous in a. However, we do not impose
such restrictions formally, as an optimal decision rule often exists in applications even if
these assumptions are violated.
1By abuse of notations, we use Θ and X to denote both the random variables and the sets of realizations.
5
A null information structure Fφ, or interchangeably φ, is an information structure that
satisfies (Fφ)Θ (θ|x) = (Fφ)Θ (θ|x′) = H (θ) for all x, x′ ∈ X. The (ex ante) value of the
decision problem 〈φ, u〉 is
V (φ, u) = EX
[
max
a∈A
∫
Θ
u (a, θ) d (Fφ)Θ (θ|x)
]
= max
a∈A
∫
Θ
u (a, θ) dH (θ) .
We call a∗ an optimal default action, or simply default action, for the decision problem
〈F, u〉, if a∗ is optimal given the prior H, i.e.,
a∗ ∈ arg max
a∈A
∫
Θ
u (a, θ) dH (θ) .
Note that a∗ only depends on the prior, so a∗ is also an optimal decision rule for the decision
problem 〈φ, u〉 and the set of default actions for the decision problem 〈F, u〉 is the same as
that for the decision problem 〈F ′, u〉. Therefore, we denote the set of optimal default actions
for the decision problem 〈F, u〉 by ∑∗φ,u and a generic element of the set ∑∗φ,u by a∗φ,u.
The value of a decision rule σ in the decision problem 〈F, u〉 is
V (σ, F, u) = EΘ
[∫
X
u (σ (x) , θ) dFX (x|θ)
]
.
In the decision problem 〈F, u〉, when an optimal decision rule σ∗F,u is used, we will achieve
V (F, u), i.e., V
(
σ∗F,u, F, u
)
= V (F, u); when an optimal default action a∗φ,u is used, we will
achieve V (φ, u), i.e., V
(
a∗φ,u, F, u
)
= V (φ, u).
The value of information structure F in the decision problem 〈F, u〉 is defined as
V (F, u)− V (φ, u) .
The value of information is the payoff difference between an optimal decision rule based on
the information structure F and a default action based on prior.
6
1.3 SIMILARITY
In this section, we introduce the concept of similarity and discuss its properties. Consider a
decision maker adopting a decision rule. The decision maker finds a decision rule favorable
when it is better than his default action. If the decision rule that is favorable is an optimal
decision rule for another decision problem, then we say that his own decision problem is
similar to the other one. Formally,
Definition 1.1 (Similarity). 〈F, v〉 is similar to 〈F, u〉 if and only if there exists σ∗F,u ∈
∑∗
F,u
such that
V
(
σ∗F,u, F, v
) ≥ V (a∗φ,v, F, v) .
We say that 〈F, v〉 is strongly similar to 〈F, u〉, when the inequality is strict.2 A decision
problem 〈F, v〉 is similar to another decision problem 〈F, u〉 if the optimal decision rule of
〈F, u〉, σ∗F,u, gives a higher payoff in 〈F, v〉 than the optimal prior-based decision rule for
〈F, v〉, a∗φ,v. We denote a similar relation by S⇒, and a strongly similar relation by S→.
Conversely, a decision problem 〈F, v〉 is not similar to another decision problem 〈F, u〉 if and
only if for all σ∗F,u ∈
∑∗
F,u, V
(
σ∗F,u, F, v
)
< V
(
a∗φ,v, F, v
)
. We denote this by 〈F, v〉 S; 〈F, u〉.
S9 is defined analogously.
The notion of similarity is implicitly invoked in many situations in our daily life. When
the optimal decision is difficult to find, we often utilize pre-existing decision rules designed
for similar situations. For instance, we use manuals, guide books, recipes on a daily basis.
No manual is written for a particular user, no guide book perfectly matches the case we
are handling, and no recipe exactly knows what food our baby boy is fond of. We use
them because figuring out the best action takes too much effort. We would rather rely on
suboptimal but ready-to-use pre-existing knowledge, as long as we find that we are facing a
similar situation. Consider the tax preparation software as an example. Going through tax
documents is not a unpleasant experience to some people. Using a tax preparation software
that specifies a typical taxpayer similar to ourselves is still a valuable option, because we
2Similarity is reflexive for any information structure F , but strong similarity is not necessarily reflexive.
Consider a constant payoff function u, we have, V
(
σ∗F,u, F, u
)
= V
(
a∗φ,u, F, u
)
.
7
benefit from following the procedure pre-programmed in the software compared to figuring
it out by our own.
The use of pre-existing rules and the development of fixed decision rules could be the
result of optimization cost, legal restriction, consistency or other regarding concerns. The
most relevant reason here is that positive optimization cost implies bounded rationality. If we
take optimization costs seriously, there is a circularity problem that we would never reach
“a optimization problem which fully incorporates the cost of its own solution” (Conlisk,
1988). At some stage of the decision making, the decision maker would have to use some
decision making procedure that is not a standard optimization. The procedure that involves
using a fixed decision rule for a class of problems is certainly a reasonable candidate. But
how would a decision maker decide which rule to use? For instance, in Mohlin (2014), the
decision maker groups observations to make predictions based on a variance-bias trade-off.
In this situation, if it is costly to figure out to which group the new observation belongs, how
does decision maker pick which prediction rule at the first stage? Our notion of similarity
suggests a particular way to make decision in such a situation.
Given two payoff functions u and v, we define w = u+ v as
w (a, θ) = (u+ v) (a, θ) = u (a, θ) + v (a, θ) for all a ∈ A and θ ∈ Θ.
We have,
Proposition 1.1 (Additivity). Suppose
∣∣∣∑∗F,u∣∣∣ = 1, if 〈F, v〉 S⇒ 〈F, u〉 and 〈F, v′〉 S⇒ 〈F, u〉,
then 〈F, av + bv′〉 S⇒ 〈F, u〉 for all a, b ≥ 0.
Proof. A decision rule σ generates a joint distribution over actions and states. By defini-
tion, (u+ v) (a, θ) = u (a, θ)+v (a, θ). Therefore, given a decision rule σ, V (σ, F, av + bv′) =
aV (σ, F, u)+bV (σ, F, v′). V
(
σ∗F,u, F, av + bv
′) = aV (σ∗F,u, F, v)+bV (σ∗F,u, F, v′). If 〈F, v〉 S⇒
〈F, u〉 and 〈F, v′〉 S⇒ 〈F, u〉, V (σ∗F,u, F, v) ≥ V (φ, v) and V (σ∗F,u, F, v′) ≥ V (φ, v′). By the
optimality of a∗φ,v and a
∗
φ,v′ , aV (φ, v) + bV (φ, v
′) ≥ V (φ, av + bv′).
When the optimal default action in 〈F, u〉 is unique, similarity is additive, because the
value of a fixed decision rule in 〈F, v + v′〉 is the sum of the value of the decision rule in
〈F, v〉 and 〈F, v′〉.
8
The rest of this section consists of a series of examples, which show that the similarity
relation does not have nice properties in a general environment. Specifically, similarity
depends on the information structure. Change in the common information structure changes
the similarity between two decision problems. Example 1.1 illustrates such dependence.
Example 1.1 (〈F, v〉 S⇒ 〈F, u〉, and 〈G, v〉 S; 〈G, u〉). Let Θ = {θ1, θ2} and A = {a1, a2, a3}.
Consider two payoff functions, u and v, as shown in the tables below, i.e., u (a1, θ1) = 1. ε
is a small positive number.
u v
θ1 θ2
a1 1 −1− ε
a2 0 0
a3 −1− ε 1
θ1 θ2
a1 1 −4
a2 0 0
a3 −4 1
The prior probability of Θ = θ1 is
1
2
, so the optimal default action in both problems,
regardless the information structure, is a2, i.e., a
∗
φ,u = a
∗
φ,v = a2. V (φ, u) = V (φ, v) = 0.
Consider the following two information structures, F and G. X = {x1, x2}. The el-
ements in the tables represent the joint distribution over the signals and the states, i.e.,
Pr (X = x1,Θ = θ1) = 0.45.
F G
θ1 θ2
x1 0.45 0.05
x2 0.05 0.45
θ1 θ2
x1 0.3 0.2
x2 0.2 0.3
According to F , Pr (θ1|x1) = 0.9 and Pr (θ1|x2) = 0.1. σ∗F,u (x1) = a1 and σ∗F,u (x2) = a3.
V
(
σ∗F,u, F, v
)
= 0.9 · 1− 0.1 · 4 = 0.5 > V (φ, v). Therefore, 〈F, v〉 S⇒ 〈F, u〉.
According to G, Pr (θ1|x1) = 0.6 and Pr (θ1|x2) = 0.4. σ∗G,u (x1) = a1 and σ∗G,u (x2) = a3.
V
(
σ∗G,u, G, v
)
= 0.6 · 1− 0.4 · 4 = −1 < V (φ, v). Therefore, 〈G, v〉 S; 〈G, u〉.
The similarity relation is clearly not complete, and it is also not symmetric or transitive
in general. When 〈F, v〉 is similar to 〈F, u〉, σ∗F,u is preferred to a∗φ,v in 〈F, v〉. It says nothing
about the comparison of σ∗F,v and a
∗
φ,v in 〈F, u〉. The following example demonstrates the
subtlety of similarity as it relies on the comparison of two suboptimal decision rules.
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Example 1.2 (〈F, v〉 S⇒ 〈F, u〉, and 〈F, u〉 S; 〈F, v〉). Let Θ = {θ1, θ2}, and A = {a1, a2, a3}.
The payoff functions, u and v, are shown as follows,
u v
θ1 θ2
a1 1 0
a2 −10 −10
a3 0 1
θ1 θ2
a1 1 0
a2 0 1
a3 0 0
The prior probability of Θ = θ1 is p >
1
2
, so the optimal default action in both problems,
regardless of the information structure, is a1, i.e., a
∗
φ,u = a
∗
φ,v = a1. V (φ, u) = V (φ, v) = p.
X = {x1, x2}. Signals are perfect, i.e., according to F , Pr (θ1|x1) = Pr (θ2|x2) = 1. In
〈F, u〉, σ∗F,u (x1) = a1, and σ∗F,u (x2) = a3. V
(
σ∗F,u, F, v
)
= p · 1 + (1− p) · 0 = p = V (φ, v).
Thus, 〈F, v〉 S⇒ 〈F, u〉. In 〈F, v〉, σ∗F,v (x1) = a1, and σ∗F,v (x2) = a2. V
(
σ∗F,v, F, u
)
=
p · 1 + (1− p) · (−10) < V (φ, u). Thus, 〈F, u〉 S; 〈F, v〉.
The following example shows that a similar relation may not be transitive. When 〈F, v〉
is similar to 〈F, u〉, σ∗F,u is preferred to σ∗φ,v in 〈F, v〉. No restriction is imposed on σ∗F,v.
Therefore, transitivity is not guaranteed.
Example 1.3 (A similarity relation that is not transitive). Let θ follow the uniform dis-
tribution on [−1, 1]. Consider a family of payoff functions, indexed by k ∈ Z+, uk (a, θ) =
− (a− θ − kb)2. Under the null information φ, a∗φ,uk = kb. Signals are perfect, i.e., condi-
tional on x, the posterior distribution of θ is a degenerated distribution at θ = x. Therefore,
σ∗F,uk = x + kb. For b small enough, 〈F, uk〉
S⇒ 〈F, uk−1〉 for all k ≥ 1. For any k ≥ 1,
conditional on θ,
uk
(
σ∗F,u0 (θ) , θ
)
= − (θ − θ − kb)2 = − (kb)2 ,
and
uk
(
a∗φ,uk (θ) , θ
)
= − (kb− θ − kb)2 = −θ2.
For k large enough, uk
(
σ∗F,u0 (θ) , θ
)
< uk
(
a∗φ,uk (θ) , θ
)
for any state realization θ. Thus,
〈F, uk〉 S; 〈F, u0〉 for k large enough.
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1.3.1 Similarity and value of information
In this section, we investigate how the similarity relation relates to the value of information
in decision problems.
Even if 〈F, v〉 is similar to 〈F, u〉, we may not know how to compare V (F, u) and V (F, v).
However, we will now show that the concept of similarity can be used to compare 〈F, u〉 and
another decision problem, using 〈F, v〉 as a bridge between the two.
Proposition 1.2. If 〈F, v〉 S⇒ 〈F, u〉, then the value of information F is higher in 〈F, u+ v〉
than in 〈F, u〉, i.e.,
V (F, u+ v)− V (φ, u+ v) ≥ V (F, u)− V (φ, u) . (1.1)
Proof. Take σ∗F,u ∈
∑∗
F,u such that V
(
σ∗F,u, F, v
) ≥ V (φ, v). We have
V (F, u+ v)− V (φ, u+ v)
≥ V (σ∗F,u, F, u+ v)− V (φ, u+ v)
=
[
V
(
σ∗F,u, F, u
)− V (a∗φ,u+v, φ, u)]+ [V (σ∗F,u, F, v)− V (a∗φ,u+v, φ, v)]
≥ [V (σ∗F,u, F, u)− V (φ, u)]+ [V (σ∗F,u, F, v)− V (φ, v)]
≥ V (σ∗F,u, F, u)− V (φ, u) ,
where the first inequality follows from the suboptimality of σ∗F,u in 〈F, u+ v〉, the second
last inequality follows the suboptimality of a∗φ,u+v in both 〈φ, u〉 and 〈φ, v〉, and the last
inequality follows from the assumption that 〈F, v〉 S⇒ 〈F, u〉.
We call 〈F, u〉, 〈F, v〉, and 〈F, u+ v〉 the original problem, the marginal problem, and
the new problem, respectively. The value of information in the new problem is higher than
that in the original problem if the marginal problem is similar to the original problem. The
intuitive explanation is indicated in the proof. If the marginal problem 〈F, v〉 is similar to
the original problem 〈F, u〉, the original optimal decision rule σ∗F,u has an advantage in the
marginal problem 〈F, v〉 over the default action. This implies that the optimal decision rule
for the new problem that combines 〈F, u〉 and 〈F, v〉 must provide an even higher payoff.
The opposite direction of this statement is not true, as illustrated by the following ex-
ample.
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Example 1.4. Let Θ = {θ1, θ2}, and A = {a1, a2}. The payoff function u is given by
u (a1, θ1) = u (a2, θ2) = 1 and u (a1, θ2) = u (a2, θ1) = 0. The payoff function (u+ v) is given
by (u+ v) (a1, θ1) = (u+ v) (a2, θ2) = 0 and (u+ v) (a1, θ2) = (u+ v) (a2, θ1) = 100. The
prior probability of Θ = θ1 is
1
2
, so V (φ, u) = 1
2
and V (φ, u+ v) = 50. Signals are perfect,
i.e., according to F , Pr (θ1|x1) = Pr (θ2|x2) = 1. Therefore, V (F, u) = 1 and V (F, u+ v) =
100. V (F, u+ v) − V (φ, u+ v) ≥ V (F, u) − V (φ, u). Since the payoff function v is given
by v (a1, θ1) = v (a2, θ2) = −1, and v (a1, θ2) = v (a2, θ1) = 100, V
(
σ∗F,u, F, v
)
= −1 <
V (φ, v) = 491
2
. Thus, 〈F, v〉 S; 〈F, u〉.
While V (F, u+ v) − V (φ, u+ v) ≥ V (F, u) − V (φ, u) does not imply the similarity of
〈F, v〉 to 〈F, u〉, it implies the similarity of 〈F, v〉 to 〈F, u〉 under an extra assumption, shown
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.3. Suppose Σ∗φ,u∩Σ∗φ,v 6= φ , if 〈F, v〉 S9 〈F, u〉, then the value of information
F is lower in 〈F, u+ v〉 than in 〈F, u〉, i.e.,
V (F, u+ v)− V (φ, u+ v) ≤ V (F, u)− V (φ, u) . (1.2)
Proof. Since V (φ, u+ v) ≤ V (φ, u) + V (φ, v), a ∈ Σ∗φ,v ∩ Σ∗φ,u implies that a ∈ Σ∗φ,u+v.
Similar to the proof for Proposition 1.2, we have
V (F, u)− V (φ, u)
≥ V (σ∗F,u+v, F, u)− V (φ, u)
=
[
V
(
σ∗F,u+v, F, u+ v
)− V (φ, u+ v)]− [V (σ∗F,u+v, F, v)− V (φ, v)]
≥ V (F, u+ v)− V (φ, u+ v) ,
where the equality follows the assumption that Σ∗φ,u ∩ Σ∗φ,v 6= φ, and last inequality follows
from the assumption that 〈F, v〉 S9 〈F, u〉.
The assumption of a common default action in two decision problems can sometimes
be restrictive. However, in certain cases with adjustment costs, this assumption appears
to be rather natural. For example, a trader only changes his portfolio when he obtains
access to some new information, a company only enters a market if it detects a new business
opportunity, and we stick to our usual dinning place unless we hear good comments about a
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newly opened restaurant. This is also a reasonable assumption when u and v are close and
actions are discrete.
The concept of similarity is quite intuitive, and it provides an intuitive way to rank
payoff functions for a given information structure, according to the value of information in
the corresponding decision problems. It is a partial order, as is Blackwell’s order. Blackwell’s
order starts from an information structure that is more valuable to all payoff functions to one
that is less valuable by a garbling of the former. An ordering based on similarity relations
starts from a payoff function that values one information structure less to one that values
more.
In Section 1.4, we are going to repeatedly use the relationship between a similarity
relation and the value of information. We construct a marginal problem, compare it with
either the original problem or the new problem, and then apply Proposition 1.2 or 1.3 to get
conclusions on changes in the value of information.
1.4 APPLICATIONS
In this section, we apply the notion of similarity to games. We find conditions under which
a player’s benefit from having information about the state of the world is higher in one
equilibrium than in another. The condition is the similarity of the problem induced by
the change in other players’ strategies from one equilibrium to another equilibrium to the
problem induced by one of the two equilibria.
As in an individual decision problem, we measure the value of information by how much
a player benefits from having that information. In measuring the value of information in
games, we abstract away from the issue of interactive knowledge. In games, changing the
information structure also changes the mutual knowledge of the information structure. The
value of information measured without abstracting away from such a change in the mutual
knowledge consists of two components: One is the instrumental value of information, which
is how much a player can benefit from having the information fixing the strategies of the
other players. The other is the strategic value of information, which is how much a player
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can benefit form a change in the equilibrium strategies of other players under the assumption
that any change in the information structure is also common knowledge. Throughout this
section, we assume that the strategies of the other players are fixed at a particular equilibrium
under a particular information structure and thus abstract away from the strategic value of
information. The value of information for a particular player is thus the payoff difference
between best-responding with and without information. It is important to note that although
we focus only on the instrumental value, the strategic aspects of the game in consideration
still matter. This is because the strategies of the other players must be equilibrium strategies.
Conceptually, the instrumental value of information measures the incentives for a player to
acquire information covertly.
To apply Propositions 1.2 and 1.3, we compare the equilibrium strategy in one equilibrium
to the optimal default action in the induced marginal problem for the player with the fixed
information structure. There are several difficulties in performing this comparison. The
first is to characterize the equilibrium strategies for all players. We need the equilibrium
strategies in constructing the induced marginal problem, as well as in the comparison we
conduct in the induced marginal problem. To cope with this difficulty, we focus on games
that have monotone equilibria. The second difficulty is to characterize the optimal default
action in the marginal problem. Given two monotone equilibria, we in general have no
idea what the optimal default action is in the induced marginal problem. For the class of
games we consider in this section, fortunately, we have ways to get around this difficulty.
In the quadratic games considered in Section 1.4.3, any action is optimal in the induced
marginal problem. In the global game considered in Section 1.4.4, the investor only chooses
either to invest or not, and this simplifies the choice of optimal default action in the induced
marginal problem. In the persuasion game considered in Section 1.4.5, there is only one
action the player can take when there is no information. The third and main difficulty is the
comparison of two endogenous objects that do not necessarily have closed form expressions
in the induced marginal problem: one is the optimal default action for the marginal problem
and the other is an equilibrium strategy in one equilibrium. In the quadratic game, we
find conditions for information structures under which we are able to have an unambiguous
comparison. In the global game, the investor always prefers the other investors to invest
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more, and the investor only cares about the aggregate level of investment in the economy.
Therefore, the equilibrium investment strategy distribution is reduced to a single parameter.
In the persuasion game, the presence of an extra expert with opposite extreme bias has two
effects that have the same direction, which leads to an unambiguous comparison. In the
corresponding sections, we will discuss in detail how these features allow us to compare two
endogenous objects and draw conclusions on the change in the value of information in the
corresponding games.
1.4.1 Games and the induced marginal problem
Consider a game with N players and let I denote the set of players. Player i ∈ I receives
a signal xi ∈ Xi ⊆ R. Denote X = ×i∈IXi. An information structure F for the game is a
joint distribution over states and signals, F : Θ × X → [0, 1]. Player i chooses an action
ai ∈ Ai ⊆ R. Denote A = ×i∈IAi. Player i’s payoff function is ui : A×Θ→ R. A strategy of
player i is a mapping from the received signals to distributions over actions, σi : Xi →4 (Ai).
Given the information structure F , let FX (.|θ) denote the signal distribution conditional on
Θ = θ, and FXi (.|θ) denote player i’s signal distribution conditional on Θ = θ. The players
have a common prior, thus EXi [FΘ (θ|xi)] = EXj [FΘ (θ|xj)] = H (θ) for all i, j ∈ I.
In order to consider the value of information in games, we need to incorporate the other
players’ strategies. Fixing the strategies of the other players, player i faces an individual
decision problem. We call the situation in which the other players use σ−i (x−i) and σ′−i (x−i)
the original problem and the new problem, respectively, and define the original problem
〈F, u˜i〉 and the new problem 〈Fi, w˜i〉 correspondingly. We define X−i × Θ as the new state
space. Given any σ−i (x−i), we can define the corresponding decision problem 〈Fi, u˜i〉 and
discuss the value of information for player i in 〈Fi, u˜i〉, which is equivalent to the value of
information given the other players are using σ−i (x−i). Similar for σ′−i (x−i) and 〈Fi, w˜i〉.
Given σ−i (x−i), player i’s payoff function is
u˜i (ai, x−i, θ) =
∫
A−i
ui (ai, a−i, θ) dσ−i (a−i|x−i) ,
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in the original problem 〈Fi, u˜i〉. With a standard abuse of notation, we write u˜i (ai, x−i, θ) =
ui (ai, σ−i (x−i) , θ). Given σ′−i (x−i), player i’s payoff function is
w˜i (ai, x−i, θ) = ui
(
ai, σ
′
−i (x−i) , θ
)
,
in the new problem 〈Fi, w˜i〉. Then, in the marginal problem induced, player i has information
structure Fi and the following payoff function,
v˜i (ai, x−i, θ) = w˜i (ai, x−i, θ)− u˜i (ai, x−i, θ) .
The construction of the marginal problem depends on σ−i (x−i) and σ′−i (x−i), and
v˜i (ai, x−i, θ) is the change in payoffs due to a change in other players’ strategy, from σ−i (x−i)
to σ′−i (x−i). In the next section, we will discuss how to compare the value of information in
two different equilibria based on the induced marginal problem defined above.
1.4.2 Value of information in equilibrium
In a game, the value of information depends on the equilibrium strategies. Given an infor-
mation structure F , σ∗ (x) is an equilibrium strategy profile if and only if
σ∗i (xi) ∈ arg max
si∈4(Ai)
∫
X−i×Θ
ui
(
si, σ
∗
−i (x−i) , θ
)
dFX−i×Θ (x−i, θ|xi) (1.3)
for all i ∈ I. In order to highlight the dependence of the equilibrium strategy profile σ∗ (x)
on the information structure F , we denote it by σ∗ (x;F ). Denote player i’s payoff by
playing σ∗i (xi;F ) when the other players are playing the equilibrium strategy σ
∗
−i (x−i;F )
by V (Fi;F ), i.e.,
V (Fi;F ) = EX×Θ [ui (σ∗ (x;F ) , θ)] ,
and it is also player i’s payoff in the equilibrium corresponding to σ∗ (x;F ).
Given the other players’ equilibrium strategies σ∗−i (x−i;F ), a
∗
i is player i’s (optimal)
default action if and only if
a∗i ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
∫
X−i×Θ
ui
(
ai, σ
∗
−i (x−i;F ) , θ
)
dF (x−i, θ) .
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Analogously, we denote it by a∗i (F ). Note that the optimal default action a
∗
i depends on
the information Fi not because player i has information Fi, but the other players believe
that player i has information Fi. Denote player i’s payoff by playing a
∗
i (F ) when the other
players are playing the equilibrium strategy σ∗−i (x−i;F ) by V (φ;F ), i.e.,
V (φ;F ) = EX−i×Θ
[
ui
(
a∗i (F ) , σ
∗
−i (x−i;F ) , θ
)]
,
and it is the payoff player i can get by unilaterally and covertly deviating from Fi to φ in
the equilibrium σ∗ (x;F ).
Given an information structure F , we define the value of information Fi to player i in
equilibrium by
V (Fi;F )− V (φ;F ) . (1.4)
The difference between V (Fi;F ) and V (φ;F ) measures how much player i benefits from
information Fi when holding the other’s belief of player i’s information constant at Fi. As
mentioned at the beginning of this section, the value of information defined by (1.4) does
not measure the strategic value of information. Therefore, (1.4) is non-negative. The value
of information as defined by (1.4) can be interpreted as a measure of the incentives of player
i to deviate from acquiring the equilibrium level of information Fi in a game with covert
information acquisition. The higher is the value, the more likely that the equilibrium with
information Fi can be sustained given a fixed cost of information acquisition.
3 With (1.4) at
hand, we can now define complementarity and substitutability in information in games. For
each player i, consider two information levels
{
φ, F i
}
, we define,
3This notion of value of information is not the only notion that one could think about in this situation.
Readers might also consider the value of information in the following sense,
EX×Θ [ui (σ∗ (x;F ) , θ)]− EX×Θ [ui (σ∗ (x;φ, F−i) , θ)] . (1.5)
The main difference between these two notions is that, when player i switches to the default action, player
i’s opponents continue to use the strategies σ∗−i (x−i;F ) in (1.4), while player i’s opponents switch to
σ∗−i (x−i;φ, F−i) in (1.5). Conceptually, when the value of information is defined by (1.5), the value of
information is determined not only by information per se but also from the change in the mutual knowledge
situation. That is, the other players always know when the information of player i changes, and they also
know that all the other players know that, etc. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Bassan, Scarsini
and Zamir (1997). However, when there is a continuum of players, the equilibrium strategies of the other
players do not depend on the information acquisition of a particular player. In that case, the two notions
(1.4) and (1.5) are equivalent. This is true, for instance, in the global game considered in Section 4.4.
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Definition 1.2. Given an information structure F =
(
F 1, ..., FN
)
, we say that player i has
complementarity (substitutability) in information with player j if and only if for all equilibria
σ∗
(
x;F j, F−j
)
and σ∗ (x;φ, F−j),
V
(
F i;F j, F−j
)− V (φ;F j, F−j) ≥ (≤)V (F i;φ, F−j)− V (φ;φ, F−j) . (1.6)
In words, information is complementary if the value of information increases with the
other players’ information level. To incorporate the possibility of multiple equilibria, our
definition of complementarity/substitutability requires the inequality (1.6) to be satisfied
for all combinations of equilibria under the information profiles
(
F j, F−j
)
and (φ, F−j). An
equally legitimate definition requires the inequality (1.6) to be satisfied for a pair of equilibria.
In all our applications, however, the equilibria involved are unique.4 The distinction of the
two definitions thus is immaterial.
In Section 1.4.3, we consider a quadratic game, and discuss how a change in the other
players’ information affects the player’s value of information in the equilibrium. We first draw
conclusions on the value of information in quadratic games with affine information structure
under which the equilibrium strategy is linear. We then extend the results to quadratic
game with monotone information structure under which a closed form equilibrium strategy
is in general unavailable. In Section 1.4.4, we consider a global game, and discuss how to
compare the value of information in two different equilibria. We show that investors find
their information less valuable when the original market condition is good (bad) and becomes
even better (worse). In Section 1.4.5, we consider a persuasion game, and discuss how the
presence of another strategic expert changes the existing expert’s value of information. For
the existing expert, adding another strategic expert with an opposite bias always reduces his
value of information. Some of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix A.
4Strictly speaking, the persuasion game we consider in Section 4.5 has more than one equilibrium, as the
experts are free to send different messages when he is indifferent. Clearly, this multiplicity has no bearing
on our calculations.
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1.4.3 Quadratic game
The quadratic payoff function has been employed extensively to study complementarity
/substitutability of information in the literature. Consider the generalized quadratic payoff
function, under which player i’s payoff from the action profile a = (a1, ..., aN) when the state
of the world is θ is given by
ui (a, θ) = −a2i + 2αai
∑
j 6=i
aj + 2βiθai + fi (a−i, θ) , (1.7)
where α, βi ∈ R are constants and fi : RN → R is a measurable function. In words, player
i’s payoff can be decomposed into two parts, a quadratic part that is quadratic in player i’s
own action ai and a functional part that is independent of ai. In the quadratic part, α is the
coefficient of the effect of the interaction between player i’s action ai and the other players’
aggregate action
∑
j 6=i aj, and βi is the coefficient of the effect of the interaction between
player i’s action ai and the state of the world θ.
5 As a result, player i’s best response depends
on both α and βi, but not on the function fi. We assume that (N − 1) |α| < 1 and βi ≥ 0.6
Given a generalized quadratic payoff function, the single parameter α characterizes the
interaction between player i and the aggregate action. If α ≥ (≤) 0, there is strategic comple-
mentarity (substitutability) in player i’s and the aggregate actions. How would the interac-
tion of actions affects the interactions of information acquisitions? In Vives (1984), comple-
mentarity (substitutability) in information depends on complementarity (substitutability) in
5If N = 2, and fi (a−i, θ) = 0, we obtain the model of oligopolistic competition of Vives (1984). In Vives
(1984), firm i’s profit pii = (α− βqi − γqj) qi, where α−βqi−γqj is the market price of good i, α is the state
of the world, qi is the firm’s quantity supplied, and qj is the opponent’s quantity supplied. Market price of
good i is decreasing in own quantity supplied, i.e., β ≥ 0.
Suppose N is large and the impact of other players’ actions on player i is only through the aggregate action,
i.e., fi (a−i, θ) = 0. Our quadratic game becomes a version of the investment game of Angeletos and Pavan
(2004). In Angeletos and Pavan (2004), there is a continuum of players. ui = [(1− α) θ + αK] ki − 12k2i ,
where θ is the state of the world, K is the total investment of the economy, i.e., K =
∫ 1
0
kidi, and ki is player
i’s investment level. α is a parameter that measures how much player i’s investment benefits from the total
investment.
Next, suppose, for some r ∈ [0, 1], α = rN−1 , β = (1− r) and fi (a−i, θ) = −
(
r
N−1
∑
j 6=i aj + (1− r) θ
)2
,
we get a two-player version of the beauty contest as in Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), ui =
− [ai − (1− r) θ − raj ]2. In Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), ui = − 1(1−r)2 (pi − p∗)
2
, where pi is player i’s
position, and p∗ = (1− r) s+ rp, s is the state of the world and p is the average position of all players. r is
a paremeter that measures player i’s incentive to match with the average position p.
6The assumption that (N − 1) |α| < 1 implies that the feedback effect from an increase in own action ai
on player i’s best response through the aggregate action
∑
j 6=i aj is less than 1-to-1.
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actions. In Morris and Shin (2002) and Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), coordination motives
in actions translate into coordination motives in information acquisitions in a beauty contest.
In Angeletos and Pavan (2004), complementarity in investment translates into complemen-
tarity in information.7
In this section, we explore the marginal problem resulting from a change in the other
players’ strategies and apply the concept of similarity to investigate the complementar-
ity/substitutability in information. For simplicity, we only consider a zero-one problem, i.e.,
player i has either no information φ or a fixed amount of information F i. Denote player i’s
information level by Fi ∈
{
φ, F i
}
. To simplify the notation, we only consider the case with
two players, i.e., N = 2, the result can be easily extended to the multiple-player case.8 Let
σ∗ (x;F ) be an equilibrium strategy profile defined in (1.3). We construct a decision problem
corresponding to the equilibrium under information structure
(
F i, φ
)
, and call it the original
problem. The value of information in the original problem is V
(
F i;F i, φ
) − V (φ;F i, φ).
Similarly, we construct a decision problem corresponding to the equilibrium under informa-
tion structure
(
F i, F j
)
, and call it the new problem. The value of information in the new
problem is V
(
F i;F i, F j
)− V (φ;F i, F j). Thus, determining the complementarity of infor-
mation is equivalent to comparing the value of information in the original problem and the
new problem. When the induced marginal problem is similar to the original problem, the
value of information is higher in the new problem than in the original problem, according
to Proposition 1.2. When the induced marginal problem is not strongly similar to the new
problem, the value of information is higher in the original problem than in the new problem,
according to Proposition 1.3.
Before constructing the marginal problem, we state a simple observation that will be
useful in the construction and the proofs. Let σ∗ (x;F ) be an equilibrium strategy profile
defined in (1.3), then we have
Lemma 1.1. Given any information structure F and any equilibrium strategy profile of the
7In Angeletos and Pavan (2004), the authors refer the complementarity in a quadratic game as moderate
complementarity, while they refer the complementarity in a global game as strong complementarity.
8Notice that the multiplier α for the interaction between ai and aj is same for all i, j ∈ I.
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quadratic game σ∗ (x;F ), for i ∈ {1, 2},
E (σ∗i (xi;F )) = ai,
where (a1, a2) is the equilibrium actions pair under the information structure (φ, φ).
By Lemma 1.1, player j must take the action aj in equilibrium under information struc-
ture
(
F i, φ
)
. Therefore, in the original problem, which corresponds to the equilibrium under
information structure
(
F i, φ
)
, player i has information F i, and the payoff function is
u˜i (ai, xj, θ) = −a2i + 2αaiaj + 2βiθai + fi (aj, θ) . (1.8)
Let F =
(
F 1, F 2
)
. In the new problem, which corresponds to the equilibrium under
information structure F , player i has information F i, and the payoff function is
w˜i (ai, xj, θ) = −a2i + 2αaiσ∗j
(
xj;F
)
+ 2βiθai + fi
(
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
, θ
)
. (1.9)
Therefore, in the induced marginal problem, player i has information F i, and the payoff
function is
v˜i (ai, xj, θ) = 2αai
(
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)− aj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
interaction between ai and (σ∗j (xj ;F)−aj)
+ fi
(
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
, θ
)− fi (aj, θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
other terms independent of ai
.
(1.10)
In the induced marginal problem
〈
F i, v˜i
〉
, the payoff function v˜i captures the impact
of a change in player j’s strategy on player i’s payoff. Intuitively, v˜i is the incremental
payoff change with respect to a change in player j’s strategy due to a change in player j’s
information, i.e., from aj to σ
∗
j
(
xj;F
)
. In the marginal problem
〈
F i, v˜i
〉
, we have,
Lemma 1.2. ai is an optimal default action in the marginal problem
〈
F i, v˜i
〉
.
To prove Lemma 1.2, take unconditional expectation of (1.10) and apply Lemma 1.1 to
conclude that the expected payoff in the marginal problem E (v˜i (ai, xj, θ)) is independent of
ai. Thus, we can simply take ai to be the optimal default action in the marginal problem.
We have,
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Lemma 1.3. Given the original problem
〈
F i, u˜i
〉
, the marginal problem
〈
F i, v˜i
〉
, and the
new problem
〈
F i, w˜i
〉
,
1) the marginal problem is similar to the original problem if and only if
αCov(σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
, σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
) ≥ 0,
and
2) the marginal problem is similar to the new problem if and only if
αCov(σ∗i
(
xi;F
)
, σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
) ≥ 0.
In the marginal problem
〈
F i, v˜i
〉
, for every realization of (xi, xj, θ), the payoff difference
between the strategy σi and the optimal default action ai is
2α (σi (xi)− ai)
(
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)− aj)︸ ︷︷ ︸,
interaction between (σi(xi)−ai) and (σ∗j (xj ;F)−aj)
(1.11)
which depends only on the interaction between players i and j. Intuitively, (1.11) measures
the incremental payoff due to some strategy σi with respect to the default action ai given a
change in the strategy of player j due to a change in player j’s information. The ex ante pay-
off difference between the equilibrium strategy σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
in the original problem
〈
F i, u˜i
〉
and the optimal default action ai in the marginal problem
〈
F i, v˜i
〉
can be written as
V
(
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
, F i, v˜i
)− V (φ, v˜i)
= 2αE
[(
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)− ai) (σ∗j (xj;F)− aj)]
= 2αCov
(
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
, σ∗j
(
xj;F
))
, (1.12)
where the first equality follows from Lemma 1.2 and the second equality follows from Lemma
1.1. Similarly, we have
V
(
σ∗i
(
xi;F
)
, F i, v˜i
)− V (φ, v˜i) = 2αCov (σ∗i (xi;F) , σ∗j (xj;F)) . (1.13)
In Section 1.4.3.1, we investigate the sign of (1.12) and (1.13) given an affine information
structure, under which the equilibrium strategies are linear. The most studied Normal
environment is a special case of affine information structures. In Section 1.4.3.2, we extend
the results to monotone information structures, under which a closed form solution is in
general unavailable.
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1.4.3.1 Affine Information Structure The first class of information structures we
consider is the affine information structure. This class of information structures includes the
most familiar Normal environment, which the majority of papers in the literature assume. As
pointed out by Vives (1988), the class of affine information structures includes many cases
other than the Normal environment. The signals could distribute according to Binomial,
Negative Binomial, Poisson, Gamma or Exponential distributions when natural conjugate
priors are assigned.
Definition 1.3 (Affine information structure). An information structure is affine if and
only if for all i, j ∈ I,
A1 E (θ|xi) = Aixi +Bi, where 0 ≤ Ai < 1 and Bi ∈ R;
A2 E (xj|xi) = E (xj) + E (θ|xi)− E (θ).
Consider the Normal environment as an example. Let θ distribute according to a Normal
distribution with mean µ and finite variance σ2. Player i receives a signal xi such that
xi = θ+ εi, where εi is a noise term independent of both θ and εj and distributed according
to a Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance υ. Under these assumptions, E (θ|xi) =
σ2
σ2+υ
xi+
υ
σ2+υ
µ. (A1) and (A2) are satisfied. Under such information structures, we establish
the existence of a unique linear equilibrium in the following lemma.
Lemma 1.4. In a quadratic game with affine information structure, the equilibrium is unique
and linear. Moreover, if the players have complementarity in actions, then the equilibrium
is also increasing.
Given Lemma 1.4, the signs of (1.12) and (1.13) depend on how the signals xi and xj are
correlated. Given (A1) and (A2), we have
Proposition 1.4. In a quadratic game with affine information structure,
1. when the players have complementarity in actions, i.e., α ≥ 0, the players have comple-
mentarity in information;
2. when the players have substitutability in actions, i.e., α ≤ 0,
a. if the equilibrium strategy σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
is decreasing, then player j’s information is
complementary to player i’s information, and
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b. if the equilibrium σ∗
(
x;F
)
is increasing, then the players have substitutability in
information.
When the players have complementarity in actions, there exists a unique increasing
linear equilibrium under both information structure
(
F i, φ
)
and F . Therefore, (1.12) is
positive if and only if the signal xi and xj are positively correlated. When (1.12) is positive,
the marginal problem
(
F i, v˜i
)
is similar to the original problem
(
F i, u˜i
)
. Therefore, the
value of information is higher in the equilibrium under information structure F than in
the equilibrium under information structure
(
F i, φ
)
, by Proposition 1.2. The generalization
of part (1 ) of Proposition 1.4 to more than 2 players is straightforward. When N > 2
and α ≥ 0, there still exists a unique increasing equilibrium that is linear. By the same
argument, complementarity in actions translates into complementarity in information. This
result is related to the complementarity in information in Vives (1984), Morris and Shin
(2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2004), and Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009).
When the players have substitutability in actions, there is no guarantee that an increas-
ing equilibrium exists under information structure F . However, it is easy to see that the
strategy σ∗
(
x;F i, φ
)
is increasing. Suppose further that the equilibrium strategy σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
is decreasing. In this case, the linearity of the strategies and the fact that the signals xi and
xj are positive correlated allow us to conclude that (1.12) is positive. Again, the marginal
problem
(
F i, v˜i
)
is similar to the original problem
(
F i, u˜i
)
. Therefore, the value of infor-
mation is higher in the equilibrium under information structure F than in the equilibrium
under information structure
(
F i, φ
)
. If there are more than 2 players, the generalization of
part (2.a) of Proposition 1.4 requires that σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
is decreasing for all j 6= i. Moreover,
when the players have substitutability in actions but the β’s are large enough relative to
α, an equilibrium under information structure F is increasing. By an argument similar to
that for part (2.a), (1.13) is positive; therefore, the marginal problem
〈
F i, v˜i
〉
is not strongly
similar to the new problem
〈
F i, w˜i
〉
. By Proposition 1.3, the value of information is lower
in the equilibrium under information structure F than in the equilibrium under information
structure
(
F i, φ
)
, as in Vives (1984).
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1.4.3.2 Monotone Information structure The second class of information structures
we consider is the monotone information structure. Under a monotone information structure,
we do not have a closed form solution in general. For this reason, to the best of my knowledge,
no paper has studied a quadratic game with a monotone information structure that is not
affine. However, we are still able to extend our previous results to monotone information
structure.
Definition 1.4 (Monotone information structure). An information structure is monotone
if and only if
M1 Xi and Θ are compact and convex subsets of R.
M2 For all i ∈ I, E (θ|xi) is continuous and increasing in xi.
M3 For all i, j ∈ I, i 6= j, F (xj|xi) is continuous in xi and xj and decreasing in xi. i.e. The
conditional distribution of xj given xi can be ordered by first order stochastic dominance.
Given such an information structure, there exists an unique equilibrium. Moreover, if the
players have complementarity in actions, the equilibrium is also increasing, as established
in Lemma 1.5. Intuitively, (M1) ensures that the players’ best responses are bounded.
(M2) implies that given a higher signal xi the expected state of the world is higher and
(M3) implies that player j’s expected action is also higher as long as player j’s strategy
is increasing. Complementarity then ensures that player i would also take a higher action
given a higher signal.
Lemma 1.5. In a quadratic game with monotone information structure, the equilibrium
is unique and continuous. Moreover, if the players have complementarity in actions, the
equilibrium is also increasing.
The proof of Lemma 1.5 is simple. Given that our assumption that |α| < 1, the best
response mapping is a contraction. The contraction mapping theorem then implies that the
game has a unique equilibrium.9 When α ≥ 0, (M2) and (M3) ensure that the best response
mapping also preserves monotonicity, implying an increasing fixed point.
9The same approach is used in Mason and Valentinyi (2010) to establish the existence and uniqueness of
monotone pure strategy equilibrium in Bayesian games under a different set of assumptions.
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Given that σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
and σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
are increasing in the signals, (M3) ensures that
the covariance between the two strategies must be positive. Just like in the case of the affine
information structure, when the players have substitutability in actions, we need additional
assumptions on the equilibrium strategies to show the complementarity/substitutability in
information. Thus, we have,
Proposition 1.5. In a quadratic game with monotone information structure,
1. when the players have complementarity in actions, i.e., α ≥ 0, the players have comple-
mentarity in information;
2. when the players have substitutability in actions, i.e., α ≤ 0,
a. if the equilibrium strategy σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
is decreasing, then player j’s information is
complementary to player i’s information, and
b. if the equilibrium σ∗
(
x;F
)
is increasing, then the players have substitutability in
information.
Intuitively, if a player’s action is more likely to move together with the state of the world
when the player acquires more information, then complementarity in actions leads to comple-
mentarity in information, and substitutability in actions to substitutability in information.
When the players have complementarity in action, the unique equilibrium is increasing under
both information structure
(
F i, φ
)
and F . Considering the corresponding equilibrium strat-
egy profiles σ∗
(
x;F i, φ
)
and σ∗
(
x;F
)
, (1.12) is positive by (M3). Therefore, the marginal
problem
(
F i, v˜i
)
is similar to the original problem
(
F i, u˜i
)
, and the value of information is
higher in the equilibrium under information structure F than in the equilibrium under in-
formation structure
(
F i, φ
)
, by Proposition 1.2.10 The result extends to N > 2 immediately.
With the same set of extra assumptions on σ∗
(
x;F
)
we made in Proposition 1.4, we can also
conclude the complementarity/substitutability in information when the players have substi-
tutability in actions. In the proof, the assumption of (M3) enables us to determine the signs
10However, notice that the complementarity concluded here is only relative to the null information. In
our environment, extra information always leads to a strategy that is more responsive. When the baseline
information level is not zero, there is no guarantee that the new strategy is more responsive to the signal
then the old strategy. For details, see Jime´nez-Mart´ınez (2012) and Ui and Yoshizawa (2015).
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of (1.12) and (1.13) as long as the equilibrium strategy is monotone, without relying on a
closed form solution.
The monotone information structure goes beyond the normal-quadratic setting. Adher-
ing to the quadratic payoff function greatly simplifies the induced marginal problem. By
Lemma 1.3, we only need to evaluate the sign of the covariance between two equilibrium
strategies to apply either Proposition 1.2 or Proposition 1.3. Extending our results with
monotone information structure beyond the quadratic payoff function, however, will be chal-
lenging, as Lemma 1.3 no long holds.
1.4.4 A Global game
In this section, we apply the concept of similarity to obtain sufficient conditions for a decrease
in the value of information in a global game with heterogeneous agents. While our sufficient
conditions depend on an endogenous object, the conditions give us some insights on how the
value of information changes in the global game.
Consider a global game with a continuum of investors indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Investors
choose simultaneously whether to invest (I) or not (N). The economic fundamental is char-
acterized by θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R. For each individual i, investment costs Ti ≥ 0, where Ti is a
differentiable function of the index i with bounded derivative. The return to a successful
investment is 1 and an investment is successful if and only if the proportion of investors who
choose to invest is high enough, i.e., p > 1− θ. The payoff to no investment is always 0. To
summarize, the payoff function for investor i is given by
ui (I, p, θ) =
 1− Ti if p > 1− θ,−Ti o.w., and u (N, p, θ) = 0.
The payoff function ui exhibits complementarity in investor i’s own action and the other
investors’ average action p since
ui (I, p
′, θ)− ui (N, p′, θ) ≥ ui (I, p, θ)− ui (N, p, θ) if p′ ≥ p.
We consider how the value of investor i’s private information changes with the other investors’
strategies. We impose the following assumptions on the information structure.
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Definition 1.5 (Monotone information structure in global games). An information structure
F of the global game is monotone if and only if it satisfies the followings:
MG1.1 θ and xi are continuous random variables,
MG1.2 The support set Θ is convex, and the support set Xi is convex and compact,
MG2 Conditional on θ, xi is i.i.d.,
MG3 F (xi|θ′) ≤ F (xi|θ) if θ′ > θ,
MG4 There exists k > 0 such that for all xi ∈ Xi and θ¯ ∈ [0, 1], ∂ Pr(θ>θ¯|xi)∂xi ≥ k.
(MG2) assumes that the investors are homogeneous in private information. (MG3)
and (MG4) impose monotonicity on the information structure, which, together with the
complementarity of own action with both the state of the world and the average action,
guarantees the existence of a monotone equilibrium in cut-off strategies. Notice that (MG4)
also implies that [0, 1] ⊆ Θ. We will focus on equilibrium in cut-off strategies. Investor i’s
strategy σi is a cut-off strategy if and only if there exists τi ∈ Xi such that
σi =
 I if xi > τi,N if xi < τi.
With a slight abuse of notation, we also denote a cut-off strategy σi by its cut-off τi. Given
that each investor is using a cut-off strategy, (MG3) implies that each investor is more likely
to invest when the state is high. Thus, we have,
Lemma 1.6. Given that each investor i uses a cut-off strategy τi and the cutoff τi is con-
tinuous in i, then the average action p is an increasing function of θ.
Given the cut-off strategies of the investors, the average action p is a deterministic
function of the state of the world θ. Since, by Lemma 1.6, p (θ) is an increasing function that
is bounded between 0 and 1, there exists a unique cut-off θ ∈ [0, 1] such that p (θ)+θ = 1. As
Pr (p > 1− θ|xi = τi) = 1−F
(
θ|xi = τi
)
, the cut-off θ then implies a unique best response in
cut-off strategy for each investor. An application of Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem shows
that there exists an equilibrium in cut-off strategies.
Lemma 1.7. In a global game with a monotone information structure, there exists an equi-
librium in cut-off strategies.
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Holding investor i’s cost fixed, consider two games with different cost functions, T ′−i and
T ′′−i. In the equilibria in cut-off strategies considered, investor j’s optimal cut-off strategies
are τ ′j and τ
′′
j , and the corresponding cut-offs for the state are θ
′
and θ
′′
, respectively.
Investor i’s payoff function is
u˜i (I, θ) = 1{θ>θ′} − Ti, and u˜i (N, θ) = 0
in the original problem. Investor i’s payoff function is
w˜i (I, θ) = 1{θ>θ′′} − Ti, and w˜i (N, θ) = 0
in the new problem. Therefore, investor i’s payoff function is
v˜i (I, θ) = 1{θ>θ′′} − 1{θ>θ′}, and v˜i (N, θ) = 0
in the marginal problem. Given the payoff function in the marginal problem, we have,
Lemma 1.8. (No) Investment is an optimal default action in the marginal problem if and
only if θ
′′ ≤ (≥) θ′.
If θ
′′
> θ
′
, v˜i (I, θ) = −1 for θ ∈ (θ′, θ′′], and v˜i (I, θ) = 0 otherwise. Thus, no investment
strictly dominates any other cut-off strategies in the marginal problem, and no investment is
the optimal default action in the marginal problem. Similarly, investment strictly dominates
any other cut-off strategies in the marginal problem if θ
′′
< θ
′
, and investment is the optimal
default action in the marginal problem. Therefore, unless θ
′′
= θ
′
, the marginal problem
is similar to neither the original problem nor the new problem. Consider the two cases in
which the default actions in the original and marginal problems are the same and apply
Proposition 1.3, we immediately conclude that,
Proposition 1.6. Investor i’s value of information (strictly) decreases if,
1) the cut-off θ in the new equilibrium is (strictly) higher than in the original equilibrium,
and no investment is an optimal default action in the original equilibrium, or
2) the cut-off θ in the new equilibrium is (strictly) lower than in the original equilibrium,
and investment is an optimal default action in the original equilibrium.
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Applying the concept of similarity to the marginal problem, we obtain two sufficient
conditions for one direction of change in the value of information. Although the cut-off θ is
an endogenous object, the conditions provide us some idea of how the value of information
changes. Intuitively, when the market sentiment is “bad” enough so that not investing is
optimal in the absence of information, a further decrease in the aggregate investment renders
information even less useful, as the investor may as well withdraw from the market. Similar
intuition applies to the opposite case when the market sentiment is “good”. Notice that
when both investment and no investment are optimal default actions in the original problem,
Proposition 1.6 implies that investor i’s value of information must decrease, regardless of how
the strategies of the other investors change.
1.4.5 Multi-expert persuasion game
In this section, we apply the concept of similarity to deduce the substitutability of infor-
mation in a multi-expert persuasion game studied by Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013).
Some assumptions in Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013) that are unimportant for our pur-
pose are relaxed. The model has a single decision-maker (DM) and two experts. The players
have a commonly known prior belief on the state of the world θ ∈ [0, 1] that is distributed
according to a probability density function f that is continuous, bounded above, and has
full support. The DM’s payoff uDM (y, θ) depends on the state of the world θ and the action
y ∈ [0, 1] she takes. The function uDM is twice differentiable. Moreover, given θ ∈ [0, 1],
the function uDM (., θ) is strictly concave and is maximized at y = θ. The payoff of expert
i ∈ {1, 2} is given by the function ui (y, θ). The two experts have opposite and extreme bi-
ases. That is, given θ ∈ [0, 1], u1 (., θ) is strictly increasing and u2 (., θ) is strictly decreasing.
If expert i acquires information, expert i receives signal xi = θ with probability pi ∈ (0, 1)
and xi = ϕ with probability 1 − pi, independent of the signal of expert j. With the null
information structure, expert i always receives the null signal xi = ϕ.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, each player receives a signal privately and
then simultaneously sends a message to the DM. The message mi that expert i can send is
restricted to {ϕ, xi}. In other words, he can only choose to reveal or conceal his signal. In
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particular, expert i can only send mi = ϕ if xi = ϕ. Next, the DM chooses y based on the
messages she receives and the game ends.
Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013) show that the equilibrium of this game is charac-
terized by a null action y∗, which the DM takes when m1 = m2 = ϕ. Moreover, expert 1 (2)
reveals his signal if x1 > y
∗ (x2 < y∗) and hides his signal if x1 < y∗ (x2 > y∗). When the
received signal is equal to y∗, the expert is indifferent between sending y∗ or ϕ and either
message can be sent in equilibrium. When a nonempty message, i.e., mi 6= ϕ, is received,
the DM chooses the optimal action y = mi.
We are interested in how the presence of expert 2 changes the value of information to
expert 1. In answering this question, we consider two equilibria: in one equilibrium, expert
2 has no information; and in another equilibrium, expert 2 has information. We call the
former the original equilibrium and the latter the new equilibrium. Let y∗n (y
∗
o) be the null
action in the equilibrium in which expert 1 has information and expert 2 has information
(no information). We have,
Lemma 1.9. The equilibrium null action shifts towards expert 1’s preferred action after
expert 2 have acquired information, but it does not reach the upper bound. i.e., y∗o < y
∗
n < 1.
We construct the original problem and the new problem corresponding to the original
equilibrium and the new equilibrium, respectively. Then we define the induced marginal
problem accordingly. Given null information, expert 1 can only send m1 = ϕ; therefore,
expert 1’s default action is identical in all three problems. The payoff difference between
expert 1’s optimal decision rule for the new problem, the cut-off strategy y∗n, and the default
action m1 = ϕ in the marginal problem is
−p1
∫ 1
y∗n
{u1 (y∗n, θ)− u1 (y∗o, θ)} f (θ) dθ. (1.14)
By Lemma 1.9, (1.14) is always negative. Thus, the marginal problem is not similar to the
new problem.11 Applying Proposition 1.3, we conclude that
Proposition 1.7. In the persuasion game of Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013), experts
with opposite and extreme biases have substitutability in information.
11Similarly, we can also show that the marginal problem is not similar to the original problem.
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This result can be understood intuitively. When an expert with opposite and extreme
bias acquires information and reports strategically, the DM increases her null action from y∗o
to y∗n. This change has two effects on the value of expert 1’s information. First, whenever
expert 1 reveals his information in the new equilibrium, the DM’s null action is lifted from y∗n
to θ instead of from y∗o. Since y
∗
o < y
∗
n, the gain from revealing information is less in the new
equilibrium. The decrease in the expected gain from revealing information is captured by
(1.14), which we obtain from the marginal problem. Second, Expert 1 has less opportunity
to use his information in the new equilibrium. Since he only uses his information when the
state is higher than the null action, y∗o < y
∗
n implies that information is less likely to be
useful to expert 1 in the new problem. Notice that the second effect does not appear in our
calculation because, by applying Proposition 1.3, we have bypassed it by noticing that it
must be negative.12
One might be interested in knowing if the answer to our question changes when the
experts have the same bias. In this case, applying the concept of similarity yields no predic-
tion. Although the negative forces identified in the previous paragraph seem to turn positive
when the DM’s null action decreases, one must add to it the effect of expert 2’s disclosure.
Since the experts have the same ordinal preference, whenever expert 1 would like to reveal
information, so does expert 2. Thus, expert 1’s disclosure may be unnecessary and duplicate
expert 2’s. This effect reduces the value of information.13 Without specifying the functions
involved any further, one cannot compare the positive and negative effects and decide if
there is complementarity in information.
12The negative effect arises from the suboptimality of the optimal strategy for the new problem in the
original problem.
13The negative effect of duplicated disclosure on the value of information is best illustrated by the presence
of a non-strategic expert 2, i.e., expert 2 sends m2 = ϕ only when x2 = ϕ. In this case, a change from
an equilibrium in which expert 2 has no information to an equilibrium in which expert 2 has information
decreases the value of information to expert 1. This is because with some probability, the DM learns the true
state from expert 2 and expert 1’s disclosure does not make a difference. In Appendix A, we demonstrate
this by showing that the marginal problem is not similar to the new problem.
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1.5 CONCLUSION
We introduce the concept of similarity in this paper. This concept speaks to a lot of decision
making situations. Given a fixed information structure, the ranking of value of information is
closely related to the idea of similarity. We apply the concept of similarity to quadratic game,
persuasion game and global game. In all three games, we study the value of information in
equilibrium without relying on a closed form solution. The same approach may be used to
explore a wider range of games.
In the future, we hope to explore the concept of similarity in individual decision prob-
lems. In our daily lives, we often make decisions based on our instinct rather than rational
calculations. Our instinct in turn builds on years of experience with problems that are similar
but not identical to the present problem. Also, firms develop payment structures, corporate
cultures, and ranking systems. None of these are tailored incentive schemes, but they work
reasonably well for employees that do not have too much idiosyncrasy. Therefore, studying
how similarity may play a role in designing decision rules for a family of decision problems
may advance our understanding of decision making under bounded rationality. Finally, we
show in this paper that similarity does not have nice properties in general, in the future, we
hope to find useful conditions under which the similarity relation is symmetric and transitive.
33
2.0 WHEN MONITORING HURTS: ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION
ACQUISITION IN A GAME OF PERSUASION
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Conflict of interest is an important issue for many regulatory procedures and market prac-
tices. For example, in the aviation industry, dangerous mechanical flaws have been found
to be known to the manufacturers but were kept from the public before they caused major
accidents. In the crash of Turkish Airlines Flight 981, technical fault with the cargo door was
recognized by the McDonnel Douglas Company even during the design process of DC-10.
But the company was financially strained and eager to put the new model into the market.
346 people were killed in the incident. A lot of questions have been raised subsequently on
engineering ethics and on the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) regulatory
policy.
It is widely recognized that when experts have their own interest in the decision, they may
influence the decision maker by withholding information. In the DC-10 example, reporting
the technical fault would definitely sabotage the sale of the new model. Yet, one dimension
of the problem that is often overlooked is that the incentives for expert to collect decision-
relevant data also depend on the decision maker’s policy. If the expert does not expect to
influence the decision, resource would not be put to such activities. We study the interactions
between the expert and the decision maker (DM) in a formal model and ask the following
question: Is it beneficial for a DM to monitor the expert’s data collection activities?
We show that monitoring may hurt the DM. More specifically, we consider a model with
a DM, who needs to make a state-contingent decision, and an expert, who has the capacity
to acquire information about the state of nature. The DM always wants to match the action
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with the state, but the expert is biased and prefers a higher final action. The DM could
learn from the expert about the state by communication, but cannot commit to her actions.
Before communication begins, the expert puts in effort to conduct investigations. Higher
effort results in a higher probability of obtaining a piece of hard evidence about the exact
realization of the state of nature. In the communication stage, the expert chooses whether to
present or conceal the hard evidence he has obtained. As information conveyed by the hard
evidence is assumed to be verifiable by the DM, the DM will always choose the action that
is most appropriate whenever hard evidence is presented. When no evidence is presented,
however, the DM needs to make inference on the lack of evidence. As a result, the expert
only reveals information when signals are favorable. We distinguish two games with respect
to the monitoring of effort. In the overt game, the expert’s effort is publicly monitored by
the DM. In the covert game, the expert’s effort is private.
When the expert’s bias is extreme, the expert always acquire more information in the
covert game than in the overt game. The logic of this result can be understood intuitively
as follows. Suppose in the overt game the DM observes a high effort and no evidence is
presented afterwards. The DM rationally concludes there is a high probability that the
expert is withholding unfavorable evidence, and thus the state is likely to be relatively low.
Therefore, the final action taken by the DM upon observing a high effort would also be low
in the lack of hard evidence. This consideration is foreseen by the expert in the information
acquisition stage. Thus, he would lower his effort accordingly to avoid the unfavorable
action in case of concealing. On the other hand, such strategic consideration is absent in the
covert game. As a result, the expert exerts more effort without the DM’s monitoring. This
argument shows that when the effort level is observable to the DM, an increase in effort has
two opposite effects on the expert’s gain, namely, the information precision effect and the
default action effect. The information precision effect is always positive, as the expert is free
to use the evidence once he has obtained it. This creates an option value. The default action
effect, however, arises from the DM’s adjustment of expectation and is always negative. In
the covert game, the expert faces no default action effect when choosing the effort level,
because the default action depends on expected effort level only. This argument carries on
to the situation with a less extreme expert.
35
The DM’s expected payoff is strictly increasing in the expert’s effort level when the
expert’s gain from the DM’s decision is strictly monotone. With this assumption, we are
able to show that the DM strictly prefers to play the covert game in a very general setting.
When this assumption does not hold, i.e., an expert with a small upward bias, the DM does
not necessarily always prefer higher effort. To discuss the case of a less extreme expert,
we employ a “uniform-quadratic” specification of our model. We show that this result
does not apply to settings in which the preferences of the expert and the DM are partially
aligned. Monitoring could be beneficial if the DM and expert’s interests are partially aligned.
However, contrary to everyday experiences, monitoring is beneficial only when the expert
has a small enough bias, but never so if the expert has a large bias.
2.1.1 Related Literature
Our paper belongs to the literature of “persuasion games” introduced by Milgrom and
Roberts (1986). This class of games differs from another important class of games, the
“cheap talk” games introduced by Crawford and Sobel (1982), by the assumption of ver-
ifiable information transmission. Although our game is not a cheap talk game, parallel
development in the cheap talk literature is also worth noting.
The related literature can be roughly grouped into three categories. The first category,
to which this paper belongs, consists of single-expert models with endogenous information
acquisition before communication begins. The second category consists of multiple-expert
models with exogenous “expertise”. The third category consists of multiple-expert models
with endogenous information acquisition.
In the first category, the paper closest to ours is Henry (2009). He considers a persuasion
game setting in which the unraveling result of Milgrom and Roberts (1986) holds. As a
result, the DM’s payoff is always monotone in the expert’s effort, so monitoring always hurts
regardless of the expert’s bias. In contrast, bias matters in our setting. Another related
paper in the first category is Che and Kartik (2009). They consider a covert persuasion
game similar to ours and show that a greater difference between the prior beliefs of the
expert and the DM provides more incentives for the expert to exert effort but also causes
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him to disclose less of the information he acquires. The choice of effort level is always
private in their paper. Argenziano, Squintani and Severinov (2015) and Pei (2015) consider
both overt and covert games in cheap talk settings. Pei (2015), in particular, shows that
monitoring can hurt, but the logic of his result is quite different from ours.
In the second category, the paper closest to ours is Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013).
In a multiple-expert persuasion game, they show that from the DM’s standpoint, higher
“quality” of the expert (i.e., a higher probability of acquiring information) does not nec-
essarily improve the DM’s ex ante welfare. Moreover, the DM always prefers expert with
“extreme” preference. Our paper further endogenizes the “quality” parameter in their model.
Many papers in the cheap talk literature are devoted to the study of competition between
experts. Examples include Battaglini (2002), Krishna and Morgan (2001), and many others.
In the last category, Kartik, Xu Lee and Suen (2015) show in a multiple-expert covert
persuasion game that competition reduces the experts’ effort and it is possible that the DM
gets worse off by hearing from one more expert.
In our model, the DM (principal) is unable to commit to an action. Contract based on
the expert’s (agent) report or effort cannot be made ex ante. This assumption is key to our
results. With commitment, additional signal of the agent’s action can never be detrimental
to the principal. The principal can simply credibly ignore the information. In the “classical”
moral hazard principal-agent problem of Holmstro¨m (1979), additional information about
agent’s action can never hurt the principal. It is strictly beneficial if and only if the principal
does not already observe a signal that is a sufficient statistic for the additional information.
In a cheap talk setting, Szalay (2005) incorporates both commitment power and costly
information acquisition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model. Section
2.3 provides the characterizations of the equilibria. Section 2.4 presents the main results.
Section 2.5 extends the analysis to the “uniform-quadratic” case. Section 2.6 concludes.
Appendix B contains all proofs omitted in the text.
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2.2 MODEL
We study a persuasion game between a decision-maker (DM) and an expert. The DM needs
to choose an action y ∈ Y that is most appropriate given the underlying state of the nature
θ ∈ Θ. We assume that Θ is a compact subset of Y and Y is a compact and convex subset
of the real line R itself.1 The payoff of the DM from taking action y ∈ Y in state θ ∈ Θ is
given by the function uDM (y, θ). The function uDM : Y × Y → R is twice differentiable.2
Moreover, given θ ∈ Θ, the function uDM (·, θ) is strictly concave and is maximized at y = θ.
As Θ ⊆ Y , the DM would always take the action y = θ if θ is known to her. The expert’s
gain from the DM’s action is given by a twice differentiable function uE : Y × Y → R. We
call uE (y, θ) the gain function of the expert. Notice that in our model the expert’s gain
could be negative even though its name may suggest otherwise. We make the following
assumption on uE throughout
Assumption MON: Given θ ∈ Θ, the function uE (·, θ) is strictly increasing.
That is, the expert always prefers a higher action. This leads to a conflict of interest be-
tween the DM and the expert. This assumption on the expert’s gain function are admittedly
restrictive. Nevertheless, it is also realistic and seems to match many real-world examples
of persuasion. For example, the DM could be the congress or any decision-making body
in a government, the expert could be an interest group from an industry and the action y
could be taken as the amount of subsidy on that industry. This assumption will be relaxed
in Section 2.5. Note also that the standard concavity assumption of utility function is not
imposed to the expert here.
The DM and the expert have a commonly known prior belief on the state of nature
that is given by a probability distribution function F : Y → R. The support of probability
distribution function F (·) is equal to Θ. The distribution admits a probability density
function f that is continuous and bounded above.
1The assumption that the sets Θ and Y are bounded is not important for our results. Allowing these sets
to be unbounded brings technical complications but no additional economic insights. For example, extra
assumptions must be made to make sure all the integrals involved in our calculations exist.
2The extension of the domain of uDM from Y × Θ to Y × Y allows us to simplify some notations. It is
of no consequence otherwise.
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The expert can potentially obtain hard evidence about the realized state θ by engaging
in costly investigation. If his investigation is successful, he knows exactly the realized state
of nature θ and is able to demonstrate the truth by presenting the verifiable hard evidence
he obtained. In the beginning of the game, the expert chooses the probability that his
investigation is successful, p ∈ [0, p], where 0 < p < 1, at a cost c(p). We will refer to
p as the probability of success or the effort level interchangeably. We say a cost function
c(·) is regular if it is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and convex and it satisfies the
Inada conditions c′(0) = 0 and c′(p) → ∞ as p → p. Except in Example 2.2 of Section 2.5,
we assume regular cost function throughout this paper. The parameter p is a upper bound
on the probability of success that the expert can achieve and thus represents a limit of the
investigation technology.
After the probability of success p is chosen, the expert privately observes the outcome
of the investigation. At this stage, the expert can either be “informed” (the investigation
is successful) or “uninformed” (the investigation is not successful) about the true state of
nature. Next, the expert sends a report m to the DM. If the expert is informed, he has the
choice of disclosing the state by presenting the verifiable evidence he obtained (i.e., m = θ)
or conceal it (i.e., m = φ). On the other hand, an uninformed expert has no choice but to
send an empty report (i.e., m = φ). After receiving the report, the DM chooses the action
y and payoffs are realized.
Following Argenziano, Squintani and Severinov (2014), we call the game in which the
choice of the effort level p is publicly observed the overt game and the game in which the
DM does not observe the expert’s choice of p the covert game. The focus of this paper is to
compare these two games.
A pure strategy of the expert in both games is given by a pair (p˜,m(p, θ)), where p˜ ∈ [0, p]
is the expert’s choice of effort level and m(p, θ) ∈ {θ, φ} specifies the expert’s report if he
has exerted effort p ∈ [0, p] and he is informed that the realized state is θ ∈ Θ. Notice that
m(p, θ) should be well-defined given all p ∈ [0, p] and θ ∈ Θ. In the overt game, a pure
strategy of the DM is a function y (p,m), which specifies the action y of the DM if choice of
effort p is observed and report m is received. In the covert game, a pure strategy y (m) of
the DM is a function of the report m only, as the choice of effort p is not observed by the
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DM.
The solution concept we used is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies.
We will simply refer to it as equilibrium at times. Let µO(θ|p,m) be the posterior belief of
the DM upon receiving the expert’s report m and observing the choice of effort p in the overt
game. Let µC(p, θ|m) be the posterior belief of the DM upon receiving the expert’s report
m in the covert game. We have the following definitions.
Definition 2.1. A strategy profile
((
p∗
O
,m∗
O
(p, θ)
)
, y∗
O
(p,m)
)
along with a belief µ∗
O
(θ|p,m)
constitutes a PBE of the overt game if the following holds:
1. The expert choose p∗
O
to maximize expected payoff given m∗
O
(p, θ) and y∗
O
(p,m).
2. For all p ∈ [0, p¯], θ ∈ Θ, m∗
O
(p, θ) = θ if and only if
uE
(
y∗
O
(p, θ), θ
)
> uE
(
y∗
O
(p, φ), θ
)
.
3. For all p ∈ [0, p¯], m ∈ Θ ∪ {φ}, the DM’s action y∗
O
(p,m) satisfies
y∗
O
(p,m) = arg max
y∈Y
∫
Θ
uDM (y, θ) dµ∗O(θ|p,m).
4. The posterior belief of the DM µ∗
O
(θ|p, φ) is obtained by using Bayes rule given the prior
belief F (θ), the choice of effort p observed, the actual report of the expert m and the report-
ing strategy m∗
O
(p, θ) whenever possible. Also, if the expert makes an out-of-equilibrium
report that reveals the state θ, the off-equilibrium belief is not allowed to put weight on
any θ′ ∈ Θ other than θ. That is, for all θ ∈ Θ, θ ∈ Θ,∫
{θ′∈Θ:θ′≤θ}
dµ∗
O
(θ′|p, θ) = 1{θ≥θ}
(
θ
)
,
where 1{θ≥θ} is indicator function for the event
{
θ ∈ Θ|θ ≥ θ}.
Definition 2.2. A strategy profile ((p∗C ,m
∗
C(p, θ)) , y
∗
C(m)) along with a belief µ
∗
C(p, θ|m)
constitutes a PBE of the covert game if the following holds:
1. The expert choose p∗C to maximize expected payoff given m
∗
C(p, θ) and y
∗
C(m).
2. For all p ∈ [0, p¯], θ ∈ Θ, m∗C(p, θ) = θ if and only if
uE (y∗C(θ), θ) > u
E (y∗C(φ), θ) .
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3. For all m ∈ Θ ∪ {φ}, the DM’s action y∗C(m) satisfies
y∗C(m) = arg max
y∈Y
∫
[0,p]×Θ
uDM (y, θ) dµ∗C(p, θ|m).
4. The posterior belief of the DM µ∗C(p, θ|m) is obtained by using Bayes rule given the prior
belief F (θ), the actual report of the expert m and the reporting strategy m∗C(p, θ) whenever
possible. Moreover, the belief is consistent with the equilibrium choice of effort level p∗C.
That is, for all p ∈ [0, p∗C), for all m ∈ Θ ∪ {φ},∫
[0,p]×Θ
dµ∗C(p
′, θ|m) = 0.
Moreover, for all p ∈ [p∗C , p], for all m ∈ Θ ∪ {φ},
∫
[0,p]×Θ
dµ∗C(p
′, θ|m) is independent
of p. Also, if the expert makes an out-of-equilibrium report that reveals the state θ, the
off-equilibrium belief is not allowed to put weight on any θ′ ∈ Θ other than θ. That is,
for all θ ∈ Θ, θ ∈ Θ, ∫
[0,p¯]×{θ′∈Θ:θ′≤θ}
dµ∗C(p
′, θ′|θ) = 1{θ≥θ}
(
θ
)
,
where 1{θ≥θ} is indicator function for the event
{
θ ∈ Θ|θ ≥ θ}.
Two remarks are in order. First, we have assumed in condition 2 of Definitions 2.1
and 2.2 that when the expert is indifferent between sending a true report and concealing
the evidence, the expert always conceals the evidence. As the probability that the expert
is indifferent is always zero, this restriction is without loss of generality. Second, following
Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013), we impose an off-the-equilibrium path belief restriction
in Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 that is not a part of the canonical definition of the PBE. The extra
assumptions are needed because our modelling assumptions require that whenever the hard
evidence is presented, the DM is able to verify the true state, even if the hard evidence is
not supposed to be presented in equilibrium.
To begin our analysis of the overt and covert games, we introduce an auxiliary game
Γ (p) for each p ∈ [0, p]. An auxiliary game Γ (p) is a proper subgame of the overt game,
which starts after the effort level is publicly chosen to be p. Our equilibrium notion for the
overt game requires any equilibrium of the overt game to generate a PBE in each of the
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auxiliary game Γ (p). Notice that an auxiliary game Γ (p) is not a subgame of the covert
game. However, it will be important for us to analyze the covert game as we shall see in the
next section.
Definition 2.3. Given p ∈ [0, p], a strategy profile (m∗(θ), y∗(m)) along with a belief µ∗(θ|m)
constitutes a PBE of the auxiliary game Γ (p) if the following holds:
1. For all θ ∈ Θ, m(θ) = θ if and only if
uE (y∗ (θ) , θ) > uE (y∗ (φ) , θ) .
2. For all m ∈ Θ ∪ {φ}, the DM’s action y∗(m) satisfies
y∗ (m) = arg max
y∈Y
∫
Θ
uDM (y, θ) dµ∗(θ|m).
3. The posterior belief of the DM µ∗(θ|m) is obtained by using Bayes rule given the prior
belief F (θ), the actual report of the expert m and the reporting strategy m∗ (θ) whenever
possible. Also, if the expert makes an out-of-equilibrium report that reveals the state θ,
the off-equilibrium belief is only allowed to put weight on θ. That is, for all θ ∈ Θ, θ ∈ Θ,∫
{θ′∈Θ:θ′≤θ}
dµ∗(θ′|θ) = 1{θ≥θ}
(
θ
)
,
where 1{θ≥θ} is indicator function for the event
{
θ ∈ Θ|θ ≥ θ}.
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2.3 EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATIONS
Without loss of generality, we further assume Y = [0, 1] from now on to simplify the presen-
tation. To begin with, we characterize equilibrium of the auxiliary game Γ (p). Our auxiliary
game Γ (p) is similar to the single-expert version of Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013). It
can be characterized accordingly.
Proposition 2.1. Given p ∈ [0, p], the unique equilibrium of the auxiliary game Γ (p) is
characterized by a default action y∗ (p) ∈ (0, 1) such that the DM takes the default action
y∗ (p) whenever the expert fails to report the state and the corresponding action if the expert
reports the state. That is,
y∗ (m) =
 θy∗ (p) if m = θif m = φ ,
where y∗ (p) is pinned down by
p
∫ y∗(p)
0
uDM1 (y
∗ (p) , θ) f (θ) dθ + (1− p)
∫ 1
0
uDM1 (y
∗ (p) , θ) f (θ) dθ = 0. (2.1)
Moreover, the expert reports the state when θ > y∗ (p) and remains silent when θ ≤ y∗ (p).
That is,
m∗ (θ) =
 θφ if θ > y
∗ (p)
if θ ≤ y∗ (p)
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
To understand the characterization, we work backward from the last stage of the game.
If the state is revealed, the DM trivially takes the action that exactly matches the state.
If the expert fails to reveal the state, the DM takes a default action y∗ (p) that maximizes
her expected payoff taking into account the possibility that the expert fails to obtain any
information as well as the possibility that the expert does know the true state but withholds
the information under the equilibrium reporting strategy m∗. Next, as the gain of the expert
is strictly increasing in the DM’s action, the expert reports the state when θ > y∗ (p) and
remains silent when θ ≤ y∗ (p). The first order condition of the DM’s optimization problem
together with the reporting strategy m∗ give us (2.1). Proposition 2.1 implies that y∗ (m) is
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unique given p and m∗ (θ) is unique given y∗ (p). To stress the dependence, we also write
y∗ (m) and m∗ (θ) as y∗ (m|p) and m∗ (θ|y∗ (p)), respectively.
The importance of Proposition 2.1 is that the default action y∗ (p) fully characterizes
the equilibrium of the auxiliary game Γ (p). Using the function y∗ (p), we write the ex ante
equilibrium payoff of the DM and the ex ante equilibrium gain of the expert of the auxiliary
game Γ (p) as functions of p and y∗ (p) only. Define
UDM (p,y∗ (p)) ≡ p
∫ 1
y∗(p)
uDM (θ, θ) f (θ) dθ + p
∫ y∗(p)
0
uDM (y∗ (p) , θ) f (θ) dθ
+ (1− p)
∫ 1
0
uDM (y∗ (p) , θ) f (θ) dθ. (2.2)
and
UE (p,y∗ (p)) ≡ p
∫ 1
y∗(p)
uE (θ, θ) f (θ) dθ + p
∫ y∗(p)
0
uE (y∗ (p) , θ) f (θ) dθ
+ (1− p)
∫ 1
0
uE (y∗ (p) , θ) f (θ) dθ (2.3)
We have the following result.
Proposition 2.2. There always exists an equilibrium of the overt game. A strategy profile((
p∗
O
,m∗
O
(p, θ)
)
, y∗
O
(p,m)
)
of the overt game is an equilibrium strategy profile if and only if
p∗
O
= arg max
p∈[0,p]
UE (p, y∗ (p))− c (p) , (2.4)
m∗
O
(p, θ) = m∗ (θ|y∗ (p))
and
y∗
O
(p,m) = y∗ (m|p) .
Proof. See Appendix B.
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To proceed, we take a look at the first order condition for (2.4), if p is endogenous and
observable to the DM, the expert’s optimal choice of p must satisfy
dUE (p,y∗ (p))
dp
 = c′ (p)≤ c′ (p) if p > 0if p = 0 . (2.5)
Note that (2.5) is only necessary for (2.4). Moreover, the effect of a publicly observed change
in probability p on the expert’s gain can be decomposed in the following way,
dUE (p,y∗ (p))
dp
= UE1 (p,y
∗ (p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
information precision effect
+ UE2 (p,y
∗ (p)) y∗′ (p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
default action effect
, (2.6)
where the partial derivative UE1 (p,y
∗ (p)) represents the effect of a small increase in the
probability p on the expected gain of the expert, holding the strategic interactions between
the DM and the expert unchanged. The term UE2 (p,y
∗ (p)) represents the effect of a small
increase in the default action y∗ (p) on the expected gain of the expert, holding the probability
p constant. The derivative y∗′ (p) measures how the default action y∗ (p) responds to a
publicly observed change in the probability p. We will show later that the information
precision effect is always positive and the default action effect is always negative.
Next, suppose that p is endogenous but unobservable to the DM, the DM’s default action
is fixed as a particular y ∈ (0, 1), not responding to p. Because the optimal reporting strategy
of the expert depends on the DM’s default action only, it is also fixed. Therefore, fixing the
DM’s default action also keeps the strategic interactions unchanged. The relevant first order
condition becomes
UE1 (p,y
∗ (p))
 = c′ (p)≤ c′ (p) if p > 0if p = 0 . (2.7)
This leads to our equilibrium characterization of the covert game.
Proposition 2.3. There always exists an equilibrium of the covert game. A strategy profile
((p∗C ,m
∗
C(p, θ)) , y
∗
C(m)) of the covert game is an equilibrium strategy profile if and only if
UE1 (p
∗
C ,y
∗ (p∗C))
 = c′ (p∗C)≤ c′ (p∗C)
if p∗C > 0
if p∗C = 0
,
m∗C(p, θ) = m
∗ (θ|y∗ (p∗C)) ,
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and
y∗C(m) = y
∗ (m|p∗C) .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Unlike the case of the overt game, checking the relevant second order condition shows
that the first order condition (2.7) can be used to fully characterize the equilibrium effort
level p∗C . In Propositions 2.1-2.3, we have characterized the equilibrium strategy profiles
without referencing to the equilibrium beliefs directly. We will, therefore, simply refer to an
equilibrium strategy profile as equilibrium hereafter.
2.4 MAIN RESULTS
To compare the equilibria of the overt and covert games, we first investigate the dependence
of the DM’s ex ante equilibrium payoff UDM (p,y∗ (p)) on p. This would allow us to rank
equilibria of the overt and covert games according to the DM’s ex ante welfare.
Proposition 2.4. The DM’s ex ante welfare in the equilibrium of the auxiliary game Γ (p)
always increases with the probability p. That is, for each p′ ∈ [0, p],
dUDM (p,y∗ (p))
dp
|p=p′ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As we have restricted ourselves to equilibria in pure strategies, the equilibrium effort
level must be a constant in both games. Proposition 2.4 shows that the DM always prefers
an equilibrium with higher effort level. Therefore, to compare the DM’s welfare, we only
need to compare the effort levels. Next, we turn to study the properties of dU
E(p,y∗(p))
dp
and
UE1 (p,y
∗ (p)). This would allow us to study the equilibrium effort levels through (2.5) and
(2.7). We prove in Lemma B.1 in the Appendix B that for all p ∈ [0, p],∫ 1
y∗(p)
f (θ) dθ > 0. (2.8)
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That is, the probability that the true state is higher than the equilibrium default action
y∗ (p) is always positive. Next, partial-differentiating (2.3) with respect to p leads to
UE1 (p,y
∗ (p)) =
∫ 1
y∗(p)
{
uE (θ, θ)− uE (y∗ (p) , θ)} f (θ) dθ > 0. (2.9)
As uE (·, θ) is strictly increasing, by (2.8), the expression in (2.9) is strictly positive. In-
tuitively, investment in concealable information is an option investment. The expert only
reveals the state when the state is favorable (i.e., θ > y∗ (p)) and gains uE (θ)− uE (y∗ (p))
by doing so. Thus, the value of information cannot be negative to the expert in the covert
game. It follows from (2.7) and (2.9) that all equilibria of the covert game involve positive
equilibrium effort. Next, by Assumption MON, we have, for all p, p′ ∈ [0, p],
UE2 (p,y
∗ (p′)) = p
∫ y∗(p′)
0
uE1 (y
∗ (p′) , θ) f (θ) dθ + (1− p)
∫ 1
0
uE1 (y
∗ (p′) , θ) f (θ) dθ > 0.
(2.10)
Note that the inequality is true even for off-equilibrium y∗. It will become be clear later
from the proof of Theorem 2.1 that this property allows us to compare all equilibrium of
the covert game with all equilibrium of the overt game, without which only set ordering is
possible. Finally, an application of the implicit function theorem to (2.1) leads to
y∗′ (p) =
∫ 1
y∗(p)
uDM1 (y
∗ (p) , θ) f (θ) dθ
p
∫ y∗(p)
0
uDM11 (y
∗ (p) , θ) f (θ) dθ + (1− p)
∫ 1
0
uDM11 (y
∗ (p) , θ) f (θ) dθ
< 0. (2.11)
Because uDM1 (y
∗ (p) , θ) > 0 for all θ > y∗ (p) and uDM11 (y
∗ (p) , θ) < 0 for all θ ∈ [0, 1],
the expression in (2.11) is strictly less than zero by (2.8). Intuitively, an increase in the
probability p makes it more likely that the expert is withholding information given that the
expert fails to reveal the state. It is thus optimal for the DM to adjust her default action
downwards, for the expert only withholds information in lower states. (2.6), (2.10), and
(2.11) together imply that
dUE (p,y∗ (p))
dp
< UE1 (p,y
∗ (p)) , (2.12)
which suggests that the expert has less incentives to acquire information when the effort
choice is observed. However, there is a subtlety here. In an equilibrium of the covert game,
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the default action is independent of p, so the marginal gain from the expert’s viewpoint at
a particular p is
UE1 (p,y
∗ (p∗C)) =
∫ 1
y∗(p∗C)
{
uE (θ, θ)− uE (y∗ (p∗C) , θ)
}
f (θ) dθ
which depends on the equilibrium p∗C (but not on p). Therefore, a low equilibrium effort level
may result from an expectation of high default action, which is in turn due to a skeptical
belief of effort level. Therefore, to compare the two games in a meaningful way, we must look
beyond (2.12) and make an equilibrium analysis. The self-fulfilling property of the covert
games also leads to multiplicity of equilibria. To see this, total-differentiating (2.9), we have
dUE1 (p,y
∗ (p))
dp
= −
(∫ 1
y∗(p)
uE1 (y
∗ (p) , θ) f (θ) dθ
)
y∗′ (p) > 0. (2.13)
The expression in (2.13) is strictly positive by Assumption MON and (2.11). Unlike usual
models of marginal analysis where uniqueness is obtained by virtue of decreasing marginal
benefit and increasing marginal cost, (2.13) implies that both sides of the equilibrium con-
dition (2.7) are increasing in p. Therefore, as in Che and Kartik (2009), multiplicity cannot
be ruled out without further restrictions on the cost function c (·). However, Theorem 2.1,
the main result of this paper, implies that equilibrium multiplicity has no bearing on our
main message, as our comparison of the two games will not depend on how the equilibria
are picked.
Theorem 2.1. The effort level of any equilibrium of the covert game is strictly larger than
the effort level of any equilibrium of the overt game. Moreover, the DM strictly prefers any
equilibrium of the covert game over any equilibrium of the overt game.
Proof. It follows directly from (2.7) and (2.9) that all equilibria of the covert game involve
positive equilibrium effort. Next, suppose by way of contradiction that there exists an
equilibrium effort level p∗
O
of the overt game and an equilibrium effort level p∗
C
of the covert
game such that
p∗C ≤ p∗O .
There are two cases.
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1. Suppose p∗C = p
∗
O
, then, as p∗C > 0, (2.5) and (2.7) imply
UE1 (p
∗
C ,y
∗ (p∗C)) = c
′ (p∗C) = c
′ (p∗
O
)
=
dUE (p,y∗ (p))
dp
|p=p∗
O
,
which contradicts (2.12).
2. Next, suppose p∗C < p
∗
O
, then by (2.11), we have y∗ (p∗C) > y
∗ (p∗O). By the definitions
of p∗C and p
∗
O
, we must have
UE (p∗C ,y
∗ (p∗C))− c (p∗C) ≥ UE (p∗O,y∗ (p∗C))− c (p∗O) ,
and
UE (p∗O,y
∗ (p∗O))− c (p∗O) ≥ UE (p∗C ,y∗ (p∗C))− c (p∗C) ,
which imply
UE (p∗O,y
∗ (p∗O)) ≥ UE (p∗O,y∗ (p∗C)) .
By (2.10), we must have y∗ (p∗C) ≤ y∗ (p∗O). In both cases, we have reached a contradic-
tion. The last statement follows directly from Proposition 2.4.
We close this section with an example that serves to illustrate the economic force behind
our results. In this example, we assume that the DM’s payoff function is quadratic3 and the
expert’s gain function is concave in y and independent of θ. In this case, the default action
effect, UE2 (p,y
∗ (p)) y∗′ (p), overwhelms the information precision effect, UE1 (p,y
∗ (p)), so
that the value of information to the expert is never positive in the overt game. As a result,
the only equilibrium of the overt game involves zero effort.
Example 2.1. Suppose the DM’s payoff function is quadratic and the expert’s gain function
is concave in y and independent of θ, then, the unique equilibrium of the overt game involves
zero effort level. However, all equilibrium of the covert game involves a positive effort level.
Proof. See Appendix B.
3Notice that given our assumptions on the DM’s payoff function uDM (y, θ), it is without loss of generality
to assume the quadratic function take the form − (y − θ)2.
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The intuition behind this example is the following. When the DM’s payoff function is
quadratic, the equilibrium action y∗ (m) equals the conditional expected value of θ. As a
result, the unconditional expected value of the DM’s action must also equal to the mean of
the distribution F . Because the expert is risk-averse and is unable to influence the mean
value of the DM’s action, the expert optimally chooses to acquire no information in the overt
game and the DM responds by taking action equal to the mean of the distribution F . In the
covert game, however, the expert is always tempted to exert a positive level of effort. This
is because, by (2.8), there is always a positive probability that the true state is higher than
the default action and the expert would be able to gain by being able to demonstrate that.
It can be shown that if the expert’s gain function is strictly convex in y instead, equilib-
rium of the overt game in Example 2.1 would also involve positive effort level. This is because
the expert is “risk-loving” and is willing to take addition risk by investing in information.
However, as we have noted in Section 2.2, concavity of the function uE (·, θ) has no bearing
on our main results. Theorem 2.1 still holds and any equilibrium effort level of the covert
game must be strictly larger than any equilibrium effort level of the overt game.
2.5 UNIFORM-QUADRATIC CASE
Up to this point, we have assumed that the expert’s gain function is strictly increasing in the
DM’s action. This assumption, though realistic, is also restrictive. It is not difficult to think
of situations in which the interests of involved parties are partially aligned. That is, matching
the state of nature with the appropriate action is to some degree also the objective of the
expert. In this section, we extend our analysis to the “uniform-quadratic” specification that
is widely used in the literature of strategic communication. The specific functional forms
used in this section allow us to solve the games explicitly and demonstrate that monitoring
may be beneficial if the expert’s bias is small.
We assume throughout this section that Θ = Y = [0, 1], f (θ) = 1 and uDM (y, θ) =
− (y − θ)2. Moreover, the expert’s gain function is given by uE (y, θ) = − (y − θ − b)2,
where b > 0. Notice that uE (y, θ) is strictly increasing in y for all y < θ + b and strictly
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decreasing for all y > θ + b. Therefore, Assumption MON is satisfied only when b > 1.
With these specifications, the conclusion of Theorem 2.1 applies more generally to the case
when b > 1
8
. To show that, we first characterize the equilibrium of auxiliary game of our
“uniform-quadratic” model.
Proposition 2.5. Consider the “uniform-quadratic” specification, given p ∈ [0, p], the
unique equilibrium of the auxiliary game Γ (p) is characterized by a default action y∗ (p) ∈
(0, 1
2
] such that the DM takes the default action y∗ (p) whenever the expert fails to report the
state and the corresponding action if the expert reports the state. That is,
y∗ (m) =
 θ if m = θy∗ (p) if m = φ ,
where y∗ (p) is given by
y∗ (p) =

1
2
− 2b2
(
p
1−p
)
if p ≤ pˇ
√
1−p
1+
√
1−p if p > pˇ
. (2.14)
Moreover, the reporting strategy m∗ is given by
m∗ (θ) =
 θ if θ /∈ [max {y∗ (p)− 2b, 0} ,y∗ (p)]φ if θ ∈ [max {y∗ (p)− 2b, 0} ,y∗ (p)] (2.15)
where pˇ ≡ 1−4b
4b2−4b+1 .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Notice that y∗ (p) is strictly decreasing. Therefore, if b < 1
4
, by (2.15), there exists p′ < pˇ
such that the equilibrium reporting strategy m∗ of the game Γ (p′) is no longer a cutoff
strategy. That is, under the optimal strategy, the expert reports the state if θ < y∗ (p′)− 2b
or θ > y∗ (p′). On the other hand, if b ≥ 1
4
, the expert always employs a cutoff reporting
strategy in equilibrium. Although y∗ (p) is still strictly decreasing in the new specification, it
is not differentiable at pˇ. This, however, can be handled easily because the left hand limit of
the function y∗′ (p) can be used instead. Following the strategy we used in proving Theorem
2.1, we can show that the first part of Theorem 2.1 still applies with the “uniform-quadratic”
specification.
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Theorem 2.2. Consider the “uniform-quadratic” specification. The effort level of any equi-
librium of the covert game is strictly larger than the effort level of any equilibrium of the
overt game.
Proof. See Appendix B.
However, the second part of Theorem 2.1, which states that the DM’s ex ante welfare is
higher in the covert game, does not carry over. Given the equilibrium strategies specified in
Proposition 2.5, we can compute the DM’s ex ante payoff function UDM (·,y∗ (·)) explicitly,
from which we can show:
Proposition 2.6. Consider the “uniform-quadratic” specification. If b > 1
8
, the DM’s ex
ante payoff function UDM (·,y∗ (·)) is strictly increasing. If 0 < b < 1
8
, there exists pˆ ∈ [0, pˇ),
such that the DM’s ex ante payoff function UDM (·,y∗ (·)) is strictly increasing on [0, pˆ)∪(pˇ, 1]
and strictly decreasing on (pˆ, pˇ).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Figure 1 illustrates the typical shape of the function UDM (p,y∗ (p)) when b < 1
8
.
Figure 1: The DM’s ex ante payoff function UDM (0 < b < 1
8
)
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Why would the DM’s ex ante payoff decrease with effort? As shown in Proposition 2.1,
when Assumption MON is satisfied, the expert always uses a cutoff strategy. A reporting
strategy with higher p and lower y∗ is more informative than one with lower p and higher y∗ in
the sense of Blackwell. In general, Blackwell ordering on the pair (p, y∗) is a partial ordering.
However, when Assumption MON is satisfied, (2.11) suggests higher p implies lower y∗
in equilibrium. We can order the informativeness of equilibrium reporting strategy by the
effort level p alone, so the order is complete for all equilibrium pairs (p, y∗). The expert also
discloses more when he exerts higher effort. Therefore, the DM’s ex ante payoff function
cannot decrease with the effort level p (Proposition 2.4). With the “uniform-quadratic”
specification, the equilibrium reporting strategy is not necessarily a cutoff strategy. As a
result, the “informativeness” of the equilibrium reporting strategy cannot be ordered by p
alone and the DM’s ex ante payoff does not necessarily increase with effort. More information
acquired does not necessarily translate into more information disclosed.
Corollary 2.1 is a simple consequence of Proposition 2.6.
Corollary 2.1. Consider the “uniform-quadratic” specification. If either b ≥ 1
8
or p ≤ pˆ,
the DM strictly prefers any equilibrium of the covert game over any equilibrium of the overt
game.
Corollary 2.1 states that the DM strictly prefers to not monitor the expert if either the
bias of the expert is large enough (b ≥ 1
8
) or the investigation technology is limited (p ≤ pˆ).
Example 2.2 further shows that there are cases in which the DM prefers to monitor the
expert’s effort even though the equilibrium effort decreases under monitoring.
Example 2.2. Consider the “uniform-quadratic” specification, suppose b = 1
12
, p = 24
25
, and
c (p) = 0, then
pˆ = 1−
√
17
85
∈ arg max
p∈[0,p]
UDM (p,y∗ (p)) ,
and the unique equilibrium effort of the covert game p∗
C
and the unique equilibrium effort of
the overt game p∗
O
are given by
p∗
C
= p =
24
25
and p∗
O
= 1−
√
17
85
.
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Moreover, the DM strictly prefers the overt game equilibrium over the covert game equilib-
rium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Notice that the cost function in this example violates the assumptions we made in Section
2.2 and is thus not regular. Nevertheless, the main implications of the example will still hold
if we replace the zero cost function by a regular cost function that is sufficiently close to
the zero function in the Lp space, where 1 ≤ p < ∞. We will still have, p∗
C
> p∗
O
but
UDM
(
p∗
C
,y∗
(
p∗
C
))
< UDM
(
p∗
O
,y∗
(
p∗
O
))
.
In Example 2.2, the DM is strictly worse off in the covert game. It is easy to show that
with the “uniform-quadratic” specification, the DM’s ex ante payoff and the expert’s ex ante
gain are related by
UE (p,y∗ (p)) = UDM (p,y∗ (p))− b2. (2.16)
As the expert’s ex ante payoff is expected gain less cost, the expert is also strictly worse off
in the covert game in the example. In general, however, equilibrium of the covert game and
equilibrium of the overt game cannot be Pareto-ranked.
It is clear from Proposition 2.6 and Example 2.2 that we can always find a regular cost
function such that the DM strictly prefers the overt game equilibrium over the covert game
equilibrium whenever 0 < b < 1
8
.
Corollary 2.2. Consider the “uniform-quadratic” specification. If 0 < b < 1
8
, there exists
a technological limit p and a regular cost function c : [0, p] → R such that the DM strictly
prefers the overt game equilibrium over the covert game equilibrium.
2.6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study a persuasion game between a decision maker and an expert. We
show that monitoring of information acquisition hampers the expert’s incentives to acquire
information. If the expert’s gain from the DM’s decision is strictly monotone, the ex ante
welfare of the DM in any equilibrium of the covert game is strictly higher than any equilibrium
54
of the overt game. We also show that this result continues to hold in a “uniform-quadratic”
framework if the bias of the expert is large. If the expert’s bias is small, however, the DM
may still prefer to monitor even though it decreases effort.
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3.0 PARTISAN VOTING AND UNCERTAINTY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In everyday politics, partisans are considered to be hard-core supporters who do not change
their position no matter what happens. Indeed, partisan voting is an important phenomenon.
According to Huffpost Politics, the latest poll estimate of party identification in the U.S. is:
independent 31.1%, Democrat 35.6%, and Republican 28.0%. Thus, more than 60% of the
U.S. population consider themselves partisans. The population share of independent voters
has also dropped from the peak estimate of 39.6% in 2011 to the current estimate of 31.1%,
the lowest value in the past 8 years.1 Moreover, voters are likely to consider themselves
independent even though they are not. Burden and Klofstad (2005) identify more partisan
voters by asking a set of questions related to party identification than asking about party
identity directly.
Is partisan voting rational? Party supporters may appear to be stubborn and irresponsive
to persuasion. In some voting models, partisans are assumed to stick to some parties (i.e.,
Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983; Myatt, 2007). Under such
assumption, partisan voters are not rational, since they do not take useful information into
account. In other models, there is no fundamental difference between swing voters and
party supporters in terms of rationality (i.e., Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1999; Aragones
and Palfrey, 2002; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2009; Krishna and Morgan, 2011). Some voters
vote according to their information, and others do not. Swing voters and partisan voters are
classified by their responsiveness to information and a voter’s responsiveness to information
1On May 5, 2016. The latest poll estimate can be found at:
http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster/party-identification
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depends on his preference intensity.
In this paper, we consider an alternative rationalization for partisan voting, and discuss
its implications. Facing uncertainty, a Knightian decision maker’s behavior is affected by his
status quo. Voters who have a particular party as their status quo behave differently from
those who do not. The status quo bias is more powerful under larger uncertainty. When
the status quo bias is strong enough, partisan voters become hard-core supporters who are
loyal to their own party regardless of any useful information. When the status quo bias is
not strong enough, partisan voters may overcome the status quo bias and vote against their
own party.
The model in this paper is built on Myerson’s large Poisson game in a common value
setting similar to Krishna and Morgan (2012). In such games, the size of the electorate is
random. Myerson (1998 & 2000) shows the equivalence of qualitative predictions between
Poisson voting model and standard voting model with a fixed electorate. In our model,
voters are assumed to be Knightian decision makers with multiple priors. With multiple
priors, two alternatives may be incomparable. If a voter treats a party as his status quo, he
will stick to his own party when he is not able to compare two alternatives. Thus, in our
model, partisans are voters with a particular status quo and swing voters are voters without
a status quo.
We characterize four types of voting equilibrium: 1) fully informative voting equilibrium,
2) uninformative voting equilibrium, 3) partisan voting equilibrium, and 4) partial partisan
voting equilibrium. Unlike expected utility models, the Knightian model can support equi-
libria that are robust to electorate size with a set of parameters. We study such equilibria
in large elections which we call limit voting equilibria. When costly information acquisition
is introduced into a large election, there exists an equilibrium in which the swing voters
acquire some information with positive probability when the number of swing voters is more
than the difference between the numbers of partisans of the two parties. In the selected
informative voting equilibrium, swing voters rationally mix between two alternatives: either
they acquire information and vote informatively or they do not acquire information and vote
to balance the partisans’ votes.
In Section 3.2, we briefly introduce Knightian decision theory and Bewley’s inertia as-
57
sumption, and argue that party identity is a natural candidate for status quo. In Section 3.3,
the model is presented. In Section 3.4, we introduce the notion of limit voting equilibrium
and study it in our model. Section 3.5 discusses a selection criterion for limit voting equilib-
ria based on the idea of justifiable preferences. Section 3.6 presents an extension with costly
information acquisition. Section 3.7 concludes. Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix
C.
3.2 INCOMPLETE PREFERENCES AND STATUS QUO
Under uncertainty, completeness is not necessarily a reasonable axiom for individual decision
problems. Bewley (1987, 1989 & 2002) develops Knightian decision theory, which relaxes
the axiom of completeness.
Under the completeness axiom, individual decision maker is able to rank any pair of
alternatives. If preference is not complete, some alternatives are incomparable. Bewley
(2002) axiomatizes a model allowing for incompleteness with subjective probabilities.
Consider a finite state space N , the set of all probability distributions over N, M (N) :=
{pi ∈ RN : pii ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ...N,
N∑
i=1
pii = 1}, and two random monetary payoffs, x, y ∈ XN ,
where X ⊂ R is finite. Bewley characterizes incomplete preference relations represented by a
unique nonempty, closed, convex set of probability distribution Π and a continuous, strictly
increasing, concave function u : X → R, unique up to positive affine transformation, such
that
x  y if and only if
N∑
i=1
piiu(xi) >
N∑
i=1
piiu(yi) for all pi ∈ Π. (3.1)
If the set of probabilities Π is a singleton, (3.1) is equivalent to an expected utility
representation, so the ordering is complete. If Π is not a singleton, comparisons between two
alternatives are done “one probability distribution at a time.” A strict preference is obtained
only when one alternative is “strictly preferred” to the other unanimously according to any
pi ∈ Π .
In some situations, a Knightian decision maker cannot make up his mind. Bewley’s
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inertia assumption helps to settle some choice problems among incomparable alternatives.
If there is a status quo, a Knightian decision maker always choose the status quo as long
as no other alternative is strictly preferred to it according to every probability distribution.
For instance, consider two alternatives x and y, x is preferred to y for some pi ∈ Π, and
y is preferred to x for some other pi′ ∈ Π. Knightian decision rule concludes that x and y
are incomparable. A decision maker without any status quo will choose either x or y, or
randomize. A decision maker with x (y) as status quo will always choose x (y). When x
and y are comparable to each other, these three types of decision makers will make the same
choice.
3.2.1 Party Identity as Status Quo
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) in their classic The American Voter wrote:
Only in the exceptional case does the sense of individual attachment to party reflects
a formal membership or an active connection with a party apparatus. Nor does it simply
denote a voting record, although the influence of party allegiance on electoral behavior is
strong, generally this tie is a psychological identification, which can persist without a con-
sistent record of party support. Most Americans have this sense of attachment with one
party or the other. And for the individual who does, the strength and direction of party
identification are facts of central importance in accounting for attitude and behavior.
In characterizing the relation of individual to party as a psychological identification
we invoke a concept that has played an important if somewhat varied role in psychologi-
cal theories of the relation of individual or individual to group. We use the concept here
to characterize the individual’s affective orientation to an important group-object in his
environment.
One difficulty in applying Bewley’s inertia assumption is “identifying a plausible candi-
date for the role of status quo” (Lopomo, Rigotti and Shannon, 2014). In the case of partisan
voting, we find party identity, an “affective orientation” as Campbell, Converse, Miller and
Stokes (1960) put it, a natural candidate for the status quo. For all possible priors, party
supporters compare two parties. They stick to their own parties as long as it is preferred
for some priors. Therefore, to motivate a party supporter to vote against his own party, the
incentives must be strong enough. Swing voters can be considered as voters without a party
identity. As long as two parties are incomparable in the Knightian sense, a swing voter can
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cast a vote in any manner and still be rational. If complete preference ordering is assumed,
such behaviors can never occur.
3.3 THE MODEL
Two party candidates, A and B, compete in an election decided by majority voting. In the
event of a tie, the winning candidate is chosen by a fair coin toss. There are two states of
nature, α and β. Voters have a compact set of prior probabilities
[
p, p
]
, where p ∈ (1
2
, 1
)
and p ∈ (0, p).2 Each p ∈ [p, p] is a prior probability that the true state of nature is α.
Candidate A is the better choice in state α, and candidate B is the better choice in state β.
In state α, the payoff of any voters is 1 if candidate A is elected and −1 if B is elected. In
state β, things reverse.
The size of the electorate is a random variable that follows the Poisson distribution with
mean n. The probability that there are m voters is e−n n
m
m!
. After the electorate size is drawn,
voters’ party identities are determined randomly. There are three types of voters: one type
of partisan voters, labeled A or partisans of A, takes party candidate A as their status quo
choice; another type of partisan voters, labeled B or partisans of B, takes party candidate
B as their status quo; swing voters, labeled S, have no party candidate as their status quo
choice. A voter’s type is A and B with probability λA and λB, respectively, independent of
the state. Otherwise, he is a swing voter, with probability λS. Therefore, λA + λB + λS = 1.
For each type i voter, λi > 0. Therefore, the sizes of partisans of A, partisans of B and swing
voters follow the Poisson distributions with mean nA, nB, and nS, respectively, given by
nA = λAn, nB = λBn, nS = λSn.
Before casting a vote, every voter receives a private signal regarding the true state of
nature. Conditional on the true state, signals are independent. The signal takes one of two
2Since our model is symmetric, the assumption that p > 12 is without loss of generality. If p ≤ 12 , then
1− p > 1− p ≥ 12 , the results of our analysis apply if we simply switch the roles of two party candidates, A
and B.
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values, a or b. The probability of receiving each signal is
1
2
< P [a | α] = P [b | β] = q < 1. (3.2)
That is, we assume that signal is informative but inconclusive. We will relax this assumption
and allow q = 1
2
when we allow costly information acquisition in Section 3.6. The posterior
beliefs of the states after receiving the signals for each p ∈ [p, p] are
qp(α | a) = pq
pq + (1− p)(1− q) > p, and
qp(β | b) = (1− p)q
(1− p)q + p(1− q) > 1− p.
3.3.1 Pivotal Voting
An elementary event is a singleton set consisting of a pair of vote totals (k, l), where k is
the number of votes for party candidate A and l the votes for party candidate B. An event
is an union of elementary events. An event is pivotal if a single vote can affect the final
outcome of the election. There are two types of elementary events where one vote can have
an effect on the final outcome: 1) there is a tie, or 2) party candidate A has one vote less
or more than party candidate B. Let T = {(k, k) : k ≥ 0} denote the event that there is
a tie, and let T−1 = {(k − 1, k) : k ≥ 1} denote the event that A has one vote less than
B, and let T+1 = {(k, k − 1) : k ≥ 1} denote the event that A has one vote more than B.
The event pivA (pivotal if vote for A) is defined by pivA := T ∪ T−1. The event pivB is
defined similarly. Let φA and φB denote the expected number of votes for A and B in state
α, respectively. Abstention is not allowed, so φA + φB = n. τA and τB are defined similarly
for the corresponding expected votes in state β.
Let ((γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ), (γ
B
a , γ
B
b )) be a voting profile, where γ
i
s is the probability of voting
for party candidate A for a type i voter with signal s.
Suppose the expected size of the electorate is n, consider the event that there are k votes
in favor of party candidate A and l votes in favor of party candidate B. The probability of
such event in state α is
Pr[{(k, l)} | α] = e−nφ
k
A
k!
φlB
l!
.
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The probability of a tie in state α is
Pr[T | α] = e−n
∞∑
k=0
φkA
k!
φkB
k!
,
while the probability that A has one vote less than B in state α is
Pr[T−1 | α] = e−n
∞∑
k=1
φk−1A
(k − 1)!
φkB
k!
,
and the probability that B has one vote less than A in state α is
Pr[T+1 | α] = e−n
∞∑
k=1
φkA
k!
φk−1B
(k − 1)! .
The corresponding probabilities in state β are obtained by substituting φ for τ . In state θ,
Pr[pivA | θ] = Pr[T | θ] + Pr[T−1 | θ],
Pr[pivB | θ] = Pr[T | θ] + Pr[T+1 | θ].
The probability of pivotal voting could be approximated using modified Bessel functions:3
Pr[T | α] ≈ e−nI0(2
√
φAφB) =
e−(
√
φA−
√
φB)
2√
2pi · 2√φAφB
= e−n
e2
√
φAφB√
2pi · 2√φAφB
; (3.3)
when n is large,
Pr[T±m | α] ≈
(
φA
φB
)±m
2
Pr[T | α]. (3.4)
The approximation is useful when we study the large population properties. Since
Pr[pivA | α] ≈ Pr[T | α]
[
1 +
(
φA
φB
)− 1
2
]
,
so Pr[pivA | α] is approximately the product of Pr[T | α] and a function independent of
population size.
3For details, see Krishna and Morgan (2012).
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3.3.2 Voting Under Knightian Uncertainty
With multiple priors, voters are Knightian. If one party is strictly preferred to the other, all
voters vote for the dominant party. If two parties are incomparable, partisans stick to their
own parties, and the voting behavior of swing voters is not determined. Let u(i) denote the
payoff for voting for candidate i. Following Bewley (2002), the strict preference relation is
characterized by
A  B ⇔ ∀p ∈ [p, p], Ep[u(A)] > Ep[u(B)],
where [p, p] is the set of priors. Notice that the function u is an endogenous object that
depends on the equilibrium voting profile. If A is strictly preferred to B, we say that A
dominates B.
Definition 3.1 (Dominance). Given a signal s, party candidate i dominates party candidate
j if and only if
Ep[u(i)|s] > Ep[u(j)|s], ∀p ∈ [p, p].
Next, we define maximal and optimal voting choices in terms of dominance in an envi-
ronment with uncertainty. Then, a voting equilibrium under uncertainty is defined in terms
of maximal and optimal voting choices.
Definition 3.2 (Maximal and Optimal Choices). Given a signal s, party candidate i is
an optimal choice if and only if party candidate i dominates party candidate j 6= i. Party
candidate i is a maximal choice if and only if party candidate i is not dominated by party
candidate j 6= i.
Given a signal s, A is optimal if Ep[u(A)|s] is strictly larger than Ep[u(B)|s] for all
p ∈ [p, p]; A is maximal if Ep[u(A)|s] is at least as large as Ep[u(B)|s] for some p ∈ [p, p].
Clearly, an optimal choice is maximal. The converse, however, may not hold.
Definition 3.3 (Voting Equilibrium under Uncertainty). A voting profile ((γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ),
(γBa , γ
B
b )) is a voting equilibrium under uncertainty if and only if
i) partisan voters vote for their own parties exclusively if it is a maximal choice, and
ii) if there is an optimal choice, all voters vote for it exclusively.
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Partisan
of A
Swing
voter
Partisan
of B
∀p ∈ [p, p], Ep[u(A)|s] > Ep[u(B)|s] A A A
∃p ∈ [p, p], Ep[u(A)|s] ≥ Ep[u(B)|s], and
∃p ∈ [p, p], Ep[u(A)|s] ≤ Ep[u(B)|s]
A
not
determined
B
∀p ∈ [p, p], Ep[u(A)|s] < Ep[u(B)|s] B B B
Table 1: Voting behaviors of partisans of A, partisans of B and swing voters
In equilibrium, partisans vote against their own parties only when the opponent is strictly
preferred for every p ∈ [p, p]. Otherwise, they always vote for their own party candidate.
By definition, they never mix. This is a restriction on the partisan voter’s behavior imposed
by the existence of a status quo. When there is an optimal choice, the model has a clear
prediction on the swing voters’ voting behavior. However, when there is no optimal choice,
no prediction is made on how swing voters vote.
3.3.3 Equilibrium Characterization
In a voting equilibrium under uncertainty, party candidate i is a maximal voting choice given
signal s if and only if
∃p ∈ [p, p], s.t. Ep [u (i) | s] ≥ Ep [u (j) | s] , i 6= j
and party candidate i is an optimal voting choice given signal s if and only if
∀p ∈ [p, p], s.t. Ep [u (i) | s] > Ep [u (j) | s] , i 6= j.
Table 1 summarizes the voting behaviors of partisans and swing voters that are consistent
with our definition of voting equilibrium under uncertainty (Definition 3.3).
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In a voting equilibrium under uncertainty, a rational voter, no matter a partisan or not,
compares the expected utility of voting for two candidates for every p ∈ [p, p]. Given signal
s, the difference between the expected utility of voting for party candidate A and B for a
particular p ∈ [p, p] is
Ep [u (A) | s]− Ep [u (B) | s]
= qp(α | s) (Pr[pivA | α] + Pr[pivB | α])− qp(β | s) (Pr[pivA | β] + Pr[pivB | β])(3.5)
where Pr[pivA | α] + Pr[pivB | α] is the increase in expected utility by voting for party
candidate A instead of B when the true state is α, while Pr[pivA | β] + Pr[pivB | β] is the
decrease in expected utility when true the state is β. We have,
Lemma 3.1. All voting equilibria under certainty satisfy the following three properties:
i) no mixing in partisans’ strategies: ∀i ∈ {A,B} ,∀s ∈ {a, b} , γis ∈ {0, 1};
ii) monotonicity across voters’ strategies: ∀s ∈ {a, b} , γAs ≥ γSs ≥ γ;
iii) monotonicity of partisans’ strategies: ∀i ∈ {A,B} , γia ≥ γib.
Properties i) and ii) simply state the observations reported in Table 1. Property iii)
follows from the fact that the signals are informative, i.e., qp(α | a) > qp(α | b). By (3.5),
this implies that party candidate A (B) is more likely to be an optimal voting choice given
signal a (b). Thus, if a partisan of B (A) votes for party candidate A (B) after receiving
signal b (a), he must vote for A after receiving signal a (b).
Our first proposition follows immediately from Lemma 3.1. It states that there are only
four possible types of voting equilibrium, as illustrated in Table 2.
Proposition 3.1. All voting equilibria under uncertainty are one of the following four types:
1) fully informative voting equilibrium, i.e., ∀i ∈ {A, S,B} , (γia, γib) = (1, 0) ;
2) uninformative voting equilibrium, i.e., ∀i ∈ {A, S,B} , (γia, γib) = (1, 1) or ∀i ∈
{A, S,B}, (γia, γib) = (0, 0) ;
3) full partisan voting equilibrium, i.e.,
((
γAa , γ
A
b
)
,
(
γBa , γ
B
b
))
= ((1, 1) , (0, 0)) ;
4) partial partisan voting equilibrium,
i.e., ((γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ), (γ
B
a , γ
B
b )) =
(
(1, 1) ,
(
1, γSb
)
, (1, 0)
)
or
((γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ), (γ
B
a , γ
B
b )) =
(
(1, 0) ,
(
γSa , 0
)
, (0, 0)
)
.
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2.1: Fully informative voting 2.2: Uninformative voting
A S B
a A A A
b B B B
A S B
a A A A
b A A A
or
A S B
a B B B
b B B B
2.3: Full partisan voting 2.4: Partial partisan voting
A S B
a A γSa B
b A γSb B
A S B
a A A A
b A γSb B
or
A S B
a A γSa B
b B B B
Table 2: Four types of voting equilibria
To prove Proposition 3.1, we simply list all the possible combinations of maximal/optimal
choices given signals and apply Lemma 3.1.
In Table 2, the rows correspond to the signals received, and the columns correspond to
the voters’ party identities. For instance, the entry in the first row and first column of Table
2.1 can be read as “in a fully informative voting equilibrium, given signal a, partisans of A
vote for party candidate A.”
In a fully informative voting equilibrium, votes represent the realized signals. In an un-
informative voting equilibrium, neither information nor preference is revealed by the votes.
Besides these two extreme cases, in a partisan voting equilibrium, both preference and infor-
mation find their way to express themselves. In a full partisan voting equilibrium, partisans
vote along their loyalty, while swing voters are responsive to information. In a partial par-
tisan voting equilibrium, partisans of one party stick to their status quo, while swing voters
and partisans of the other party respond to their signals.
To further characterize the equilibria, denote qp(β | a)
qp(α | a) and
qp(β | b)
qp(α | b) by Q
a
p, and Q
b
p, respec-
tively. We have
Qap =
(1− p)(1− q)
pq
and Qbp =
(1− p)q
p(1− q) .
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Qsp is the ratio of the posterior probabilities of the two states given signal s and prior p, or
signal ratio in short. We also define the ratio of the pivotal probabilities in the two states,
Ω, or pivotal ratio in short, by
Ω =
Pr[pivA | α] + Pr[pivB | α]
Pr[pivA | β] + Pr[pivB | β] .
By comparing these two ratios, Ω and Qsp, voters can decide their votes based on the
information derived from the scenario of being pivotal for the final outcome of the election
and the information derived from their private signals. If it is more likely to be pivotal in
one state than the other, it is wise to vote for the corresponding party candidate, since not
much damage can be done even if the choice is incorrect.
Notice that Qap and Q
b
p are decreasing in p. As a result, party candidate A is maximal
(optimal) given signal s if and only if Ω ≥ Qsp (Ω > Qsp). Similarly, party candidate B
is maximal (optimal) given signal s if and only if Ω ≤ Qsp (Ω < Qsp). This observation
greatly simplifies equilibrium characterization: we only need to check the inequalities for the
boundary beliefs, p and p, instead of the entire set of priors [p, p].
3.3.3.1 Fully informative voting equilibrium In a fully informative voting equilib-
rium, all voters vote according to their private signals. All voters vote for party candidate
A (B) if signal a (b) is received. Such an equilibrium is possible if party candidate A is an
optimal choice given signal a, while party candidate B is an optimal choice given signal b,
as illustrated in Table 2.1. In this equilibrium,
(
(γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ), (γ
B
a , γ
B
b )
)
= ((1, 0) , (1, 0) , (1, 0)) .
Since the voting behavior is deterministic given signals, the expected number of votes in
each state only depends on the signal precision q and the electorate size n:
φA = qn = τB, φB = (1− q)n = τA.
Given the expected number of votes in state α and β, the pivotal ratio always equals one by
Lemma C.1 in the Appendix C.
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Since party candidate A is an optimal choice given signal a, he is strictly preferred to
party candidate B for p:
Ω = 1 > Qap =
(
1− p) (1− q)
pq
⇔ q > 1− p.
On the other hand, party candidate B is an optimal choice given signal b, therefore, it is
strictly preferred to party candidate A for p:
Ω = 1 < Qbp =
(1− p) q
p (1− q) ⇔ q > p.
The following proposition summarizes the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of a fully informative voting equilibrium under uncertainty.
Proposition 3.2 (Fully Informative Voting Equilibrium). A fully informative voting equi-
librium exists if and only if
q > max(1− p, p). (3.6)
To support a fully informative voting equilibrium, the signals have to be precise enough
to overcome the uncertainty in the prior belief. If q is lower than p, signal b is not able to
persuade partisans of A to vote against their own party. If q is lower than 1 − p, no signal
can induce a vote for party candidate A from partisans of B. On the other hand, if (3.6)
is satisfied, given signal a, voters are reasonably sure that the true state is α. Same for
signal b. When the prior is a singleton, i.e., p = p, the condition (3.6) is simply q > p. It
corresponds to the condition required to support a fully informative voting equilibrium in
an environment without uncertainty.4
4Strictly speaking, in a standard expected utility model, the condition required is q ≥ p. However, due
to the inertia assumption we used, the case q = p could not support a sincere voting equilibrium.
68
3.3.3.2 Uninformative Voting Equilibrium Uninformative equilibria, in which all
voters vote for one party regardless of their own signal, are also possible. In voting games
with a fixed electorate size, an uninformative equilibrium may arise because the probability of
being pivotal is zero. However, in voting games with unknown electorate size, the probability
of being pivotal is always positive.
In the equilibrium where all voters always vote for party candidate A, we have
(
(γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ), (γ
B
a , γ
B
b )
)
= ((1, 1) , (1, 1) , (1, 1)) ,
and in the equilibrium where all voters always vote for party candidate B, we have
(
(γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ), (γ
B
a , γ
B
b )
)
= ((0, 0) , (0, 0) , (0, 0)) .
With an unknown electorate size, there is always a positive probability that there are less
than three voters. When there are three or more voters, a single voter can never be pivotal
in the equilibrium where all voters vote for one party. When there are only two voters, a
voter can cast a vote to cancel the vote cast by the other. When there is only one voter, the
election result is determined solely by his vote.5 Again, we find that the pivotal ratio Ω is
exactly one by Lemma C.1 in Appendix C. This is because the voting profile is independent
of the state, φA = τA.
Suppose party candidate A is the optimal choice given both signals, party candidate A
is preferred to party candidate B for p given both signals a and b, we must have
Ω > Qap and Ω > Q
b
p.
Proposition 3.3 immediately follows.
Proposition 3.3 (Uninformative Voting Equilibrium. A). An uninformative voting equilib-
rium with every voter voting for party candidate A exists if and only if
q < p. (3.7)
5If there is no voter, which is still possible, there is no voting problem.
69
To make partisans of B vote against their own party regardless of their signals, we need
a biased prior belief and noisy signals such that q < p. In that case, a favorable signal
alone does not constitute a reason to vote against the population, as there is no information
provided by pivotal events.
Similarly, the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an uninformative
voting equilibrium, in which every voter votes for party candidate B, is p < 1− q. But since
q > 1
2
, it contradicts our assumption that p > 1
2
. Therefore, such an equilibrium does not
exist under our assumptions.
Proposition 3.4 (Uninformative Voting Equilibrium. B). An uninformative voting equilib-
rium with every voter voting for party candidate B does not exist.
3.3.3.3 Full Partisan Voting Equilibrium In a full partisan voting equilibrium, par-
tisans of A always vote for party candidate A, and partisans of B always vote for party
candidate B. Partisans do not agree on their choices only when no party candidate is an op-
timal choice. In that case, swing voters are free to use any strategy as both party candidates
are maximal choices. Swing voters might or might not respond to their signals. To support
a full partisan voting equilibrium, it is necessary that upon receiving a signal, either a or b,
neither party candidate is strictly preferred to the other.
In a full partisan voting equilibrium, the partisans’ voting strategies are fixed, therefore,
(
(γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ), (γ
B
a , γ
B
b )
)
=
(
(1, 1) , (γSa , γ
S
b ), (0, 0)
)
.
To support a full partisan voting equilibrium, party candidate A needs to be weakly
preferred to party candidate B for some p and party candidate B weakly preferred to party
candidate A for some p, given both signals. Therefore, given signal b, party candidate A
is weakly preferred to party candidate B for p. Also, given signal a, party candidate B is
weakly preferred to party candidate A for p. We must have
Qbp ≤ Ω ≤ Qap. (3.8)
At this stage, we do not know what condition is required to guarantee that the pivotal
ratio Ω falls into this interval. Condition (3.8) merely says that Ω is bounded above and
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below by some positive constants. Moreover, the bounds are uniquely defined by the triple(
p, p, q
)
. The interval
[
Qbp, Q
a
p
]
is nonempty if and only if
(
q
1− q
)2
≤
(
p
1−p
)
(
p
1−p
) . (3.9)
The left-hand side of (3.9) is strictly increasing in q while the right-hand side is strictly
increasing in p and strictly decreasing in p. Intuitively, as information precision grows, larger
uncertainty is required to sustain full partisan voting in equilibrium. Our next proposition
provides a sufficient condition for the existence of a full partisan voting equilibrium.
Proposition 3.5 (Full Partisan Voting Equilibrium). A full partisan voting equilibrium
exists if
q ≤ min (p, 1− p) . (3.10)
In proving Proposition 3.5, we identify a particular set of full partisan voting equilibria,
namely, full partisan voting profiles satisfying γSa = γ
S
b or γ
S
a + γ
S
b = 1 +
λB−λA
λS
. In Section
3.4.2, we will prove that these are the only full partisan limit voting equilibria in large
elections. We also defer the discussion on the properties of these strategy profiles to Section
3.4.2.
3.3.3.4 Partial Partisan Voting Equilibrium The last type of equilibrium is the
partial partisan voting equilibrium, where only one type of the partisans vote regardless
of their signals, see Table 2.4. To support such an equilibrium, it is necessary that one
party candidate is optimal when its corresponding signal is received, and is maximal but not
optimal when the other signal is received. As a result, swing voters vote according to the
signal upon receiving one of the two signals, but are free to use any strategy upon receiving
the other one.
In a partial partisan voting equilibrium, in which partisans of A are not responsive to
their signals, party candidate A is optimal given signal a, while both party candidate A and
B are maximal given signal b. Thus, the equilibrium voting profile is given by
(
(γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ), (γ
B
a , γ
B
b )
)
=
(
(1, 1) ,
(
1, γSb
)
, (1, 0)
)
.
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In equilibrium, party candidate A dominates B given signal a, and both party candidates
are maximal choices given signal b. Therefore, party candidate A is strictly preferred to party
candidate B for p given signal a, and is weakly preferred to party candidate B for p given
signal b; party candidate B is weakly preferred to party candidate A for p given signal b.
The required conditions are
Ω > Qap, and Q
b
p ≤ Ω ≤ Qbp. (3.11)
Similarly, in a partial partisan voting equilibrium, in which partisans of B are not re-
sponsive to their signals, we must have
Qap ≤ Ω ≤ Qap, and Ω < Qbp. (3.12)
The equilibrium conditions look similar to those for a full partisan equilibrium. Given
any triple of
(
p, p, q
)
, there are only two possible orderings of the Q’s: Qap < Q
a
p ≤ Qbp < Qbp
or Qap < Q
b
p < Q
a
p < Q
b
p. Figure 2 illustrates the requirements for the partisan voting
equilibrium in these two cases.
Figure 2: Supports of partisan voting equilibrium
In Figure 2, the grey segments on the left represent the values of Ω that support a
partial partisan equilibrium favoring party candidate B, while the grey segments on the
right represent the values of Ω that support a partial partisan equilibrium favoring party
candidate A.
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3.4 LARGE ELECTIONS
In the previous section, we list all the possible forms of equilibria that can arise in the
voting game under uncertainty. In the cases of fully informative voting equilibrium and
uninformative voting equilibrium, we are able to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions
for existence. The specifications of fully informative and uninformative voting equilibrium
also pin down the equilibrium voting profiles. In the case of full partisan voting equilibrium,
we obtain a set of voting profiles that would constitute a full partisan voting equilibrium if
condition (3.10) is met. Condition (3.10) is, therefore, only sufficient. Moreover, we do not
have much idea about what conditions are required for a partial partisan voting equilibrium
to exist. The difficulty to derive analytical results for these voting equilibria is that the
pivotal ratio Ω is determined by the equilibrium voting profile.
Moreover, Knightian uncertainty presents an additional difficulty in a complete analysis
of equilibria. Unlike voters in expected utility models, whose equilibrium strategies are
determined by the optimal action under a single prior, the swing voters in our model are
free to vote for anyone when the candidates are maximal choices. This indeterminacy leads
to a larger set of equilibria. The approach in this paper is to limit the equilibrium analysis
to a type of equilibrium for large electorate, which we call limit voting equilibrium. A limit
voting equilibrium is a voting equilibrium for large electorate with the property that the
voting profile is independent of the expected number of voters n. A limit voting equilibrium
is thus robust to perturbation of the parameter n. Therefore, it can be viewed as a selection
of equilibria for large electorate. The notion of limit voting equilibrium is also related to the
notion of sincere voting studied in Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). In Proposition 3.6, we
show that any limit voting equilibrium must be sincere.
By studying the large population property of the pivotal ratio Ω of limit voting equilibria,
we show that, for each triple (p, p, q), at most one of the four types of voting equilibrium
exists. Thus, based on our selection criterion, we are able to make unique prediction of the
type of the limit voting equilibrium in large electorate in some cases. In other cases, the
selection criterion does not produce any prediction as a limit voting equilibrium does not
exist.
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3.4.1 Limit Voting Equilibrium
To begin with, we define the concept of limit voting equilibrium. A voting profile is a limit
voting equilibrium if it is an equilibrium for electorate size that is sufficiently large.
Definition 3.4 (Limit Voting Equilibrium). A voting profile
(
(γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ), (γ
B
a , γ
B
b )
)
is
a limit voting equilibrium under uncertainty if and only if there exists an integer N such that
whenever the expected number of voters n exceeds N ,
(
(γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ), (γ
B
a , γ
B
b )
)
constitutes
a voting equilibrium under uncertainty.
The following lemma shows that the pivotal ratio Ω of a limit voting equilibrium is always
one.
Lemma 3.2. In any limit voting equilibrium, either
φA = τA or φA = τB. (3.13)
Moreover,
Ω = 1. (3.14)
This result characterizes the vote shares in all limit voting equilibria. Moreover, all limit
voting equilibria are voting equilibria for all electorate size n. This is because conditions
(3.13) and (3.14) depend on the voting profile but not the electorate size n. If (3.13) and
(3.14) hold for a particular n, it also holds for all n. One of the properties of limit voting
equilibrium is that voting must be sincere, which we define below.
Definition 3.5 (Sincere Voting). A voting profile
(
(γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ), (γ
B
a , γ
B
b )
)
is sincere if
and only if each voter votes as if he were the only decision maker.
When a single voter decides the election outcome, the pivotal ratio Ω equals 1 as he is
always pivotal. By Lemma 3.2, Ω = 1 in any limit voting equilibrium. Thus, the problems
faced by the voters in the two cases are identical. We have,
Proposition 3.6. Any limit voting equilibrium is sincere.
Lemma 3.3 follows immediately from Lemma 3.2 and conditions (3.11) and (3.12).
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Lemma 3.3. A partial partisan limit voting equilibrium favoring party candidate A exists
only if
p ≤ q ≤ p and 1− p < q,
and a partial partisan limit voting equilibrium favoring party candidate B exists only if
p < q ≤ 1− p.
Since any limit voting equilibrium is also a voting equilibrium for some electorate size,
Propositions 3.2 to 3.5 still apply. With Lemma 3.3, we can now illustrate these necessary
conditions graphically in the
(
p, p
)
space. In Figures 3 to 5, the x−axis presents values of p
while the y− axis presents values of p. The area above the 45-degree line represents the set
of
(
p, p
)
such that p > p. The shaded area in each figure represents the set of
(
p, p
)
under
consideration.
Figure 3: (p, p, q) and the potential types of limit voting equilibrium: 1
2
< p ≤ p
Figure 3 shows the potential limit voting equilibria when 1
2
≤ p < p. In this case, the
voters hold a set of prior beliefs that favors party candidate A. When the signals are precise
enough, i.e., q > p, there exists a fully informative limit voting equilibrium. When the signals
are imprecise enough, i.e., q < p, there exists an uninformative voting equilibrium in which
voters vote for party candidate A unanimously. When the signal precision is moderate, i.e.,
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Figure 4: (p, p, q) and the potential types of limit voting equilibrium: p < 1
2
< 1− p ≤ p
p ≤ q ≤ p, a limit voting equilibrium, if exists, is partial partisan favoring party candidate
A.
Figure 4 shows the potential limit voting equilibria when p < 1
2
< 1−p < p. In this case,
the voters hold a balanced set of prior beliefs, i.e., p < 1
2
< p. But the set of priors slightly
favors party candidate A, i.e., p + p > 1. Similar to the previous case, when signal quality
is high enough, q > p, there exists a fully informative limit voting equilibrium. When the
signals are noisy enough, i.e., q ≤ 1− p, there exists a full partisan limit voting equilibrium,
as the private signals are not strong enough to persuade partisans to vote against their own
parties. With moderate signal precision, i.e., 1 − p < q ≤ p, a limit voting equilibrium, if
exists, is partial partisan favoring party candidate A.
Figure 5 shows the potential limit voting equilibria when p ≤ 1
2
< p ≤ 1 − p. This case
differs from the situation in Figure 4 only when signal precision is moderate, i.e., p < q ≤
1 − p. In this case, a partial partisan limit voting equilibrium favors party candidate B,
instead of party candidate A, may exist.
To summarize, we have shown that given a triple (p, p, q), at most one type of the limit
voting equilibria may exist.
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Figure 5: (p, p, q) and the potential types of limit voting equilibrium: p < 1
2
< p ≤ 1− p
1. When the signal precision q is high enough, a fully informative limit voting equilibrium
exists by Proposition 3.2.
2. When the signal precision q is moderate, Lemma 3.3 and condition (3.8) implies that
limit voting equilibrium, if exists, is partial partisan. In the next section, we will check
the equilibrium condition and show that partial partisan limit voting equilibrium does
not exist. Therefore, the selection criterion of limit voting equilibrium fails to produce a
prediction in this case.
3. When the signal precision q is low, a limit voting equilibrium, if exists, is either unin-
formative or full partisan. If q < p, the existence of uninformative voting equilibrium is
guaranteed by Proposition 3.3. Furthermore, a limit voting equilibrium must be uninfor-
mative. At first sight, this seems to contradict the results of Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1997), who show that there always exists a sequence of responsive equilibria in large
electrons and that the outcomes of such sequence always converge to the full information
case. However, such sequence of responsive equilibria would generally involve voting
profiles that vary with the electorate size n, which is ruled out by the definition of limit
voting equilibrium. If q ≤ min (p, 1− p), limit voting equilibrium, if exists, must be
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full partisan. Unlike partial partisan limit voting equilibrium, we will show in the next
section that full partisan limit voting equilibrium does exist.
3.4.2 Equilibrium Strategies
In this section, we study partisan voting profiles that satisfy condition (3.13). By doing so,
we are able to characterize the entire set of voting profiles that supports a full partisan limit
voting equilibrium. On the other hand, it turns out that no voting profile could support a
partial partisan limit voting equilibrium.
3.4.2.1 Full partisan voting equilibrium In a full partisan voting equilibrium,(
(γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ), (γ
B
a , γ
B
b )
)
=
(
(1, 1) , (γSa , γ
S
b ), (0, 0)
)
.
In state α,
φA = nA + nS
[
qγSa + (1− q)γSb
]
,
φB = nB + nS
[
q(1− γSa ) + (1− q)(1− γSb )
]
,
while in state β,
τA = nA + nS
[
(1− q)γSa + qγSb
]
,
τB = nB + nS
[
(1− q)(1− γSa ) + q(1− γSb )
]
.
By imposing condition (3.13) on the vote shares in state α and β, we find that there is
a large set of voting profiles that satisfies Ω = 1. Some of the voting profiles are uninforma-
tive. Such equilibrium always exists as long as condition (3.10) is satisfied. There are also
equilibria that are informative and require a relatively balanced partisan voter population,
i.e., λB−λA
λS
∈ (−1, 1).
Proposition 3.7. A full partisan limit voting equilibrium exists if and only if
q ≤ min (p, 1− p) . (3.15)
Moreover, the set of all full partisan limit voting equilibria is{(
(1, 1) , (γSa , γ
S
b ), (0, 0)
)
: γSa = γ
S
b or γ
S
a + γ
S
b = 1 +
λB − λA
λS
}
. (3.16)
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In a full partisan limit voting equilibrium, two possible scenarios may occur. In one
scenario, γSa = γ
S
b , swing voters may mix or not, but they do not respond to their private
signals even though the signals contain valuable information. As a result, information is not
aggregated in such equilibrium. It is an uninformative full partisan voting equilibrium, and
it differs from an uninformative voting equilibrium by having partisans stick to their own
parties. In such equilibrium, partisans express their preferences, while swing voters express
their indecisiveness. It happens when there is no useful information revealed by pivotal
events, and the private signal is not precise enough to help a voter reach a decision out of a
balanced prior belief.
In the other scenario, γSa + γ
S
b = 1 +
λB−λA
λS
, swing voters vote responsively, except when
γSa = γ
S
b =
1
2
(
1 + λB−λA
λS
)
. When γSa > γ
S
b , voting is informative. The necessary condition
for the existence of an informative full partisan limit voting equilibrium is λB−λA
λS
∈ [−1, 1].
Swing voters mix their votes to the extent that it enables others to vote informatively after
counter-balancing impact of partisan votes. The terms 1 and λB−λA
λS
on the right-hand
side represent the pivotal and vote-balancing considerations, respectively. When λB = λA,
the balancing component disappears. It also suggests that the difference between the two
partisan populations cannot be too large relative to the population size of the swing voters,
otherwise swing voters would not be able to counter-balance the impact of the over-populated
party supporters. When voting is informative, indecisiveness remains, but it constitutes an
overall informative decision.
To summarize, we do not have a sharp prediction of how a swing voter would vote in a
full partisan limit voting equilibrium. The equilibrium requirements impose little restrictions
on the relation between γSa and γ
S
b . Knightian decision making introduces the flexibility into
our voting model. In Section 3.5, we discuss a way of selecting these equilibria based on the
idea of justifiable preferences.
3.4.2.2 Partial partisan voting equilibrium In a partial partisan voting equilibrium
favoring party candidate A,
(
(γAa , γ
A
b ), (γ
S
a , γ
S
b ), (γ
B
a , γ
B
b )
)
=
(
(1, 1) ,
(
1, γSb
)
, (1, 0)
)
.
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In state α,
φA = nA + nS
[
q + (1− q)γSb
]
+ nBq,
φB = nB (1− q) + nS(1− q)(1− γSb );
while in state β,
τA = nA + nS
[
(1− q) + qγSb
]
+ nB (1− q) ,
τB = nBq + nSq(1− γSb ).
The expressions for the vote shares in a partial partisan voting equilibrium favoring party
candidate B are similar. Checking condition (3.13) shows that no feasible voting profile can
support a partial partisan limit voting equilibrium. This is our next proposition.
Proposition 3.8. There does not exist a partial partisan limit voting equilibrium.
3.4.3 Information Aggregation
In this section, we study the information aggregation of limit voting equilibria. In state α,
it is optimal to elect party candidate A, so the probability of an incorrect decision is
Pr [B wins|α] = 1
2
Pr [T |α] +
∞∑
m=1
Pr [T−m|α]
<
∞∑
m=0
Pr [T−m|α] ,
where T−m = {(k −m, k) : k ≥ m} is the event that B wins by exactly m votes. Using the
approximation formulas (3.3) and (3.4), we have
∞∑
m=0
Pr [T−m|α] ≈ e
−(
√
φA−
√
φB)
2√
4pi
√
φAφB
∞∑
m=0
(√
φB
φA
)m
=
e−(
√
φA−
√
φB)
2√
4pi
√
φAφB
1
1−
√
φB
φA
. (3.17)
We study when the sum (3.17) would tend to zero as the expected number of voters n goes
to infinity in the next proposition.
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Proposition 3.9. If q > max(p, 1− p), the probability that the right candidate is elected in
each state goes to one as the expected number of voters n goes to infinity in all limit voting
equilibria. If q ≤ min (p, 1− p) and |λA − λB| < λS, there exists a limit voting equilibrium
in which the probability that the right candidate is elected in each state goes to one as the
expected number of voters n goes to infinity.
It is straightforward to show that the sum in (3.17) tends to zero under the stated
conditions. If q ≤ min (p, 1− p), by Proposition 3.7, there are only two types of full partisan
limit voting equilibria. In the first type of equilibria, γSa = γ
S
b , voting is not informative.
Thus, no information is aggregated. If the condition |λA − λB| < λS is also satisfied, there
exists a limit voting equilibrium satisfying γSa + γ
S
b = 1 +
λB−λA
λS
and γSa > γ
S
b . In such
equilibrium, the probability that the right candidate is elected in each state goes to one. On
the other hand, if the condition |λA − λB| < λS is violated, say, λA > λS +λB, the partisans
of A would be too numerous for information to aggregate in large elections. Even if all the
swing voters vote for party candidate B in state β, party candidate A is still expected to
win.
To summarize, in our model, when the signal precision is high enough, by Proposition
3.2, the only limit voting equilibrium is fully informative, information aggregation is guaran-
teed. However, when the signal is only moderately precise, by Proposition 3.8, limit voting
equilibrium ceases to exist. The most interesting case is when the signal is very imprecise.
In this case, information aggregation depends on the value of p and the composition of par-
tisans and swing voters. If p ≤ 1
2
, the limit voting equilibrium is full partisan, there are
always equilibria that do not aggregate information properly. But if |λA − λB| < λS is also
satisfied, there also exists an equilibrium that aggregates information properly. If p > 1
2
, the
limit voting equilibrium is uninformative, information does not aggregate.
3.5 JUSTIFIABLE VOTING EQUILIBRIUM
In Section 3.4.2.1, we have identified the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of a full partisan limit voting equilibrium. There is, however, always a continuum of such
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equilibria whenever one exists. The multiplicity arises from the incompleteness of swing
voters’ preference as the two party candidates may be incomparable. One way to “resolve”
such indeterminacy is to consider the completion of the swing voters’ Knightian preference
to Knightian-justifiable preference (Lehrer and Teper, 2011). Given a utility function u
and a multiple–prior Π that represent an incomplete Knightian preference , consider the
justifiable extension ′, where
x ′ y ⇔ ∃p ∈ Π, Ep[u(x)] ≥ Ep[u(y)].
It is clear that the extension agrees with the original preference whenever there is an optimal
choice. Such an extension puts additional restrictions on the voters’ equilibrium strategies
when both party candidates are maximal choices.
Rather than introducing such an extension formally to the model, we take a shortcut
to view justifiability as an equilibrium section criterion. We call the selected equilibrium
justifiable voting equilibrium under uncertainty.
Definition 3.6 (Justifiable Voting Equilibrium under Uncertainty). A voting equilibrium
under uncertainty
((
γAa , γ
A
b
)
,
(
γSa , γ
S
b
)
,
(
γBa , γ
B
b
))
is justifiable if and only if for each type
of the voters i ∈ {A,B, S}, there exists a pi ∈ [p, p], such that (γia, γib) maximizes voter i’s
expected utility under pi.
Notice that the justifiability requirement on the partisans’ strategies is always satisfied by
any voting equilibrium under uncertainty. Since the ratios Qap and Q
b
p are strictly decreasing
in p, the equilibrium strategies of partisans of A and B are justified by p and p, respectively.
The justifiability requirement, however, does impose restrictions upon swing voters’ behavior.
Since, for all p ∈ [p, p], Qap > Qbp, the swing voters’ equilibrium voting strategy must be
monotone in the signal under justifiability. Moreover, the swing voters cannot mix given
both signals. If the swing voters mix given one signal, he must vote for the favored party
candidate for sure given the other signal. Thus, we have
Lemma 3.4. In a justifiable voting equilibrium under uncertainty, we must have
γSa ≥ γSb
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and either
γSa = 1 or γ
S
b = 0.
Applying Lemma 3.4 to the set of full partisan limit voting equilibria identified in Propo-
sition 3.7, we find that, in a justifiable full partisan limit voting equilibrium, the swing voters
either always vote for one candidate or vote according to the most informative responsive
equilibrium in Proposition 3.7. Our next proposition shows that these are indeed justifiable
voting equilibrium strategies.
Proposition 3.10. Suppose q ≤ min (p, 1− p). If |λA − λB| ≥ λS, the set of justifiable full
partisan limit voting equilibria is given by
{((1, 1) , (1, 1), (0, 0)) , ((1, 1) , (0, 0), (0, 0))} . (3.18)
If |λA − λB| < λS, the set of justifiable full partisan limit voting equilibria is given by those
in (3.18) and (
(1, 1) , (1−min
{
0,
λB − λA
λS
}
,max
{
0,
λB − λA
λS
}
), (0, 0)
)
. (3.19)
In the equilibria given by (3.18), the swing voters “choose” to become a partisan by
justifying his choice with an extreme prior. In the responsive justifiable equilibrium given
by (3.19), the swing voters vote for the underdog for sure after receiving a favorable signal
but mix when the opposite signal is received. This strategy is justified by a prior belief that
makes him indifferent between two choices upon receiving one signal and strictly prefer to
vote for the underdog upon receiving the other signal. Notice that this equilibrium is the
most informative among those identified in Proposition 3.7.
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3.6 COSTLY INFORMATION
In this section, we consider an extension of the original model, in which voters need to
acquire costly information before the election at their own cost. In this environment, we
show that partisan behaviors arise naturally from the status quo biases in large elections.
Moreover, when partisan population is balanced, there is an informative voting equilibrium
with “robust” voting profile and justifiable strategies, in which the swing voters rationally
mix between two alternatives: either they acquire information and vote informatively or
they do not acquire information and vote to cancel the partisans’ votes. However, the swing
voters only acquire a vanishing amount of information in large elections.
We assume that the voters have a balanced set of prior, i.e., p < 1
2
< p. The voting game
is the same as in the previous sections, except that voters are endowed with no information.
Before signals are revealed, a voter individually decide how much to pay to improve his signal
precision. If he decides not to pay, a random noise is generated. The cost of information is
a twice differentiable, increasing and strictly convex function of information precision. That
is, for all q ∈ [1
2
, 1), c′(q) ≥ 0, c′′(q) > 0. Moreover, it satisfies the Inada conditions
c
(
1
2
)
= c′
(
1
2
)
= 0 and lim
q→1
c′ (q) =∞.
That is, a vanishing amount of information has a vanishing cost, i.e., c′
(
1
2
)
= 0,6 and
nobody can afford perfect knowledge, i.e., c′ (1) = ∞. A pure strategy in this model is a
triple (q, γa, γb) ∈ S, where q ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
specifies an information acquisition level, γa ∈ {1, 0}
specifies which party candidate to vote after receiving signal a, and γb ∈ {1, 0} specifies which
party candidate to vote after receiving signal b. A mixed strategy for voter i ∈ {A, S,B} is
a probability distribution σi over the set of pure strategies. We also call q the information
acquisition strategy and the pair (γa, γb) the voting strategy. Thus, a pure strategy consists
of an information acquisition strategy and a voting strategy.
6Notice that q = 12 corresponds to the zero information acquisition level, as the signal is completely
uninformative when q = 12 .
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For any p ∈ [p, p], the expected benefit of a pure strategy s = (q, γa, γb) is
vp(s) = p(a, q)
 γa (q(α | a) Pr[pivA | α]− q(β | a) Pr[pivA | β])+(1− γa) (q(β | a) Pr[pivB |β]− q(α | a) Pr[pivB | α])

+p(b, q)
 γb (q(α | b) Pr[pivA | α]− q(β | b) Pr[pivA | β])+(1− γb) (q(β | b) Pr[pivB |β]− q(α | b) Pr[pivB | α])
 ,
where p(a, q) and p(b, q) are the probabilities of acquiring signals a and b, given signal
precision q, respectively. Given the cost of signal c (q), the expected payoff of a pure strategy
s = (q, γa, γb) given p ∈
[
p, p
]
is given by
Vp(s) = vp(s)− c(q).
Next, we define the concepts of optimal and maximal strategies. Then, we use these con-
cepts to define an equilibrium in this voting game with endogenous information acquisition.
Let Σ = ∆S.
Definition 3.7 (Dominance). Let σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, σ dominates σ′ if and only if Vp (σ) > Vp (σ′)
for all p ∈ [p, p].
As in the previous sections, if σ dominates σ′, σ is strictly better than σ′ in all circum-
stances. The concepts of optimal and maximal strategies are defined accordingly.
Definition 3.8 (Maximal and Optimal Strategies). σ ∈ Σ is an optimal strategy if and only
if it dominates σ′ 6= σ for all σ′ ∈ Σ. σ ∈ Σ is a maximal strategy if and only if it is not
dominated by any σ′ ∈ Σ.
Facing information acquisition decision, voters are also under uncertainty. In such an
environment, uncertainty never goes away, but it may shrink or exaggerate. We define the
following equilibrium concept with costly information under uncertainty. We assume that
status quo choice of the partisan voters is to vote for their own party candidate and not
acquire any information. We have,
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Definition 3.9 (Voting Equilibrium with Costly Information under Uncertainty). A strategy
profile (σ∗A, σ
∗
B, σ
∗
S) forms a voting equilibrium with costly information under uncertainty if
and only if
i) partisan voters vote for their own party exclusively and acquire no information if it is
a maximal strategy,
ii) if there is an optimal strategy, all voters use it exclusively, and
iii) ∀i ∈ {A,B, S} , σ∗i is a maximal strategy.
A justifiable voting equilibrium can be defined in a way analogous to Definition 3.6.
Definition 3.10 (Justifiable Voting Equilibrium with Costly Information). A voting equi-
librium with costly information under uncertainty (σ∗A, σ
∗
B, σ
∗
S) is justifiable if and only if
for each type of the voters i ∈ {A,B, S}, there exists a pi ∈ [p, p], such that σ∗i maximizes
voter i’s expected utility under pi.
Our first observation for this game is that when information cost is out of one’s own
pocket, a voter pays for it only if he knows he is going to use it. Every piece of information
that is acquired is to be used properly. That is,
Lemma 3.5 (Fully Informative Voting with Positive Information Acquisition). In any voting
equilibrium with costly information under uncertainty, for any pure strategy (q, γa, γb) played
in equilibrium with positive probability, if q > 1
2
, then,
γa = 1 and γb = 0.
Lemma 3.5 depends on neither the electorate size, the party identity of the voter nor
the equilibrium voting profile. However, it does not require the voters to acquire a positive
amount of information. It may be maximal for some voters to acquire no information at
all. Indeed, when a voter does not acquire any information, his signal does not contain any
information and any voting strategy that conditions on the signal becomes equivalent to a
mixed voting strategy.
Our second observation is that the voters’ levels of information acquisition must tend to
zero as the electorate size increases. The intuition is straightforward. In a large election, the
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probability of being pivotal must tend to zero. Thus, a voter, whether a swing voter or not,
could not find it beneficial to acquire a significant amount of information.
Lemma 3.6 (Vanishing Information Acquisition). In any sequence of voting equilibria with
costly information under uncertainty, for all i ∈ {A,B, S}, for any pure strategy (q, γa, γb)
played in equilibrium with positive probability,
lim
n→∞
q =
1
2
.
By Lemma 3.6, the only equilibrium information acquisition strategy that is robust to
electorate size is no information acquisition. Thus, requiring the equilibrium information
acquisition strategy to be robust to electorate size may impose too much restriction on the
possible forms of equilibrium. Therefore, to extend the notion of limit voting equilibrium to
this environment, we only require condition (3.13) to be satisfied. We define,
Definition 3.11 (Balanced Voting). A strategy profile (σA, σB, σS) for an electorate size n
is balanced if and only if it satisfies condition (3.13).
The concept of a balanced voting equilibrium with costly information is closely related
to the notion of a limit voting equilibrium with exogenous information. We have shown in
Lemma 3.2 that any limit voting equilibrium with exogenous information must be balanced.
In fact, any sequence of voting equilibria must satisfy (3.13) asymptotically. A balanced
voting equilibrium is balanced in the sense that a voter’s pivotal probabilities are identical
across the two states. The concept of balanced voting is also closely related to sincere voting.
An application of Lemma C.1 in the Appendix shows that a balanced voting equilibrium must
be sincere. This is because when the pivotal ratio Ω equals to one, “pivotal” consideration
disappears, voters vote as if they alone decide the outcome of the election.
The next proposition is the main result of this section. It states that when the electorate
size is large enough, any voting equilibrium that is both balanced and justifiable must be full
partisan. Moreover, there are always two that are uninformative. If the partisan population is
balanced, i.e., |λA − λB| < λS, there is an additional equilibrium that is balanced, justifiable,
and yet informative.
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Proposition 3.11 (Full Partisan Voting Equilibrium with Costly Information). Suppose
p < 1
2
< p, when the electorate size n is large enough,
1. If |λA − λB| ≥ λS, the set of balanced and justifiable voting equilibria is given by{((
1
2
, 1, 1
)
, (
1
2
, 1, 1),
(
1
2
, 0, 0
))
,
((
1
2
, 1, 1
)
, (
1
2
, 0, 0),
(
1
2
, 0, 0
))}
. (3.20)
2. If |λA − λB| < λS, the set of balanced and justifiable voting equilibria is given by those
in (3.20) and equilibrium (σ∗A, σ
∗
B, σ
∗
S) that satisfies
a. σ∗A =
(
1
2
, 1, 1
)
, and σ∗B =
(
1
2
, 0, 0
)
,
b. If λB ≥ λA, σ∗S =
{
µA,
(
1
2
, 1, 1
)
; (1− µA) , (q∗, 1, 0)
}
, where µA =
λB−λA
λS
. If λB <
λA, σ
∗
S =
{
µB,
(
1
2
, 0, 0
)
; (1− µB) , (q∗, 1, 0)
}
, where µB =
λA−λB
λS
.
c. q∗ solves
2e−n
∞∑
k=0
φkA
k!
φkB
k!
+ e−n
∞∑
k=1
φk−1A
(k − 1)!
φkB
k!
+ e−n
∞∑
k=1
φkA
k!
φk−1B
(k − 1)! = c
′ (q) . (3.21)
Notice that R.H.S. of (3.21) is a continuous increasing function with c′
(
1
2
)
= 0 and
c′ (1) = ∞ and the L.H.S. of (3.21) is a continuous and bounded positive function. Thus,
(3.21) must have at least one solution whenever |λA − λB| < λS.
3.7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study a common value Knightian voting model. The model has some
interesting properties and yields several interesting results.
First, our Knightian voting model offers additional flexibility in the swing voters’ be-
haviors. In the absence of an optimal choice, a Knightian swing voter is free to use any
strategy. In contrast, in an expected utility model, maximization under a particular prior
often pins down equilibrium strategies and mixed strategies can only be used in the case
of indifference. We show that this additional flexibility allows us to construct equilibrium
that is simple and robust to small perturbation of parameters. In particular, we are able to
find voting equilibria that are robust to the electorate size with a large set of parameters. In
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addition to being simple, these voting equilibria are also sincere in the sense of Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996).
Second, the status quo choices of Knightian decision theory provide a rationalization of
partisan behaviors. In our model with costly information acquisition, a voter with a status
quo party choice rationally “ignores” information in large elections and becomes “partisan”.
Moreover, a voter without a status quo may also behave like a partisan. The observation of
Burden and Klofstad (2005) that a voter may show partisan tendency even if he/she is not
identified with a party himself/herself is consistent with our model, in which voters without
a status quo party choice may justify their partisan behavior by an extreme prior. On the
other hand, voters without a status quo can also contribute to the overall informativeness of
the election by actively acquiring information and voting informatively. The prerequisite of
such behavior is that the number of partisans of one party does not overwhelm the other’s,
so that the swing voters may reasonably hope to change the outcome of the election.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Given any information structure F , take any equilibrium (σ∗1, σ
∗
2), the
first order conditions of the players imply that for i ∈ {1, 2},
σ∗i (xi;F ) = αE
(
σ∗j (xj;F ) |xi
)
+ βiE (θ|xi) .
Applying the law of iterated expectations, we have
E (σ∗1 (x1;F )) = αE (σ
∗
2 (x2;F )) + β1E (θ) , (A.1)
E (σ∗2 (x2;F )) = αE (σ
∗
1 (x1;F )) + β2E (θ) . (A.2)
Our assumption that |α| < 1 implies that the solution to (A.1) and (A.2) is unique. Thus,
for i ∈ {1, 2},
E (σ∗i (xi;F )) = ai.
Proof of Lemma 1.2. Proof in text.
Proof of Lemma 1.3. Proof in text.
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Proof of Lemma 1.4. The first order condition for equilibrium is
σ∗i (xi) = αE
(
σ∗j (xj) |xi
)
+ βiE (θ|xi) .
Denote Ei (θ) = E (θ|xi), EiEj (θ) = E (E (θ|xj) |xi), Ekij (θ) = E
(
E
(
Ek−1ij (θ) |xj
) |xi) and
E0ij (θ) = θ. Then,
σ∗i (xi) = βiE (θ|xi) + αE
(
σ∗j (xj) |xi
)
= βiEi (θ) + αβjEiEj (θ) + α
2E (E (σ∗i (xi) |xj) |xi)
= ...
=
∞∑
k=1
(
α2
)k−1 [
βiE
k−1
ij Ei (θ) + αβjE
k
ij (θ)
]
(A.3)
By (A1), there exist 0 ≤ Ai, Aj < 1 and Bi, Bj ∈ R, such that E (θ|xi) = Aixi + Bi and
E (θ|xj) = Ajxj +Bj. Then, by (A2), we have, for all k ≥ 1,
EkijEi (θ) = E
k
ij (Aixi +Bi)
= AiE
k−1
ij EiEj (xi) +Bi
= AiE
k−1
ij Ei (E (xi) + E (θ|xj)− E (θ)) +Bi
= AiE
k
ij (θ) + [AiE (xi)− AiE (θ) +Bi]
Let AiE (xi) − AiE (θ) + Bi = B′i, then EkijEi (θ) = AiEkij (θ) + B′i. Similarly, all k ≥ 1,
Ekij (θ) = AjE
k−1
ij Ei (θ) + B
′
j, where B
′
j = AjE (xj) − AjE (θ) + Bj. Therefore, σ∗i (xi) is
linear in xi. Since 0 ≤ Ai, Aj < 1, our assumption that |α| < 1 implies that the sum (A.3)
must converge. Thus, a unique equilibrium exists and is linear. Finally, by (A1), Ai, Aj ≥ 0
and βi, βj ≥ 0, if α ≥ 0, σ∗i (xi) must be increasing in xi.
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Proof of Proposition 1.4. Part (1), as noted in the text, we only need to show that
Cov (xi, xj) ≥ 0.
By (A1), there exists Ai ≥ 0 and Bi ∈ R such that
E (θ|xi) = Aixi +Bi. (A.4)
Applying the law of iterated expectations to (A.4), we have E (θ) = AiE (xi) + Bi. (A2)
implies that
E (xj|xi)− E (xj) = E (θ|xi)− E (θ) = Ai (xi − E (xi)) .
Thus, Cov (xi, xj) = E ((xi − E (xi)) (E (xj|xi)− E (xj))) = AiE
(
(xi − E (xi))2
) ≥ 0.
Part (2.a), consider the information structure
(
F i, φ
)
, by Lemma 1.1, σ∗j = aj. The first
order condition of the player i becomes
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
= αaj + βiE (θ|xi) .
By (A1), σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
must be increasing. By Lemma 1.4, σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
and σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
are linear. By assumptions, α ≤ 0 and σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
is decreasing. By the proof of part (1),
Cov (xi, xj) ≥ 0, thus 2αCov
(
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
, σ∗j
(
xj;F
)) ≥ 0 and the claim follows from
Lemma 1.3 and Proposition 1.3. Similarly, part (2.b) follows from the proof of part (1) and
an application of Lemma 1.3 and Proposition 1.3.
Proof of Lemma 1.5. Given any strategy profile σ, consider the best response mapping B
which takes strategy profile σ and returns the best response strategy profile B (σ), where,
for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the i-component of the best response mapping, Bi (σ) is player i’s best
response to player j’s strategy σj. We have
Bi (σ) (xi) = αE(σj|xi) + βiE (θ|xi) .
By (M1), given any bounded strategy profile σ, Bi (σ) is bounded and well-defined. By
(M2) and (M3), B (σ) is also continuous. Thus, it is without loss of generality to focus on
the space of bounded continuous functions from X to A, which we denote by S. Consider the
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metric space (S, d), where d is the metric associated with the p-norm. (S, d) is a complete
metric space. Since, by assumption, |α| < 1, for all σ, σ′ ∈ S,
d (B (σ) ,B (σ′))
= ‖B (σ)−B (σ′)‖p
= sup
(x1,x2)∈X1×X2
{
(α [E(σ2 − σ′2|x1)])p + (α [E(σ1 − σ′1|x2)])p
} 1
p
< sup
(x1,x2)∈X1×X2
{
[E(σ2 − σ′2|x1)]p + [E(σ1 − σ′1|x2)]p
} 1
p
≤
{
sup
x2∈X2
[σ2 (x2)− σ′2 (x2)]p + sup
x1∈X1
[σ1 (x1)− σ′1 (x1)]p
} 1
p
= sup
(x1,x2)∈X1×X2
{
[σ2 (x2)− σ′2 (x2)]p + [σ1 (x1)− σ′1 (x1)]p
} 1
p
= d (σ, σ′) .
Thus, B is a contraction. By the contraction mapping theorem, e.g. Theorem 3.2 in Stokey,
Lucas, and Prescott (1989), B has a unique fixed point.
Finally, suppose α ≥ 0, (M2) and (M3) imply that given any increasing strategy profile
σ, B (σ) is also increasing. Thus, the fixed point of B must also be increasing.
Proof of Proposition 1.5. Part (1 ), by Lemma 1.5, if α ≥ 0, the equilibrium strategies
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
and σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
are increasing. Since Xi is convex, Lemma 1.1 and continu-
ity imply that there must be an xˆi ∈ Xi such that∫
Xj
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
dF (xj|xˆi) = aj.
Since σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
is an increasing function of xj and the family F (·|xi) is ordered by first
order stochastic dominance, we must have∫
Xj
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
dF (xj|xi) ≥ aj, if xi > xˆi,
and ∫
Xj
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
dF (xj|xi) ≤ aj, if xi < xˆi.
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Thus,
Cov
(
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
, σ∗j
(
xj;F
))
=
∫
xi≤xˆi
(
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)− ai)(∫
Xj
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
dF (xj|xi)− aj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
dF (xi)
+
∫
xi>xˆi
(
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)− ai)(∫
Xj
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
dF (xj|xi)− aj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
dF (xi)
≥ (σ∗i (xˆi;F i, φ)− ai) ∫
Xi
(∫
Xj
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
dF (xj|xi)− aj
)
dF (xi)
=
(
σ∗i
(
xˆi;F i, φ
)− ai) (E [σ∗j (xj;F)]− aj)
= 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
is increasing in xi and the last
equality follows from Lemma 1.1.
Part (2.a), consider the information structure
(
F i, φ
)
, by Lemma 1.1, σ∗j = aj. The first
order condition of the player i becomes
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
= αaj + βiE (θ|xi) .
By (M2), σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
must be increasing. Part (2.a) will follow from an application of
Lemma 1.3 and Proposition 1.2 if
Cov
(
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
, σ∗j
(
xj;F
)) ≤ 0.
Since Xi is convex, Lemma 1.1 and continuity imply that there must be an xˆi ∈ Xi such
that ∫
Xj
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
dF (xj|xˆi) = aj.
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Since σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
is by assumption a decreasing function of xj and the family F (·|xi) is ordered
by first order stochastic dominance, we must have
Cov
(
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
, σ∗j
(
xj;F
))
=
∫
xi≤xˆi
(
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)− ai)(∫
Xj
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
dF (xj|xi)− aj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
dF (xi)
+
∫
xi>xˆi
(
σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)− ai)(∫
Xj
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
dF (xj|xi)− aj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
dF (xi)
≤ (σ∗i (xˆi;F i, φ)− ai) ∫
Xi
(∫
Xj
σ∗j
(
xj;F
)
dF (xj|xi)− aj
)
dF (xi)
=
(
σ∗i
(
xˆi;F i, φ
)− ai) (E [σ∗j (xj;F)]− aj)
= 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
is increasing in xi and the last
equality follows from Lemma 1.1.
Part (2.b) follows from the fact that
Cov
(
σ∗i
(
xi;F
)
, σ∗j
(
xj;F
)) ≥ 0,
the proof of which follows from replacing σ∗i
(
xi;F i, φ
)
with σ∗i
(
xi;F
)
in the proof of part
(1 ), and an application of Lemma 1.3 and Proposition 1.3.
Proof of Lemma 1.6. Given the cut-off strategies τi as a function of i, then, by (MG2) and
(MG3), for all θ′ > θ,
p (θ′) =
∫ 1
0
Pr (xi ≥ τi|θ′) di
≥
∫ 1
0
Pr (xi ≥ τi|θ) di
= p (θ) .
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Proof of Lemma 1.7. Suppose each investor j 6= i is using a cut-off strategy, we need to show
that player i’s best response is uniquely given by a cut-off strategy, so that one can restrict
the strategy space to the set of cut-off strategies to prove the existence of an equilibrium in
cut-off strategies. Given any xi, investor i’s expected payoff of investment is
(1− Ti) Pr (p (θ) > 1− θ|xi)− [1− Pr (p (θ) > 1− θ|xi)]Ti = Pr (p (θ) > 1− θ|xi)− Ti,
and the expected payoff of no investment is 0. Thus, our claim follows if Pr (p (θ) > 1− θ|xi)
is a strictly increasing function of xi. By Lemma 1.6, there exists a θ ∈ [0, 1] such that
p (θ) ≶ 1−θ if and only if θ ≶ θ. Thus, by (MG4), Pr (p (θ) > 1− θ|xi) is strictly increasing
in xi. As a result, each investor i can be thought of as choosing a cut-off τi to maximize his
payoff. Suppose τi is in the interior of Xi, τi is uniquely pinned down by
Pr
(
θ > θ|τi
)
= Ti. (A.5)
Differentiating (A.5), we have
dτi
di
=
dTi
di
∂ Pr(θ>θ|xi)
∂xi
|xi=τi
.
By (MG4), the derivative dτi
di
is uniformly bounded. Thus, the set of all best response cut-off
functions is equicontinuous and thus compact.1 An application of Glicksberg’s fixed point
theorem implies that an equilibrium exists.
Proof of Lemma 1.8. Suppose no investment is an optimal default action in the marginal
problem, then ∫
Θ
[
1{θ>θ′′} − 1{θ>θ′}
]
dF (θ)
=
[
1− F
(
θ
′′)]− [1− F (θ′)]
= F
(
θ
′)− F (θ′′) ≤ 0,
which is equivalent to θ
′′ ≥ θ′. Similarly, investment is an optimal default action if and only
if θ
′′ ≥ θ′.
1Each element in this set is a function from the index set [0, 1] to Xi.
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Proof of Lemma 1.9. Suppose y∗n = 1, then the DM’s first order condition implies that
(1− p2)
∫ 1
0
∂uDM (1, θ)
∂y
f (θ) dθ ≥ 0,
which is impossible since ∂u
DM (1,θ)
∂y
< 0 for all θ < 1. Similarly, suppose y∗n = 0, then the
DM’s first order condition implies that
(1− p1)
∫ 1
0
∂uDM (0, θ)
∂y
f (θ) dθ ≤ 0,
which is impossible since ∂u
DM (0,θ)
∂y
> 0 for all θ > 0. Thus, y∗n ∈ (0, 1) and satisfies
0 = p1 (1− p2)
∫ y∗n
0
∂uDM (y∗n, θ)
∂y
f (θ) dθ + p2 (1− p1)
∫ 1
y∗n
∂uDM (y∗n, θ)
∂y
f (θ) dθ
+ (1− p1) (1− p2)
∫ 1
0
∂uDM (y∗n, θ)
∂y
f (θ) dθ.
Suppose y∗n ≤ y∗o, then
0 = p1 (1− p2)
∫ y∗n
0
∂uDM (y∗n, θ)
∂y
f (θ) dθ + p2 (1− p1)
∫ 1
y∗n
∂uDM (y∗n, θ)
∂y
f (θ) dθ
+ (1− p1) (1− p2)
∫ 1
0
∂uDM (y∗n, θ)
∂y
f (θ) dθ
> (1− p2)
(
p1
∫ y∗n
0
∂uDM (y∗n, θ)
∂y
f (θ) dθ + (1− p1)
∫ 1
0
∂uDM (y∗n, θ)
∂y
f (θ) dθ
)
≥ (1− p2)
(
p1
∫ y∗o
0
∂uDM (y∗o, θ)
∂y
f (θ) dθ + (1− p1)
∫ 1
0
∂uDM (y∗o, θ)
∂y
f (θ) dθ
)
,
where the first inequality follows from the facts that y∗n < 1 and
∂uDM (y∗n,θ)
∂y
> 0 for all θ > y∗n
and the second inequality from the fact that the term inside the bracket is strictly decreasing
in the null action y. Thus, the DM’s first order condition in the original game implies that
y∗o = 0. But this is impossible since 0 < y
∗
n ≤ y∗o. Therefore, we must have y∗o < y∗n < 1.
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Proof of Proposition 1.7. In the original equilibrium, expert 2 has no information and the
DM’s null action is y∗o. Expert 1’s payoff given the quadruple (m1, x1, x2, θ) in the original
problem is given by
u˜1 (x1, x1, x2, θ) =
 u1 (θ, θ) if x1 = θ,u1 (y∗o, θ) if x1 = ϕ, (A.6)
u˜1 (ϕ, x1, x2, θ) = u1 (y
∗
o, θ) ,
In the new equilibrium, expert 2 has information and the DM’s null action is y∗n. Expert 1’s
payoff given the quadruple (m1, x1, x2, θ) in the new problem is given by
w˜1 (x1, x1, x2, θ) =

u1 (θ, θ) if x1 = θ, or
x1 = ϕ, x2 = θ and θ ≤ y∗n,
u1 (y
∗
n, θ) if x1 = ϕ, x2 = θ and θ > y
∗
n, or
x1 = x2 = ϕ.
and
w˜1 (ϕ, x1, x2, θ) =
 u1 (θ, θ) if x2 = θ and θ ≤ y∗n,u1 (y∗n, θ) if x2 = θ and θ > y∗n, or x2 = ϕ,
as expert 2 only sends message x2 when x2 ≤ y∗n in equilibrium. The marginal problem is
thus
v˜1 (x1, x1, x2, θ) =

0 if x1 = θ,
u1 (θ, θ)− u1 (y∗o, θ) if x1 = ϕ, x2 = θ and θ ≤ y∗n,
u1 (y
∗
n, θ)− u1 (y∗o, θ) if x1 = ϕ, x2 = θ and θ > y∗n, or
x1 = x2 = ϕ.
and
v˜1 (ϕ, x1, x2, θ) =
 u1 (θ, θ)− u1 (y∗o, θ) if x2 = θ and θ ≤ y∗n,u1 (y∗n, θ)− u1 (y∗o, θ) if x2 = θ and θ > y∗n, or x2 = ϕ.
Given null information, expert 1 can only send m1 = ϕ, therefore, expert 1’s default action
is identical in all three problems. Applying expert 1’s optimal decision rule for the new
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problem to the marginal problem and comparing the payoff to that obtained by using the
default action m1 = ϕ, we have
E [∆v̂1 (x1, x2, θ)]
= E
[
v˜1 (x1, x1, x2, θ) 1{x1≥y∗n} + v˜1 (ϕ, x1, x2, θ) 1{x1<y∗n,x1=ϕ} − v˜1 (ϕ, x1, x2, θ)
]
= −p1
∫ 1
y∗n
{u1 (y∗n, θ)− u1 (y∗o, θ)} f (θ) dθ
< 0.
Proof for Footnote 13. It is not difficult to show that y∗o = y
∗
n = y
∗. The original problem
is the same as in the proof of Proposition 1.7. i.e.,
u˜1 (x1, x1, x2, θ) =
 u1 (θ, θ) if x1 = θ,u1 (y∗o, θ) if x1 = ϕ,
u˜1 (ϕ, x1, x2, θ) = u1 (y
∗
o, θ) ,
With a non-strategic expert 2, in the new problem, expert 1’s payoff given the quadruple
(m1, x1, x2, θ) is given by
w˜1 (x1, x1, x2, θ) =
 u1 (θ, θ) if x1 = θ or x2 = θ,u1 (y∗n, θ) if x1 = x2 = ϕ,
and
w˜1 (ϕ, x1, x2, θ) =
 u1 (θ, θ) if x2 = θ,u1 (y∗n, θ) if x2 = ϕ.
In the marginal problem, expert 1’s payoff given the quadruple (m1, x1, x2, θ) is given by
v˜1 (x1, x1, x2, θ) =

0 if x1 = θ,
u1 (θ, θ)− u1 (y∗o, θ) if x1 = ϕ, and x2 = θ,
u1 (y
∗
n, θ)− u1 (y∗o, θ) if x1 = x2 = ϕ,
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and
v˜1 (ϕ, x1, x2, θ) =
 u1 (θ, θ)− u1 (y∗o, θ) if x2 = θ,u1 (y∗n, θ)− u1 (y∗o, θ) if x2 = ϕ.
Without any information, expert 1 can only send m1 = ϕ. Therefore, expert 1’s default
action is identical in all three problems. Applying expert 1’s optimal decision rule for the
new problem to the marginal problem and comparing the payoff to that obtained by using
the default action m1 = ϕ, we have
E [∆v̂1 (x1, x2, θ)]
= E
[
v˜1 (x1, x1, x2, θ) 1{x1≥y∗n} + v˜1 (ϕ, x1, x2, θ) 1{x1<y∗n,x1=ϕ} − v˜1 (ϕ, x1, x2, θ)
]
= −p1
∫ 1
y∗n
[(1− p2)u1 (y∗n, θ) + p2u1 (θ, θ)− u1 (y∗o, θ)] f (θ) dθ
= −p1p2
∫ 1
y∗
(u1 (θ, θ)− u1 (y∗, θ)) f (θ) dθ
< 0.
Thus, the marginal problem is not similar to the new problem. Applying Proposition 1.3,
we obtain the desired conclusion.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Suppose the DM take the action y∗ = y∗ (φ) in an equilibrium of
the auxiliary game Γ (p). As uE (·, θ) is strictly increasing, the “nondisclosure” set is simply
N (y∗) = {θ ∈ Θ : θ ≤ y∗}.
The belief of the DM must be given by
µ∗ (θ|p,m) =

1{θ≥θ′} (θ) if m = θ′
p
∫ min{θ,y∗}
0
f(θ′)dθ′+(1−p)
∫ θ
0
f(θ′)dθ′
p
∫ y∗
0
f(θ′)dθ′+(1−p)
if m = φ
, (B.1)
where 1{θ≥θ′} (θ) denotes the indicator function for the set {θ ≥ θ′}. Optimality of the action
y∗ implies that
y∗ = arg max
y∈[0,1]
{
p
∫ y∗
0
uDM (y, θ) f (θ) dθ + (1− p)
∫ 1
0
uDM (y, θ) f (θ) dθ
}
.
The first-order condition is
p
∫ y∗
0
uDM1 (y
∗, θ) f (θ) dθ + (1− p)
∫ 1
0
uDM1 (y
∗, θ) f (θ) dθ = 0.
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By assumption, uDM11 (·, θ) < 0. The objective function is strictly concave so that the first
order condition is both necessary and sufficient for optimality. To show that an equilibrium
always exists and is unique, define the function
H (y, p) = p
∫ y
0
uDM1 (y, θ) f (θ) dθ + (1− p)
∫ 1
0
uDM1 (y, θ) f (θ) dθ.
The equilibrium condition is thus
H (y∗, p) = 0. (B.2)
As uDM (·, θ) is strictly concave and maximized at θ, we have, for all p ∈ [0, p],
H (0, p) = (1− p)
∫ 1
0
uDM1 (0, θ) f (θ) dθ > 0,
H (1, p) =
∫ 1
0
uDM1 (1, θ) f (θ) dθ < 0.
Moreover,
H1 (y, p) = p
∫ y
0
u11 (y, θ) f (θ) dθ + (1− p)
∫ 1
0
u11 (y, θ) f (θ) dθ < 0.
Therefore, for each p ∈ [0, p], there is an unique y∗ (p) that solves (B.2).
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Let µ∗O (θ|p,m) = µ∗ (θ|p,m), where µ∗ (θ|p,m) is defined in (B.1).
By Proposition 2.1, Conditions 2-4 of Definition 2.1 are uniquely satisfied. [0, p] is a compact
set and the objective function is continuous. Therefore, (2.4) has a solution. An equilibrium
as specified exists. The “only if” part follows the sufficiency of the characterization of
Proposition 2.1.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3. Let
µ∗C(p, θ|m) =
 0 if p < p∗Cµ∗ (θ|p∗C ,m) if p ≥ p∗C ,
where µ∗ (θ|p,m) is defined in (B.1). By Proposition 2.2, Conditions 2-4 of Definition 2.2
are uniquely satisfied. Continuity of the function UE1 (p,y
∗ (p)) and the Inada conditions
imply that (2.7) must have a solution. An equilibrium as specified exists. The “only if” part
follows the sufficiency of the characterization of Proposition 2.1.
Lemma B.1. For all p ∈ [0, p], ∫ 1
y∗(p)
f (θ) dθ > 0.
Proof of Lemma B.1. Suppose by way of contradiction that for some p ∈ [0, p],∫ 1
y∗(p)
f (θ) dθ = 0.
Then, the condition (2.1) can be rewritten as∫ y∗(p)
0
uDM1 (y
∗ (p) , θ) f (θ) dθ = 0.
By assumption, for all θ < y∗ (p), uDM1 (y
∗ (p) , θ) < 0, it follows that∫ 1
0
f (θ) dθ = 0,
which is a contradiction.
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Proof of Proposition 2.4. Partial-differentiating (2.2) leads to
UDM1 (p,y
∗ (p)) =
∫ 1
y∗(p)
{
uDM (θ, θ)− uDM (y∗ (p) , θ)} f (θ) dθ
and
UDM2 (p,y
∗ (p)) = p
∫ y∗(p)
0
uDM1 (y
∗ (p) , θ) f (θ) dθ + (1− p)
∫ 1
0
uDM1 (y
∗ (p) , θ) f (θ) dθ.
Because uDM (θ, θ) > uDM (y∗ (p) , θ) for all θ > y∗ (p), (2.8) implies that the first equation
is strictly positive. The second equation is equal to zero due to (2.1). Therefore,
dUDM (p,y∗)
dp
= UDM1 (p,y
∗) > 0.
Proof for Example 2.1. Suppose that the DM’s payoff function is quadratic and the expert’s
gain function is independent of θ, let uE (y) ≡ uE (y, θ). (2.11) becomes
y∗′ (p) =
∫ 1
y∗(p)
(y∗ (p)− θ) f (θ) dθ
p
∫ y∗(p)
0
f (θ) dθ + (1− p)
. (B.3)
Multiply (2.10) with (B.3) , we have
UE2 (p,y
∗ (p)) y∗′ (p) =
[∫ 1
y∗(p)
(y∗ (p)− θ) f (θ) dθ
]
uE′ (y∗ (p)) . (B.4)
(2.6), (2.9), and (B.4) lead to
dUE (p,y∗ (p))
dp
=
∫ 1
y∗(p)
{
uE (θ)− uE (y∗ (p))− uE′ (y∗ (p)) (θ − y∗ (p))} f (θ) dθ ≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the concavity of uE (·). (2.5) implies p∗
O
= 0. By
Theorem 2.1, all equilibria of the covert game involve positive equilibrium effort.
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Proof of Proposition 2.5. Suppose the DM take the action y∗ = y∗ (φ) in an equilibrium of
the auxiliary game Γ (p). The “nondisclosure” set is simply
N (y∗) = {θ ∈ [0, 1] : −b2 ≤ − (y∗ − θ − b)2}
= {θ ∈ [0, 1] : y∗ − 2b ≤ θ ≤ y∗}.
The belief of the DM must be given by
µ∗ (θ|p,m) =

1{θ≥θ′} (θ) if m = θ′
pmax

∫ min{θ,y∗}
max{y∗−2b,0}
f(θ′)dθ′,0
+(1−p)θ
pmin{y∗,2b}+(1−p) if m = φ
, (B.5)
where 1{θ≥θ′} (θ) denotes the indicator function. As the DM’s payoff function is quadratic,
y∗ must be given by
y∗ = E (θ|m = φ)
=
p
(∫ y∗
max{y∗−2b,0}
θdθ
)
+ 1−p
2
pmin {y∗, 2b}+ 1− p (B.6)
Solving (B.6), we have
y∗ (p) =

1
2
− 2b2
(
p
1−p
)
if p ≤ pˇ
√
1−p
1+
√
1−p if p > pˇ
.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Our proof of Theorem 2.2 mirrors closely the proof of Theorem 2.1.
To begin with, we prove two lemmas that would allow us to sign the default action effect.
Lemma B.2. For all p ∈ [0, p],
UE2 (p,y
∗ (p)) > 0.
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Proof of Lemma B.2.
UE2 (p,y
∗ (p))
= −2p
y∗(p)∫
max{y∗(p)−2b,0}
(y∗ (p)− θ − b) dθ − 2 (1− p)
∫ 1
0
(y∗ (p)− θ − b) dθ
= −2p
(
(y∗ (p)− b) min {y∗ (p) , 2b} − y
∗2 (p)
2
+
max {y∗ (p)− 2b, 0}2
2
)
−2 (1− p)
(
y∗ (p)− b− 1
2
)
If y∗ (p) < 2b, we have
UE2 (p,y
∗ (p)) = −py∗ (p) (y∗ (p)− 2b)− 2 (1− p)
(
y∗ (p)− b− 1
2
)
.
If y∗ (p) ≥ 2b, we have
UE2 (p,y
∗ (p)) = −2 (1− p)
(
y∗ (p)− b− 1
2
)
.
In either case,
UE2 (p,y
∗ (p)) > 0,
as y∗ (p) ≤ 1
2
.
Lemma B.3. For all p ∈ (0, p) \ {pˇ},
y∗′ (p) < 0.
Moreover, the left-hand limit y∗′ (pˇ−) and right-hand limit y∗′ (pˇ+) exist and
y∗′
(
pˇ−
)
< y∗′
(
pˇ+
)
< 0.
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Proof of Lemma B.3. Define
G (p,y∗ (p)) ≡ (pmin {y∗ (p) , 2b}+ (1− p)) y∗ (p)− p
 y
∗(p)∫
max{y∗(p)−2b,0}
θdθ
− 1− p
2
.
If p > pˇ, then, y∗ (p) < 2b, we have
G2 (p,y
∗ (p)) = py∗ (p) + (1− p) > 0.
If p < pˇ, then, y∗ (p) > 2b, we have
G2 (p,y
∗ (p)) = 1− p > 0.
Moreover,
G1 (p,y
∗ (p)) =
(
1
2
− y∗ (p)
)
+
min {y∗ (p) , 2b}y∗ (p)− y
∗(p)∫
max{y∗(p)−2b,0}
θdθ
 > 0.
By the implicit function theorem, we have
y∗′ (p) = −G1 (p,y
∗ (p))
G2 (p,y∗ (p))
> 0
for all p ∈ (0, p) \ {pˇ}. Moreover, y∗′ (pˇ−) < y∗′ (pˇ+) < 0.
Next, we have
UE1 (p,y
∗ (p)) =
∫
θ/∈N(y∗(p))
{
(y∗ (p)− (θ + b))2 − b2} dθ > 0, (B.7)
because |y∗ (p∗C)− (θ + b)| > |b| for all θ /∈ N (y∗ (p∗C)). It follows directly from (2.7) and
(B.7) that all equilibria of the covert game involve positive equilibrium effort. Next, suppose
by way of contradiction that there exists an equilibrium effort level p∗
O
of the overt game and
an equilibrium effort level p∗
C
of the covert game such that
p∗C ≤ p∗O .
There are two cases.
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1. Suppose p∗C = p
∗
O
, by (2.4), we must have
lim
p→p∗−O
dUE (p,y∗ (p))
dp
− c′ (p∗
O
) ≥ 0.
By Lemmas B.2 and B.3,
lim
p→p∗−O
UE2 (p,y
∗ (p)) y∗′ (p) < 0.
Therefore,
UE1
(
p∗
C
,y∗
(
p∗
C
))− c′ (p∗
C
)
> 0,
which implies p∗
C
is not an equilibrium effort level of the covert game. Contradiction.
2. Next, suppose p∗C < p
∗
O
, then by Lemma B.3, we have y∗ (p∗C) > y
∗ (p∗O). By the
definitions of p∗C and p
∗
O
, we must have
UE (p∗C ,y
∗ (p∗C))− c (p∗C) ≥ UE (p∗O,y∗ (p∗C))− c (p∗O) ,
and
UE (p∗O,y
∗ (p∗O))− c (p∗O) ≥ UE (p∗C ,y∗ (p∗C))− c (p∗C) ,
which imply
UE (p∗O,y
∗ (p∗O)) ≥ UE (p∗O,y∗ (p∗C)) .
On the other hand, by Lemma B.2, we must have y∗ (p∗C) ≤ y∗ (p∗O). Again, we have
reached a contradiction.
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Proof of Proposition 2.6. Suppose p ≤ pˇ, using (2.14), we have
UDM (p,y∗ (p))
= −p
∫
θ∈N(y∗(p))
(θ − y∗ (p))2 dθ − (1− p)
∫ 1
0
(θ − y∗ (p))2 dθ
= −p
[
(θ − y∗ (p))3
3
]y∗(p)
y∗(p)−2b
− (1− p)
[
(θ − y∗ (p))3
3
]1
0
= −1
3
(
1− p
4
+ 8pb3 + 12
(
p2
1− p
)
b4
)
.
Suppose p > pˇ, using (2.14), we have
UDM (p,y∗ (p))
= −p
∫
θ∈N(y∗(p))
(θ − y∗ (p))2 dθ − (1− p)
∫ 1
0
(θ − y∗ (p))2 dθ
= −p
[
(θ − y∗ (p))3
3
]y∗(p)
0
− (1− p)
[
(θ − y∗ (p))3
3
]1
0
= −1
3
1− p(
1 +
√
1− p)2
Total-differentiate, we have
dUDM (p,y∗ (p))
dp
=

−1
3
(
−1
4
+ 8b3 + 12
(
2p
1−p +
p2
(1−p)2
)
b4
)
if p < pˇ
1
3(1+
√
1−p)3
if p > pˇ
.
By solving the equation
−1
3
(
−1
4
+ 8b3 + 12
(
2p
1− p +
p2
(1− p)2
)
b4
)
= 0, (B.8)
we find that UDM (·,y∗ (·)) has a local maximum at pˆ ∈ (0, pˇ) given by
pˆ = 1− 4
√
3b2
√
12b2 + 4b+ 1
−24b3 + 4b2 + 2b+ 1 (B.9)
if and only if b < 1
8
. If b > 1
8
, (B.8) has no solution on [0, pˇ] and UDM (·,y∗ (·)) is strictly
increasing.
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Proof for Example 2.2. By (B.9), UDM (·,y∗ (·)) is maximized at pˆ = 1 −
√
17
85
. By (2.16), pˆ
is also the unique maximizer of UE (p,y∗ (p))− c (p). Therefore, pˆ is the unique equilibrium
effort level of the overt game. On the other hand, (B.7) implies that p∗
C
= p = 24
25
.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1. i) follows immediately from the definition of voting equilibrium under
uncertainty. To show ii), consider s ∈ {a, b}, if γBs = 1, party candidate A is an optimal
choice given signal s, we must have γAs = γ
S
s = 1. Similarly, if γ
A
s = 0, party candidate B is
an optimal choice given signal s, we have γSs = γ
B
s = 0. Finally, if
(
γAs , γ
B
s
)
= (1, 0), both
party candidates are maximal choices. Therefore, swing voters are free to use any strategy
γSs ∈ [0, 1]. In all cases, we have γAs ≥ γSs ≥ γBs . To show iii), suppose partisan A (B) votes
for party candidate A after receiving signal b. (If partisan A (B) votes for party candidate
B after receiving signal b, his strategy is trivially monotone in the signal.) Notice that party
candidate A is maximal (optimal) given signal a if and only if Ω ≥ Qap (Ω > Qap). Since
Qbp > Q
a
p (Q
b
p > Q
a
p), if partisan A (B) votes for party candidate A after receiving signal b,
he must vote for party candidate A after receiving signal a.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Proof in text.
Lemma C.1. Regardless of the expected number of voters n, if condition (3.13) is satisfied,
Ω = 1.
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Proof of Lemma C.1. If φA = τA, Pr[T | α] = Pr[T | β], Pr[T−1 | α] = Pr[T−1 | β], and
Pr[T+1 | α] = Pr[T+1 | β]. So
Ω =
2 Pr[T | α] + Pr[T−1 | α] + Pr[T+1 | α]
2 Pr[T | β] + Pr[T−1 | β] + Pr[T+1 | β] = 1.
If φA = τB, then,
Pr[T | α] =
∞∑
k=0
e−n
φkA
k!
φkB
k!
=
∞∑
k=0
e−n
τ kA
k!
τ kB
k!
= Pr[T | β],
Moreover,
Pr[T−1 | α] = e−n
∞∑
k=1
φk−1A
(k − 1)!
φkB
k!
= e−n
∞∑
k=1
τ k−1B
(k − 1)!
τ kA
k!
= Pr[T+1 | β],
and
Pr[T+1 | α] = e−n
∞∑
k=1
φkA
k!
φk−1B
(k − 1)! = e
−n
∞∑
k=1
τ kB
k!
τ k−1A
(k − 1)!
= Pr[T−1 | β].
Therefore,
Ω = 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Consider a fully informative voting profile ((1, 0) , (1, 0) , (1, 0)), we
have φA = τB = qn. By Lemma C.1, Ω = 1. Thus,
q > max
(
1− p, p)⇔ Qap < Ω < Qbp.
Therefore, a fully informative voting equilibrium exists if and only if q > max
(
1− p, p).
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Proof of Proposition 3.3. Consider an uninformative voting profile with every voter voting
for party candidate A, ((1, 1) , (1, 1) , (1, 1)), we have φA = τA = n. By Lemma C.1, Ω = 1.
Thus,
p > max(q, 1− q) = q ⇔ Ω > Qap & Ω > Qbp
Since q > 1
2
, an uninformative voting equilibrium with every voter voting for party candidate
A exists if and only if q < p.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Proof in text.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Consider a full partisan voting profile
(
(1, 1) , (γSa , γ
S
b ), (0, 0)
)
sat-
isfying γSa = γ
S
b or γ
S
a + γ
S
b = 1 +
λB−λA
λS
, notice that
γSa = γ
S
b
⇐⇒ nA + nS
[
qγSa + (1− q)γSb
]
= nA + nS
[
(1− q)γSa + qγSb
]
⇐⇒ φA = τA
Moreover,
γSa + γ
S
b = 1 +
λB−λA
λS
⇐⇒ nA + nS
[
qγSa + (1− q)γSb
]
= nB + nS
[
(1− q)(1− γSa ) + q(1− γSb )
]
⇐⇒ φA = τB
By Lemma C.1, Ω = 1. It constitutes a full partisan voting equilibrium if and only if
(1− p)q
p(1− q) ≤ 1 ≤
(1− p)(1− q)
pq
⇔ q ≤ min (p, 1− p) . (C.1)
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Proof in text.
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Proof of Lemma 3.2. Given any voting equilibrium under uncertainty, by Proposition 3.1, it
is one of the four types. If it is a fully informative voting equilibrium, we have φA = qn = τB.
By Lemma C.1, Ω = 1. If it is an uninformative voting equilibrium, we have φA = τA = n.
By Lemma C.1, Ω = 1.
Next, suppose the limit voting equilibrium is a partisan voting equilibrium, let νA =
φA
n
∈ [0, 1] and ωA = τAn ∈ [0, 1] denote the expected vote share of candidate A in states α
and β, respectively. Note that νA and ωA do not depend on the expected population size n.
Using the Bessel function approximation, we have
Ω ≈ Pr[T | α]
Pr[T | β]
[2 +
(
φA
φB
) 1
2
+
(
φA
φB
)− 1
2
]
[2 +
(
τA
τB
) 1
2
+
(
τA
τB
)− 1
2
]
=
e−n e
2
√
φAφB√
2pi·2√φAφB
e−n e
2
√
τAτB√
2pi·2√τAτB
[2 +
(
φA
φB
) 1
2
+
(
φA
φB
)− 1
2
]
[2 +
(
τA
τB
) 1
2
+
(
τA
τB
)− 1
2
]
=
(
e2n
)√νA(1−νA)−√ωA(1−ωA)( νA (1− νA)
ωA (1− ωA)
)− 1
4 [2 +
(
νA
1−νA
) 1
2
+
(
νA
1−νA
)− 1
2
]
[2 +
(
ωA
1−ωA
) 1
2
+
(
ωA
1−ωA
)− 1
2
]
= g(n, νA, ωA)f (νA, ωA) .
where
g(n, νA, ωA) =
(
e2n
)√νA(1−νA)−√ωA(1−ωA) ,
and
f (νA, ωA) =
(
νA (1− νA)
ωA (1− ωA)
)− 1
4 [2 +
(
νA
1−νA
) 1
2
+
(
νA
1−νA
)− 1
2
]
[2 +
(
ωA
1−ωA
) 1
2
+
(
ωA
1−ωA
)− 1
2
]
.
g(n, νA, ωA) is a function of the expected population size n, and vote shares of party candidate
A in two states, νA and ωA. νA and ωA depend only on the voting profile (γSa , γ
S
b ) and signal
precision q. f (νA, ωA) is a function of νA and ωA. In a partisan voting equilibrium, there is at
least a type of the partisans who will always vote for their party candidate when they receive
a signal favoring their party candidate. Since q ∈ (1
2
, 1
)
, this implies that νA, ωA ∈ (0, 1).
Given a particular partisan voting profile, f (νA, ωA) is a positive constant uniquely defined.
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Next, g(n, νA, ωA) increases exponentially in n, if
√
νA (1− νA) ≥
√
ωA (1− ωA). Oth-
erwise, it decreases exponentially in n. Therefore,
lim
n→∞
g(n, νA, ωA) =

∞ if νA (1− νA) > ωA (1− ωA)
1 if νA (1− νA) = ωA (1− ωA)
0 if νA (1− νA) < ωA (1− ωA)
.
By conditions (3.8), (3.11), and (3.12), there are positive and finite upper and lower bounds
for Ω. Therefore, in any limit voting equilibrium, we must have νA (1− νA) = ωA (1− ωA),
which implies g(n, νA, ωA) = 1. This also implies
νA = ωA or νA = 1− ωA,
which is equivalent to
φA = τA or φA = τB.
We can now use Lemma C.1 to conclude that Ω equals one exactly.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. By Lemma 3.2, in any limit voting equilibrium, Ω = 1. By condition
(3.11), a partial partisan limit voting equilibrium favoring party candidate A exists only if
(1− p)(1− q)
pq
< 1 and
(1− p)q
p(1− q) ≤ 1 ≤
(1− p)q
p(1− q) ,
which is equivalent to
1− p < q and p ≤ q ≤ p.
Moreover, by (3.12), a partial partisan limit voting equilibrium favoring party candidate B
exists only if
(1− p)(1− q)
pq
≤ 1 ≤ (1− p)(1− q)
pq
and 1 <
(1− p)q
p(1− q) ,
which is equivalent to
1− p ≤ q ≤ 1− p and p < q.
Notice that, by assumptions, q > 1
2
, p > 1
2
, so the condition that 1−p ≤ q is not required.
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Proof of Proposition 3.7. By Lemma 3.2, in any limit voting equilibrium, Ω = 1. Since
q ≤ min (p, 1− p)⇔ Qbp ≤ Ω ≤ Qap,
full partisan limit voting equilibrium can only occur when q ≤ min (p, 1− p). Moreover, by
Lemma 3.2, in any limit voting equilibrium, either φA = τA or φA = τB. Consider the full
partisan voting profile
(
(1, 1) , (γSa , γ
S
b ), (0, 0)
)
, we have
φA = τA
⇐⇒ nA + nS
[
qγSa + (1− q)γSb
]
= nA + nS
[
(1− q)γSa + qγSb
]
⇐⇒ γSa = γSb
and
φA = τB
⇐⇒ nA + nS
[
qγSa + (1− q)γSb
]
= nB + nS
[
(1− q)(1− γSa ) + q(1− γSb )
]
⇐⇒ γSa + γSb = 1 + λB−λAλS .
Thus, the set of all full partisan limit voting equilibria is given by (3.16).
Proof of Proposition 3.8. Suppose there exists a partial partisan limit voting equilibrium
favoring party candidate A, by Lemma 3.2, we only need to consider two cases. If φA = τA,
then
nA + nS [q + (1− q)γb] + nBq = nA + nS [(1− q) + qγb] + nB (1− q)
nS [1− γb] + nB = 0.
Since nS, nB > 0, γb < 1, we have reached a contradiction. If φA = n− τA, then
nA + nSγb = 0.
Again we have reached a contradiction. Therefore, there does exist a partial partisan voting
profile favoring party candidate A to support Ω = 1. Similarly, one can show that a partial
partisan limit voting equilibrium favoring party candidate B does not exist.
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Proof of Proposition 3.9. There are two cases.
1. q > max(p, 1 − p): In this case, the limit voting equilibrium is fully informative, thus,
√
φA −
√
φB =
√
n
(√
q −√(1− q)), √φB
φA
=
√
1−q
q
,
√
φAφB = n
√
q (1− q).
2. q ≤ min(p, 1 − p) and |λA − λB| < λS: In this case, there is a full partisan limit voting
equilibrium that satisfies γSa > γ
S
b and γa + γb = 1 +
λB−λA
λS
, so
√
φA −
√
φB
=
√
n
{√
λB + λS [(1− q)(1− γSa ) + q(1− γSb )]
−
√
λB + λS [(1− q)(1− γSb ) + q(1− γSa )]
}
Moreover,
√
φAφB = n
√
λB + λS [(1− q)(1− γSa ) + q(1− γSb )]
×
√
λB + λS [(1− q)(1− γSb ) + q(1− γSa )]
and √
φB
φA
=
√
λB + λS [(1− q)(1− γSb ) + q(1− γSa )]
λB + λS [(1− q)(1− γSa ) + q(1− γSb )]
.
In both cases, the exponential term in (3.17) dominates. As a result, Pr [B wins|α]→ 0.
A similar argument shows that Pr [A wins|β]→ 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Suppose the swing voters’ strategy (γSa , γ
S
b ) is justified by the prior
pS ∈
[
p, p
]
. Notice that for all p ∈ [p, p], Qbp > Qap. Thus, if γSb ∈ (0, 1], then Ω ≥ QbpS ,
QbpS > Q
a
pS
implies that γSa = 1.
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Proof of Proposition 3.10. Consider the set of full partisan limit voting equilibria identified
in (3.16), suppose γSa = γ
S
b , the requirements in Lemma 3.4 imply that γ
S
a = γ
S
b ∈ {0, 1}.
Suppose γSa + γ
S
b = 1 +
λB−λA
λS
, by Lemma 3.4, either γSa = 1 or γ
S
b = 0. Suppose γ
S
a = 1,
then γSb =
λB−λA
λS
. Since γSb ∈ [0, 1], we must have λB−λAλS ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose γSb = 0, then
γSa = 1 − λA−λBλS . Since γSa ∈ [0, 1], we must have
λA−λB
λS
∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the equilibria
identified in Proposition 3.10 are the only possible forms of justifiable full partisan limit
voting equilibria.
Next, we proceed to show that the equilibria identified in Proposition 3.10 are indeed
justifiable. Suppose γSa = γ
S
b = 0, the swing voters’ strategy can be justified by p = p. If
γSa = γ
S
b = 1, the swing voters’ strategy can be justified by p = p. Suppose γ
S
a = 1 and
γSb =
λB−λA
λS
, the swing voters’ strategy can be justified by p = q. Suppose γSa = 1 − λA−λBλS
and γSb = 0, the swing voters’ strategy can be justified by p = 1− q.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. It is easy to see that, for all p ∈ [p, p], for any q > 1
2
, we have
Vp(
1
2
, 1, 1)− Vp(q, 1, 1) = Vp(1
2
, 0, 0)− Vp(q, 0, 0) = c (q) > 0.
This is because, with the dominated strategies, (q, 1, 1) and (q, 0, 0), the information cost
c (q) is always paid, but the information is never utilized. It is thus better to not acquire the
information in the first place. Similarly, for all p ∈ [p, p], for any q > 1
2
, we have
Vp(
1
2
, 0, 1)− Vp(q, 0, 1)
=
(
q − 1
2
)
(p (Pr[pivA | α] + Pr[pivB | α]) + (1− p) (Pr[pivA | β] + Pr[pivB |β])) + c (q) .
Thus, for any q > 1
2
, the pure strategies (q, 1, 1), (q, 0, 0), and (q, 0, 1) are not maximal and
the only pure strategy with q > 1
2
that is not ruled out is (q, 1, 0).
Lemma C.2 (Vanishing Marginal Benefit of Information). In any sequence of voting equi-
libria with costly information under uncertainty, the derivative ∂vp(σ)
∂q
converges uniformly to
zero as n tends to infinity.
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Proof of Lemma C.2. To prove the lemma, we prove the stronger result that all the pivotal
probabilities, Pr[pivA | α], Pr[pivB | α], Pr[pivA | β], and Pr[pivB | β], converge uniformly
to zero as n→∞. The result follows because
∂vp(q, γa, γb)
∂q
= (γa − γb) {p (Pr[pivA | α] + Pr[pivB | α]) + (1− p) (Pr[pivA | β] + Pr[pivB |β])} .
Consider the pivotal probability
Pr[pivA | α] = e−n
∞∑
k=0
(nηA)
k
k!
(n (1− ηA))k
k!
+ e−n
∞∑
k=1
(nηA)
k−1
(k − 1)!
(n (1− ηA))k
k!
, (C.2)
where ηA ∈ [0, 1]. Let η˜nA be the maximizer of (C.2) given n. All the terms in the first
summation are maximized at ηA =
1
2
and each term in the second summation is maximized
at ηA =
k−1
2k−1 . Since all the terms are strictly concave, for each n, η˜
n
A ∈
(
0, 1
2
)
. Moreover, as n
increases, the latter terms in the second summation receive more “weights”, so η˜nA is strictly
increasing in n. Thus, limn→∞ η˜nA =
1
2
and limn→∞
√
φAφB = ∞, so by the approximation
formulas (3.3) and (3.4),
Pr[pivA | α] ≈ e
−(
√
φA−
√
φB)
2√
4pi
√
φAφB
[1 +
(
φA
φB
)− 1
2
].
Since limn→∞ φA > 0, the first term tends to zero as n increases while the second term in
the square bracket is bounded. Hence, along the sequence {η˜nA}n≥1,
lim
n→∞
Pr[pivA | α] = 0.
By definition, the sequence {η˜nA}n≥1 maximizes (C.2) for each n. The convergence of the
probability Pr[pivA | α] to zero for the sequence {η˜nA}n≥1 implies the convergence of the
probability Pr[pivA | α] to zero for all other sequences.
Similarly, we can show that
lim
n→∞
Pr[pivB | α] = lim
n→∞
Pr[pivA | β] = lim
n→∞
Pr[pivB | β] = 0.
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Proof of Lemma 3.6. To prove the lemma, we first identify the set of pure maximal strategies
in a given equilibrium for a given n. Then we show that the q-projection of this set converges
to the set
{
1
2
}
as n→∞. From Lemma 3.5, we know that a pure maximal strategy must be
of the form (q, 1, 0) if q > 0. Given that voting is fully informative, the maximizer q∗ ∈ [1
2
, 1
]
for each p ∈ [p, p] is pinned down by the first–order condition
c′ (q∗) = p (Pr[pivA | α] + Pr[pivB | α]) + (1− p) (Pr[pivA | β] + Pr[pivB |β]) .
Note that the optimal q∗ as a function of p satisfies
q∗′ (p)

> 0
= 0
< 0
if Ω > 1
if Ω = 1
if Ω < 1
Thus, the image of the mapping q∗ :
[
p, p
]→ R is given by
[
min
{
q∗
(
p
)
, q∗ (p)
}
,max
{
q∗
(
p
)
, q∗ (p)
}]
.
Because the function Vp(·, 1, 0) is strictly concave, any pure strategy of the form (q, 1, 0)
with q ∈ [1
2
,min{q∗ (p) , q∗ (p)}) is dominated by the strategy (min{q∗ (p) , q∗ (p)} , 1, 0).
Similarly, any pure strategy of the form (q, 1, 0) with q ∈ (max{q∗ (p) , q∗ (p)} , 1] is domi-
nated by the strategy
(
max
{
q∗
(
p
)
, q∗ (p)
}
, 1, 0
)
. By Lemma C.2, for all p ∈ [p, p], q∗ (p)
converges uniformly to 1
2
as n → ∞. Therefore, for any sequence of pure strategies played
in equilibrium with positive probability, q converges uniformly to 1
2
as n→∞.
Proof of Proposition 3.11. The proof consists of two parts. In the first part, we show that,
for n large enough, the strategy profiles identified in Proposition 3.11 are balanced and
justifiable equilibria. In the second part, we show that, for n large enough, any balanced and
justifiable voting equilibrium must be one of the equilibria identified in Proposition 3.11.
1. We consider balancedness and justifiability separately.
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a. Balancedness: Consider the strategy profile ((1
2
, 1, 1), (1
2
, 1, 1), (1
2
, 0, 0)), we have
φA = nA + nS = τA.
Similarly, consider the strategy profile ((1
2
, 1, 1), (1
2
, 0, 0), (1
2
, 0, 0)), we have
φA = nA = τA.
Suppose the swing voters use the strategies (1
2
, 1, 1) and (q∗, 1, 0) with probabilities
µA and 1− µA, respectively, then
φA = nA + nS [µA + (1− µA) q∗]
= nB + nS [(1− µA) q∗]
= τB.
Similarly, suppose the swing voters use the strategies (1
2
, 0, 0) and (q∗∗, 1, 0) with
probabilities µB and 1− µB, respectively, then
φA = nA + nS [(1− µB) q∗]
= nB + nS [µB + (1− µB) q∗]
= τB.
Thus, all the identified strategy profiles are balanced.
b. Justifiability: Given that the strategy profile is balanced, by Lemma C.1, Ω = 1.
Thus, we have, for all p ∈ [p, p],
∂vp(q, 1, 0)
∂q
= p (Pr[pivA | α] + Pr[pivB | α]) + (1− p) (Pr[pivA | β] + Pr[pivB |β])
= Pr[pivA | α] + Pr[pivB | α]
= 2e−n
∞∑
k=0
φkA
k!
φkB
k!
+ e−n
∞∑
k=1
φk−1A
(k − 1)!
φkB
k!
+ e−n
∞∑
k=1
φkA
k!
φk−1B
(k − 1)! .
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By (3.21) and Lemma C.2, there exists N such that for all n > N , 1
2
< q∗ <
min
(
p, 1− p). Fix n > N and consider the difference between the payoffs of the
strategies (1
2
, 1, 1) and (q∗, 1, 0). Given that Ω = 1, we have
Vp(
1
2
, 1, 1)− Vp (q∗, 1, 0) = (p− q∗) (Pr[pivA | α] + Pr[pivB | α]) + c (q∗) , (C.3)
which is positive if p = p. Moreover, as Ω = 1, when p = 1
2
, the symmetry between
the two states implies that
V 1
2
(
1
2
, 1, 1) = V 1
2
(
1
2
, 1, 0) < V 1
2
(q∗, 1, 0) .
Thus, (C.3) is negative if p = 1
2
. Since the difference (C.3) is continuous and strictly
increasing in p, for each n > N , there is a unique pnA ∈
(
1
2
, p
)
such that VpnA(
1
2
, 1, 1) =
VpnA (q
∗, 1, 0) and for each p ∈ (pnA, p], Vp(12 , 1, 1) > Vp (q∗, 1, 0). Moreover, since
pnA >
1
2
, for each p ∈ [pnA, p],
Vp(
1
2
, 1, 1) > Vp(
1
2
, 1, 0) = Vp(
1
2
, 0, 1) > Vp(
1
2
, 0, 0).
Using the same proof as in Lemma 3.5, we can show that all other pure strategies
are dominated by the strategy (q∗, 1, 0). Thus, the pure strategy (1
2
, 1, 1) is justified
by any prior p ∈ [pnA, p] and mixed strategy between (12 , 1, 1) and (q∗, 1, 0) is justified
by the prior pnA.
Similarly, there exists a pnB ∈
(
p, 1
2
)
such that the pure strategy (1
2
, 0, 0) is justified
by any prior p ∈ [p, pnB] and mixed strategy between (12 , 0, 0) and (q∗, 1, 0) is justified
by the prior pnB.
Finally, since the partisans stay with the status quo, justifiability implies that the
strategy profiles are indeed voting equilibria.
2. Consider any sequence of balanced and justifiable voting equilibria {(σnA, σnB, σnS)}n≥1,
we would like to show that for n large enough, (σnA, σ
n
B, σ
n
S) must be one of equilibria
identified in Proposition 3.11. Since (σnA, σ
n
B, σ
n
S) is a balanced voting equilibrium, by
Lemma C.1, Ω = 1. Moreover, the proof of Lemma 3.6 establish that there exists N such
that for all n > N , any pure strategy played with positive probability in equilibrium
must have q < min
(
p, 1− p). Fix such N .
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a. We would like to show that the partisans must not acquire any information and must
vote for their party candidates. Suppose partisans A play a pure strategy with q > 1
2
with positive probability. By Lemma 3.5, the strategy must be of the form (q, 1, 0).
However, q < p means that 1 > Qbp =
(1−p)q
p(1−q) , we have
Vp (q, 1, 0) < Vp (q, 1, 1) < Vp(
1
2
, 1, 1).
The last inequality follows from Vp
(
1
2
, 1, 1
) − Vp (q, 1, 1) = c (q) > 0. Thus, the
strategy (q, 1, 0) is not optimal. As a result, partisans A cannot use any pure strategy
with q > 1
2
. Moreover, p > q = 1
2
implies that 1 > Qbp, so
Vp
(
1
2
, 0, 0
)
< Vp
(
1
2
, 0, 1
)
= Vp
(
1
2
, 1, 0
)
< Vp
(
1
2
, 1, 1
)
.
Thus, partisans of A must use the pure strategy
(
1
2
, 1, 1
)
in equilibrium. Similarly,
partisans of B must use the pure strategy
(
1
2
, 0, 0
)
in equilibrium.
b. Next, we would like to show that the swing voters can only use the strategies iden-
tified in Proposition 3.11. Suppose the swing voters use a pure strategy with q > 1
2
with positive probability in equilibrium, as Ω = 1 in a balanced voting equilibrium,
we have
∂vp(q, 1, 0)
∂q
= p (Pr[pivA | α] + Pr[pivB | α]) + (1− p) (Pr[pivA | β] + Pr[pivB |β])
= Pr[pivA | α] + Pr[pivB | α],
which is independent of the prior p. Thus, given the voting strategy (1, 0), the
information acquisition level q∗∗ that solves
Pr[pivA | α] + Pr[pivB | α] = c′ (q) ,
maximizes the expected payoff under all p ∈ [p, p]. Thus, any strategy (q, 1, 0) with
q 6= q∗∗ is dominated by (q∗∗, 1, 0) and cannot be used with positive probability in
equilibrium. Notice, however, that q∗∗ depends on the equilibrium strategy profile
and is not determined at this point. However, in the following steps, we will show
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that the equilibrium strategy profile must be given by those in 2. of Proposition
3.11, forcing q∗∗ = q∗.
Next, since Vp(
1
2
, 0, 1) = Vp(
1
2
, 1, 0) and (1
2
, 1, 0) is dominated by (q∗, 1, 0), (1
2
, 0, 1) is
also dominated.
At this point, we have shown that the swing voters can only mix between (q∗∗, 1, 0),
(1
2
, 1, 1), and (1
2
, 0, 0). Next, we want to show that the swing voters cannot mix
between (1
2
, 1, 1) and (1
2
, 0, 0). Suppose the mixed strategy is justified by the prior
pS ∈
[
p, p
]
, then the optimality of the strategies given pS implies thatQ
a
pS
= QbpS = 1,
so pS =
1
2
. But then
V 1
2
(
1
2
, 1, 1) = V 1
2
(
1
2
, 0, 0) = V 1
2
(
1
2
, 1, 0) < V 1
2
(q∗∗, 1, 0).
Thus, mixing between (1
2
, 1, 1) and (1
2
, 0, 0) cannot be justified.
Next, suppose the swing voters mix between (1
2
, 1, 1) and (q∗∗, 1, 0) with probabilities
µ and 1−µ, respectively. A balanced voting equilibrium requires that either φA = τA
or φA = τB. Thus, suppose φA = τA, then
φA = τA
⇐⇒ nA + nS [µ+ (1− µ) q∗∗] = nA + nS [µ+ (1− µ) (1− q∗∗)]
⇐⇒ q∗∗ = 1− q∗∗,
which is impossible since q∗∗ > 1
2
. Suppose φA = τB, then
φA = τB
⇐⇒ nA + nS [µ+ (1− µ) q∗∗] = nB + nS [(1− µ) q∗∗]
⇐⇒ µ = λB−λA
λS
.
which is the probability µA identified in 2. of Proposition 3.11.
Finally, suppose the swing voters mix between (1
2
, 0, 0) and (q∗∗, 1, 0) with probabil-
ities µ and 1 − µ, respectively. A balanced voting equilibrium requires that either
φA = τA or φA = τB. Suppose φA = τA, then
φA = τA
⇐⇒ nA + nS (1− µ) q∗∗ = nA + nS (1− µ) (1− q∗∗)
⇐⇒ q∗∗ = 1− q∗∗
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which is impossible since q∗∗ > 1
2
. Suppose φA = τB, then
φA = τB
⇐⇒ nA + nS [(1− µ) q∗∗] = nB + nS [µ+ (1− µ) q∗∗]
⇐⇒ µ = λA−λB
λS
.
which is the probability µB identified in 2. of Proposition 3.11.
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